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ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at young children's attempts to express generality within specific
learning situations with the aid of carefully designed tools, and at how, given
appropriate means of expression, they are able to justify their generalisations. The
literature on representation and abstraction leads to a focus on construction of
meaning through pupils' concretising of mathematical objects by means of the
development of representations and interconnections between representations of
those objects.
The study involved eight pairs often and eleven year old children. I devised a series
of tasks centred on the creation of simple "function machines" expressed in the Logo
programming language. The children's work involved the construction and empirical
testing of these functions within a game-like situation. Part of the game involved
verbally justifying the validity of the Logo procedures to a partner and to the
Researcher. These activities provided a window onto children's construction of
meaning.
Analysis of the data revealed that within the specific learning situation designed for
the study: children were able to make formalised generalisations of mathematical
relationships, often webbed by "semi-generalisation"; the expressive powers of the
symbolism achieved a more functional role by the symbols' association with a history
of specific numerical examples; children constructed situated abstractions for the
justification of generality using "generic structuring" and "naturalised formalism" as
powerful forms of webbing; and the apparent "rift" between empirical and deductive
starting points for generalisation, justification and proving activities appeared less
clear than the literature suggests.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The expression of generality is a process which lies at the very heart of mathematics,
yet whilst this centrality of generalisation to mathematics is undisputed, there appear
to be many problems associated with children's ability to express that generality
within current school curricula. The United Kingdom National Curriculum promotes
an approach to generalisation which begins with pattern spotting through scrutiny of
number patterns expressed, for example, in spatial arrangements, and leads on to
generalisation of that pattern in words and eventually in simple algebra (see below).
Two important issues emerge from such an approach: the means of expression of
generality; and the extension of activities involving the generalisation of mathematical
relationships to those which incorporate justification and eventual proof of that
generalisation.
Looking first at problems in the expression of generality, the promotion of pattern
spotting activities as points of access to algebraic expression has resulted in problems
which differ from, but are as important as the problems which appear to result from
the introduction of algebra in less apparently "real" contexts. Where algebra is viewed
solely as an abstract language, the manipulation of whose symbols becomes the prime
concern of school algebra lessons, pupils fail to apportion meaning to the symbols
which they are manipulating; where, however, algebraic expressions are viewed as the
goal to be reached through pattern spotting and rule writing, pupils are unable to make
the necessaiy "cognitive leaps" towards this final goal unless they have at their
fingertips an algebraic language with which they can explore and identify structure and
express their findings. In other words, unless there is an interaction between the
manipulation of algebraic syntax and the use of generalismg and symbolising activities,
neither approach is sufficient in itself to develop pupils' ability to express generality.
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Turning now to the extension of generalising activities to embrace justification and
proof, school curricula - and, by extension, school texts - appear to place a constraint
on what might be thought of as a continuum which stretches from simple pattern
spotting through generalisation, empirical testing and justification to formal
mathematical proof Most generalisation activities are looked on as self contained,
and few look onward towards justification and proof of the generality.
The common theme which unites these two issues is the role of formalism: the use of
formalism to express generality in situations which may begin from an informal basis
and where formalism is used as an end result; and the use of formalism as a tool for
the justification of generality.
My over-riding concern in this thesis is to look at learning situations in which children
are able not only to generalise from the identification of mathematical patterns, but
also to justify these generalisations as part of one extended mathematical activity in
which algebraic formalism is used both to express generality and to structure
justification. I propose a computer programming environment as a possible situation
in which this may occur (for reasons I outline below). Thus the central research issue
of the thesis is to investigate how use of a carefully designed computer programming
environment structured children's expression of generality and the justfIcation of that
expression.
Having already mentioned the United Kingdom National Curriculum, it is useful to
look briefly at the messages it broadcasts. The National Curriculum has appeared in a
number of guises (DES 1989, DES 1991, DES 1995) and its contents have been
successively slimmed down under pressure from various bodies. The section which
refers to generalisation and proof (Attainment Target 1: Using and applying
mathematics) in the original curriculum (DES 1989) and in the first revision (DES
1991) most explicitly reflects the current approach to generalisation and proof in
16
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British schools':
Level I:
Level 2:
Level 3:
Level 4:
Level 5:
Level 6:
Level 7:
Level 8:
Level 9
Level 10:
making predictions based on experience
asking and responding to questions, e.g. "What would happen if
?",
investigating and testing predictions and general statements;
checking results, considering whether they are sensible
using examples to test solutions, statements or definitions;
making generalisations or simple hypotheses
generalising from a number of particular examples and carrying
out simple tests
making and testing generalisations and simple hypotheses;
defining and reasoning in simple contexts with some precision
following a chain of mathematical reasoning;
spotting inconsistencies
making statements of conjecture using "if... then";
defining, reasoning, proving and disproving, using counter-
examples;
construct an extended chain or argument using "if... then"
appropriately
stating whether a conjecture is true, false or not proven;
defining and reasoning; proving and disproving;
using symbolisation;
recognising and using necessary and sufficient conditions
giving definitions which are sufficient and minimal;
using symbolisation with confidence; constructing a proof,
including proof by contradiction
1 In the current (1995) version the levelling is reorganised but the progression of ideas remains largely
unaltered.
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To put this briefly into perspective, the "average" seven year-old is expected to reach
Level 2, the average eleven year-old Level 4 and the average sixteen year-old (on
sitting GCSE examinations and completing compulsory mathematics education) is
expected to reach around Level 6 or 7.
The emphasis here, at least until Level 7, is entirely on justification by means of
empirical methods and at Level 8 the examples given to illustrate the statement are of
the type "search for a counter example to demonstrate that this is not always true".
At Level 9 the illustrative example involves justifying the solution to a practical
problem:
When reporting on the best way to stock and transport pipes, explain
solutions in terms of costing, volume, surface area and stability.
Only at the final level is there reference to abstract concepts of proof One example
given is:
Followfrom a book Euclid's proof by contradiction that 	 is irrational,
write out a similar prooffor ,fi andfind why it breaks down for .J.
Pupils would not seem to be learning about justification and proof in their school
curricula. The focus on looking for patterns in either spatial, visual or numerical
examples and on attempting to generalise these patterns in natural and then algebraic
language rarely leads any further than these activities. The activity stops, "precisely
at the point where a central process of mathematics, namely justification and proof,
should begin" (Anderson 1995, p. 48).
Now, the overriding impression given by consideration of the UK National
Curriculum is one of the apparent importance of levels: the unstated assumption is
18
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that pupils must satisfy the requirements of one level before moving onto the next,
with the direct implications for teaching that this frame of mind implies. Use of
levels, and the location of pupils at some point within a hierarchy of levelled
activities, is not confined to school curricula. Much research has at its heart a model
involving levels of achievement or levels of abstraction. For example, Sfard 2 describes
three stages of abstraction (interiorization, condensation and reification); and
BalachefP describes a levelled model for defining types of proof (Naive Empiricism,
Crucial Experiment, Generic Example and Thought Experiment).
Figure 1.1: Model C - General Learning Principles represented as a cross-section of
layers, rather like geological strata ofrock types
Much useful research has resulted from an approach which emphasises the
importance of hierarchies, but is this always the most appropriate way of thinking
about how children build meanings or mathematical (and other) concepts? In talking
about the use of theoretical frameworks to describe learning, diSessa describes the
notion of G types, that is a version of constructivism which "relies on General,
powerful learning principles (like reflective abstraction) and does not pay much
attention to the specific schemata that form the naive interpretations out of which
reflection (to name one mechanism) builds more adequate ones" (diSessa 1994, p.
251). DiSessa's General Learning Principles might be represented as a cross-section of
2 See Chapter 2, § 2.3.2
See Chapter 3, § 3.2
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layers, rather like geological strata of rock types (Figure 1.1). Pupils move from one
level to the next: each level must be thoroughly assimilated before the next level is
entered.
However, an alternative view of the construction of knowledge "believes that the
naive state, as well as the expert state, needs thorough analysis, both in terms of the
Specific naive schemata that form the grist out of which better developed ideas evolve,
and also, naturally, in terms of the theoretical categories that describe this thinking"
(ibid p. 251). DiSessa terms this the S version. Using my model of a stratified cross-
section, specific naive schemata might appear as columns - S-columns - cutting
through the layers (Figure 1.2). The S-columns represent specific, situated knowledge
which may touch several layers of abstraction: they may cut through the entire body
of knowledge or they may touch on one or two layers.
Figure 1.2: Model S - SpecfIc Naive Schemata: situated "bore holes" are shown
cutting through the strata of ordered knowledge
Now, if generalisation, justification and proof were represented by such a multi-
layered block, the S-columns would then represent specific situated knowledge
containing elements from many layers of abstraction, such as generalisation, empirical
testing and formal deductive proof, combined within a single, narrowly-focused
20
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mathematical experience. A useful way of thinking about these S-columns might be as
bore holes, boring into the strata of knowledge. The challenge is to sink some of these
bore holes in carefully constructed situations and to investigate the relationships
thereby revealed.
The aims of the thesis, then, were to look at how children might construct meanings
for generality and justification, and more specifically:
i) to investigate ways in which children expressed generality using the
programming medium;
ii) to investigate connections between different expressions of generality
made in different modalities and their role in children's creation of
mathematical meaning;
iii) to investigate the role of connections between expressions of generality in
children's attempts to justify their constructed generalisations.
A programming environment was chosen, using the constructionist tenet that the
internal construction of meaning is best seen through the external construction of a
mathematical (or other) object, as providing a window onto children's expression of
generality and justification. This theme is developed in Chapter Two.
The study centred around pairs of children - all aged between nine and eleven -
working on tasks which involved modelling mathematical relationships, presented in
natural language, as mathematical functions on a computer using the programming
language Logo. A learning situation was constructed in which the two children in a
pair worked "competitively" on separate computers with the ultimate aim of
convincing each other of the validity of their procedures and justifying why one
procedure might work where the other might not. Programming with Logo was
chosen as providing an environment where pupils would be able to express
mathematical generality through the construction of procedures (a form of algebraic
21
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formalism), verify their procedures using specially created features of the medium,
and justify their own constructions using the programming language of construction.
The thesis is organised into eleven chapters. In Chapter Two I discuss the major
theoretical influences which have a bearing on the stance adopted in the thesis. Chief
amongst these are theories of representation and abstraction, a redefinition of what
constitutes concrete and abstract including the idea of concretion, the notion of
situated abstraction, and the place of microworids and convivial tools in opening
windows onto the construction of meaning.
The thesis is concerned with children expressing formal arguments. Justification and,
in a broadly-defined sense, proof of children's generalisations made on the basis of
their own mathematical experiences provided a situation in which children were able
to make such formal arguments. Thus in Chapter Three I review the Literature on
proof, focusing both on a dichotomised view of the teaching of proof which emerges
from much of the literature with an accompanying concentration on what children fail
to achieve, and on research which focuses on what children can achieve given
appropriate tools and carefully constructed learning situations.
In Chapter Four I describe the design of the learning situation used in the study, in
particular the computational medium, the mathematical activities and the relationship
between pupil and researcher, including an analysis of the important role adopted by
the researcher.
In Chapter Five I present the Research Methodology for the initial phases of the
study and trace their evolution and the evolution of the design of the learning situation
prior to the main study. In Chapter Six I develop some of the ideas on abstraction
discussed in Chapter Two in light of the initial phases of the study, defining the terms
expressions of meaning and connections. From here I move on to present a
methodology for the main study of the thesis and analyse some preliminary findings
22
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from the research data. These findings are used to frame the final research questions
and to create four categories in which I analyse the study data in Chapters Seven,
Eight, Nine and Ten.
Finally, in Chapter Eleven I draw conclusions and implications from the discussion in
the preceding four chapters, and identify areas for further research.
23
CHAPTER Two:
REPRESENTATION AND
ABSTRACTION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Whether one looks on the acquisition of knowledge as an orderly ascension through
pre-determined hierarchies - diSessa's G types described in Chapter One (diSessa
1994 p. 251), or as an altogether less easily categonsable process involving the
creation of connections within narrowly situated contexts (the S type model), a
central focus common to both these viewpoints is theories of representation and
abstraction, and it is to these two processes that I turn first.
In this chapter I look first at two broad interpretations of the term representation and
at how, evolving from these interpretations, come differing understandings of the role
of representations. From this I move on to a discussion of processes of abstraction,
introducing an important view of abstraction which reinterprets the nature of abstract
and concrete. A consideration of some of the problems associated with prevalent
theories surrounding the process of abstraction leads into an exploration of the idea of
scaffolding and webbing, looking at how pupils may be able to construct meaning
within these cognitive frameworks. Finally I look at how use of computer
programming may provide a window onto how pupils construct their own
representations.
24
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2.2 REPRESENTATION
2.2.1 Defining Representation
Use of the word representation encompasses such a breadth of meaning in the context
of mathematics education as to cloud that use in ambiguity. Most writers divide
definitions of representations into two broad groups depending on whether they are
discussing symbolic systems or the internal mental organisation of knowledge.
Janvier (1987c, p. 148), for example, makes this distinction when he uses the tenn
schematization or illustration to refer to "some material organisation of symbols
which refers to other entities or 'modelizes' various mental processes"; and the term
conception to describe mental images and the organisation of knowledge in the human
mental system. Concentration on the former type of representation, a viewpoint he
shares with Goldin (198Th) and Kaput (1987a), approaches representation from an
external aspect, attempting to produce external representations which model people's
mental representations of the world.
Another group of writers (such as von Glasersfeld 1987a, Mason 198Th) also
differentiate between what might be called mental representations and external
representations, although they prefer to approach problems of representation from
inside, attempting to "capture experience of the inner world by using metaphor and
descriptive frameworks that resonate with other people's experience" (Mason 1987 b,
p. 208).
I want now to look at what characterises these two interpretations and to consider
some of the ensuing implications.
25
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2.2.2 Representation Systems
Kaput, for example, sees representation as a structure of mappings between symbol
systems. Representation involves two "related but functionally separate entities", the
representing world and the represented world (Kaput 1987a, p. 23). The act of
representation implies some sot of correspondence between these two entities. He
defines a symbol scheme as a concretely realisable collection of characters together
with explicit rules for identifying and combining them; and a symbol system as the
system which contains a symbol scheme, a field of reference and a systematic rule of
correspondence. Mappings between symbol systems (translations) and within
symbol systems (transformations) become of paramount importance in demonstrating
understanding of a particular problem (see, for example, Lesh, Post and Behr 1987).
Kaput sees this ability as the key:
The students of the near future will be choosing how to represent given
relationships. This skill in choosing or building representations, together with
interpretative skills, will soon outstrip computational skills by a wide margin.
Kaput (op cit. p. 21)
But does it always make sense to talk about translating directly from one external
representation to another? There are at least three problems with such an approach.
Firstly, the nature of mappings between symbol systems. Symbols system theories
are developed with mathematical rigour (Kaput 198Th, Goldin 198Th) with the
correspondence between the "represented world" and the "representing world" as an
integral element of the structure. But in fact neither the mappings, nor indeed the
systems are as well-defined as might at first be thought:
Just as the signs and conjIgurations of a given representational system can be
ill-defined or only partially spec y'Ied, so can the correspondence between two
representational systems be fuzzy. A mapping in mathematics may permit one
system to represent another in a very precise way, as when an abstract
mathematical gro up is represented by linear operators in a vector space. On
the other hand, words in a purely verbal representational system can represent
26
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objects in a non-verbal representational system, yet the relationship may defy
precise specf1cation
(Goldin 198Th, p. 131)
Even mappings between two abstract mathematical representations can be 'fuzzy'.
For example Kaput (1987 b, p. 185) shows that extension of the standard base ten
place holder symbols system to include negative numbers immediately loses one-to-
one correspondence.
Secondly, there appears to be a danger in concentrating on how children translate from
one external representation to another of losing sight of children's own mental
representations and real world referents to which their mathematical ideas should be
firmly linked. Mason (1987 b, p. 214) draws an apt analogy with translating foreign
prose into English word for word. Such a translation may give a decipherable
translation of the meaning of each sentence, but it is unlikely to convey any feeling of
the overall style or general understanding of the passage as a whole. Unless
translations between representations are carried out with a close regard for the overall
mathematical context which the representations are modelling, they may become
merely a blind, routine exercise which does little to develop a child's understanding of
a particular concept.
Thirdly, to what extent do children learn about the concepts embedded in a variety of
representations when performing translations from one to another, or to what extent
are they merely learning something about the relationship between these
representations? Dufour-Janvier, Bednarz and Belanger find that the use of multiple
(external) representations results only in pupils putting representations into
correspondence one with another so that all that is constructed are "syntactical rules
of correspondence rather than constructing the concept itself via its representation"
(Dufour-Janvier, Bednarz and Belanger 1987, p. 113).
27
Chapter Two: Representation and Abstraction
There is a feeling in all this literature of merely skimming the surface with a neat,
precise, manageable (and therefore superficially attractive) theoretical structure, but of
one which never gets to the heart of the problem, one which appears to tell only haifa
story. The emphasis is on how children encounter and make sense of external
representations: there appears to be no room for children's creation of meaning
through their own experience or of how this creation is shaped by the context in which
they encounter the mathematics or the tools they have at their disposal. I want now
to look at another theory of representation which places emphasis on the internal
construction and reconstruction of knowledge.
2.2.3 Cognitive Structures and Mental
Representation
The form mental representations must take is dependent on the mariner in which
knowledge is acquired and processed by the child. If we accept a Constructivist
viewpoint which sees knowledge acquired through children's experience of the real
world, then that knowledge must be represented in a form that reflects the
fragmentary, ever-changing and developing way in which children gain their
experience. Lawler (1985) suggests that the world can only be experienced as a
collection of disparate microworlds4 and that correspondingly the mind is maLle up of
a system of disparate, active, cognitive structures, built up through interaction with
these microworlds, which he terms microviews. Microviews are task-rooted, that is
descriptions of actual things in the real world. Learning implies an understanding of
what unifies these otherwise diverse and fragmentary experiences.
' This term is used by Lawler in a manner distinct from that in which I shall use it later in this
chapter.
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Thus children build up knowledge not in a clearly defmed, ordered progression of
facts, but in a random, almost accidental manner, developing not so much a clear
picture of a concept, but rather a rough sketch which is refined and given more detail
as the child gains more experience. Minsky (1986 p. 245) uses the term frame to
identify these internal cognitive structures. He likens a frame to a "sort of skeleton,
somewhat like an application form with many blanks or slots to be filled". Since
mental representations (the structure and fill-able slots of a frame) are built on the
basis of an individual's past experience, and since no two people have an identical set
of experiences for any one concept, it follows that a mental representation is unique
to its owner. This is what von Glasersfeld (1987a, p. 6) terms subjectivity of
mean lAg.
Through their own experience, children will develop simple theories, however vague
and sketchy, to explain phenomena in real life. These theories may not be entirely
correct, but they can form a basis on which skilful teaching can build. DiSessa (1987,
p. 84) calls these phenomenological primitives (or p-prims). As the child's knowledge
increases, so the p-prims may cease to be primitive and some, it may transpire, will
be false. However, p-pnms can be used as elements of analysis which partially
explain more formal ideas.
Mental representations, then, may be viewed as dynamic, constantly developing and
unique interior structures which are constructed and re-constructed on the basis of our
own experience of the real 5 world. The emphasis on construction here is vital. In
fact, the word presentation is preferred to representation by some authors (see Mason
198Th, von Glasersfeld 198Th, Dreyfus 1991) since it refers to "a primary creation, to
an act of perceptual or imaginal construction, and there is no prior 'object' that serves
as onginalto be replicated or re-presented" (von Glasersfeld 198Th, p. 218).
But see Nemirovsky's point about real and unreal in § 2.3.2.
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So these two differing schools of thought place emphasis either on exploring pupils'
contact and ability to work with pre-determined external representations of a
mathematical idea, or on looking for ways to access the mental representations which
pupils themselves construct as they create their own meanings for some mathematical
concept.
2.3 ABSTRACTION
Closely related to the idea of representation is that of abstraction. This section looks
briefly at the role of abstraction in mathematics and outlines some examples from the
literature which suggest how concept formation may occur. Discussion of some
problems in these theories leads into the description of an important Vygotskian
theory and the application of ideas contained within this theory to mathematical
learning situations.
2.3.1 The Role of Abstraction
The verb to abstract means to draw away, and much of the power of mathematics lies
in its ability to draw away from the particular to express the general (see Mason
1989). People who, for one reason or another, do not like mathematics complain that
it is this abstraction that is the cause of their dislike. This may be due to their
mathematical experience commonly being confined to using mathematics in an
abstracted form (i.e. in an abstraction created by someone else) but never maldng
abstractions for themselves. This is particularly apparent in the mechanical use of
symbols in mathematics, an activity all too often treated as sufficient in itself. This
results in pupils rarely doing more than manipulating other people's symbols. Whilst
practice in the use of symbols is important, its relevance may be questioned if pupils
have no experience of symbolising for themselves (i.e. of expressing an idea
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symbolically in terms of their own mental representations). Since pupils rarely have
much experience of the process of abstraction and only of already abstracted ideas,
they are likely to view abstracted mathematical concepts as divorced from reality
rather than be aware of the process by which they have been drawn from the
particular to the general. Thus teaching methods which encourage developing
awareness of roots with "real" ideas need to be developed if pupils are to work
successfully with abstracted ideas in mathematics.
2.3.2 Processes of Abstraction
Abstraction has been described as a "delicate shift of attention from seeing an
expression as an expression of generality, to seeing the expression as an object or
property" (Mason 1989, p. 2). How this "delicate shift" comes about is discussed by
a number of authors. For example, Sfard (1991, p. 18) describes three stages in the
shift from "operational conceptions" (processes, algorithms and actions which are
dynamic and sequential) towards "structural conceptions" (abstract, static objects
which can be manipulated as a whole).
The problem with such theoretical models which encompass carefully defined stages
is that the world being modelled rarely fits neatly into the stages we defme. For
example, it is interesting to note that in the standard algebraic notation of a function
such as y = 3x4, the = sign can be interpreted as a command (operational) or as a
symbol of identity (structural). Furthermore an expression such as 6x is both
indication of a problem and the name for the answer. Here lies both a strength and a
weakness ofalgebraicsymbolism. (For discussions of the ambiguity between process
and product see, for example Davis 1975, Sfard and Linchevski 1994, and Gray and
Tall 1994.)
Sfard's model of abstraction is essentially recursive, so that the newly formed object
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itself becomes the focus of intenorization at a higher level 6. The cyclical nature of
concept formation is a feature of models suggested by Mason (1980) and Hiebert
(1988) and in fact all three models have much in common in that they highlight the
cormectedness between each successive layer of abstraction, which exists by virtue of
the final stage in each level providing the first stage at the next level. Three important
phases are common to each model:
i) manipulation of the referent: the referent (an object at the first level,
symbols at subsequent levels 7) is manipulated with growing confidence. A
widening, but inarticulate sense of some idea is developed
ii) creation of a new symbol: a symbolic record of the first stage is created.
Because the new symbol is created through manipulation of the referent, it too
is easily manipulated, but in ways which closely mirror the ways in which the
original referents were manipulated. Increasingly, the referent ceases to be
important, a broader view of the process is developed and the process gains
meaning at the symbolic leveL
iii) acceptance of the symbol as an object: the new symbol becomes an object
which can itself be manipulated and provide the referent for the next level of
abstraction.
An important feature of Mason's model is that at any point in the spiral process of
abstraction (as he represents it), pupils can "fold back" (Pine and Kieren 1989, p. 9)
to a level at which they feel more confident Essential to the understanding of these
models is the interpretation of the terms "object" and "symbol", an interpretation
which can only be made subjectively by the learner at any one point in the learning
process. In the simplest scenario, the referent changes from an object at the lowest
6 And of course the richness of mathematical symbolism mentioned is a good example of a
representation with a "history" at a different level of abstraction, which can serve to remind the pupil of
that other level and of the processes associated with that level.
But see the discussion of "Concrete" below.
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level of abstraction to a symbolic representation of that object at the next level of
abstraction and to further symbolic representations with each successive abstraction;
in fact the original referent may not be an object in the usual sense - in some areas of
mathematics the most "concrete" representation is itself symbolic. The veiy process
of abstraction dictates that at each successive level of abstraction the new symbol
becomes the object for the next abstraction.
Now, this structured model of abstraction fits neatly into the view of concept
formation as the execution of mappings between and within symbols systems
discussed earlier. However, if the alternative view is adopted, that concepts are built
up by means of the acquisition and assimilation of random snippets of information
and experience (what Levi-Strauss, 1963-76, calls a process of Bricolage), the model
of abstraction begins to appear over rigid and the use of the terms "abstract" and
"concrete" must be called into question, for if we accept von Glasersfeld's idea of the
subjectivity of meamng, then we must also accept that what is and is not "concrete"
or "abstract" must equally vaiy from one pupil to another and from one time and set
of experiences to another. Wilensky makes this very point:
Concreteness is that properly which measures the degree of our relatedness to
the object, (the richness of our representations, interactions, connections with
the object), how close we are to it, or, fyou will, the quality of our relationship
with the object.
(Wilensky 1993, p. 198)
If we accept such a definition, then it is no longer possible to refer to objects as being
either "concrete" or "abstract", only concrete (or abstract) to a particular person
within a particular situation. And despite the similarities with the model of
abstraction described above, this definition (which I shall refer to as the Subjectivity of
Concreteness) carries with it further important implications. For example, it
questions the hierarchic nature of abstraction (as exemplified in models such as the
ones outlined above). From Wilensky's definition, any objects may be described as
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being concrete for a particular person if they have "multiple modes of engagement
with them and a sufficiently rich collection of models to represent them" (ibid, p.
198). This does not limit them to occupying a position within some externally
imposed hierarchy with concrete objects "beneath" and abstract objects "above". This
theme is developed in Chapter Six8
Noss and Hoyles see the process of abstraction not as an ascension away from
meaning but as a process of creation, producing new collections of meaning: "Meaning
can be maintained by involvement in the process of acting and abstracting, building
new connections whilst consolidating old ones (Noss and Hoyles 1996, p. 49)."
Subjectivity of Concreteness also brings us back to the issue of connections between
representations:
The more connections we make between an object and other objects, the more
concrete it becomes for us. The richer the set of representations of the object,
the more ways we have of interacting with it, the more concrete it is for us.
(Wilensky op cit, p. 198)
Thus an important element in pupils' construction of meaning is a process of
abstraction which has at its heart the building of connections between children's
mental representations of an object.
Also called into question is what constitutes "real" and "unreal" situations for
mathematical activity. Nemirovsky makes the point that it is necessary to free
ourselves from such stereotypes: "often problems are characterised as being
decontextualised because they are just about numbers (as opposed to quantities or
measures of specific things), as if all the rich background of ideas and experiences that
students develop around numbers could not offer a context" (Nemirovsky 1996 b, p.
' SeeChapterSix § 6.2.
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313). This idea resonates closely with Wilensky's subjective definition of concrete.
In the same way that what is concrete for one person may be abstract for another, so
what for one person is a "real" problem may be equally "unreal" for another.
What these models of abstraction and concept formation and Wilensky's definition of
the concrete have in common is a view of representation centred on the learner
referents are subjective entities, as is the definition of concrete proposed by
Wilensky, and any abstraction that takes place on a concept, changes that concept in a
way that is unique to the learner and not necessarily shared by other students - in the
same way that concepts are uniquely concrete or abstract depending on where one
happens to be standing.
2.3.3 Some Difficulties in Abstraction Theory
There are, however, further problems in the idealised models of the abstraction
process discussed above. Sfard presents an interesting paradox: in order to develop a
structural concept, pupils need to interiorize, condense and reify. Reification is the
leap from seeing an entity as a lower level process to seeing it as an object. However,
in order to see it as an object, we must have some experience of interionzing that
object at a higher level. But until we can see it as an object, interiorization at that
higher level carries little meaning. Or, to put it more succinctly, "the lower level
reification and the higher level intenonzation are prerequisite for each other" (Sfard
199!, p. 31).
This problem has interesting similarities to Vygotsky's theory of the Zone of
Proximal Development in which he identifies the "distance between the actual
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of
potential development as detennined through problem solving under adult guidance or
in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky 1978, p. 86) as the zone within
35
Chapter Two: Representation and Abstraction
which children should be working to achieve maximum potential. Children working at
their actual developmental level remain neither stretched nor stimulated and in fact
Vygotsky goes on to say that "the only 'good learning' is that which is in advance of
development" (ibid, p. 89).
It follows that in the abstraction process, and more particularly at the stage within the
abstraction process at which pupils are having to re-present a process as a
manipulable object, it is necessary for them to practise higher level manipulation of
symbols without necessarily understanding the abstraction required to produce these
symbols. In other words, pupils must use algebraic symbols before they truly
understand them. And this would seem to bring us back to the problem of pupils
being asked to use other people's abstractions of a mathematical concept without
having first gained the experience of making their own abstractions.
The key to this paradox lies in Vygotsky's use of the phrase, "under adult guidance or
in collaboration with more capable peers." Learning is a social rather than an
individual process and "human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a
process by which children grow into the intellectual life of those around them" (ibid,
p. 88). Through imitation of those around them, children are able to internalise
concepts which lie within their Zone of Proximal Development, the emphasis of
control shifting gradually from teacher to learner.
The vital role in this learning model is that of the teacher whose job it is to lead and
coax and then to allow pupils to express ideas for themselves. Wood, Bruner and
Ross (1979) see the teacher's role as one of building scaffolding which offers the
learner some degree of assistance in solving a problem and allowing work at the pupil's
level of proximal development. This assistance may take a number of different forms:
"the adult could act as a memory bank for the pupil, could direct the pupil's attention,
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or could motivate and encourage the pupil to keep going9" (Sutherland I 993a, p. 105).
So, pupils can abstract ideas from concepts with which they are already familiar,
provided the "cognitive demands of expressing a general rule" (Mason 1989, p. 7) are
met by the support of a teacher or some external agency. This support is gradually
faded as the participation of the learner increases.
The idea of scaffolding has been extended to computational settings in a form
described as webbing (Noss and Hoyles 1996, p. 107). In making this extension, a
number of limitations in the scaffolding model have to be addressed: the model carries
with it connotations of an externally erected structure (whereas I have earlier stated
the importance of capturing "experience of the inner world from the inside"); it
suggests the idea of a bounded territory; and the concept of fading in a computer
enviromnent implies that the support offered by the computer would eventually be
replaced by something else. Consequently, addressing these issues, webbing differs
from scaffolding through incorporation of the following features:
i) it is under the learner's control;
ii) it is available to signal possible user paths rather than point towards a
unique, directed goal;
iii) the structure of local support available at any time is a product of the
learners' current understandings as well as the understandings built by others
into it;
iv) the global support structure understood by the user at any time emerges
from connections which are forged in use by the user.
(Noss and Hoyles 1996, p. 108)
Webbing in fact extends the idea of scaffolding. Noss and Hoyles describe the
following important features of webbing:
For further discussion see also the Role of the Researcher in Chapter Four, § 4.4.2.
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i) pupils must build their own structures taking what is important from the
ambient pedagogical setting, rather than receiving what is given;
ii) webbing is domain contingent;
iii) webbing cedes control of the support structure to the learner.
The crux of the webbing idea is that "the computational medium structures and is
structured by the student's emerging mathematical ideas" (ibid, p. 108). Pupils' own
construction of meaning lies at the heart of the webbing concept.
Now, if we accept a view of the construction of meaning as being a personal,
subjective act based on individual experience (although often within a social setting), I
suggest that such a view carries with it further implications relating to the context in
which these experiences are encountered. If meaning is specific to one person and
moreover specific to that person's collection of experiences, does it not follow that
meaning may also be specific to the context in which that construction takes place?
Nunes et al (1993) describe how untrained "street mathematicians" (such as farmers,
fishermen and carpenters) will frequently develop their own methods of performing
the calculations necessary for their work (which may include ratio and
proportionality); "school mathematicians" - students who have learnt formal methods
of calculation - frequently have difficulty performing similar problems using the
methods they have learnt. The context in which the street mathematicians construct
their meanings would appear to contain elements which help in the concretisation of
the mathematical concepts in question in a way that the school mathematicians'
context does not. Whether or not the mathematics is concretised appears to depend
upon the context in which it is encountered.
Interestingly, although Nunes shows that the same streets mathematicians were able
to apply their working methods to new problems within the same environment, it
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does not necessarily follow that the notion of concrete as I have defined it here, is
transferable to other unrelated environments. Rather, if concreteness is an individual
and unique construction formed through particular and unique experiences, it follows
that concretisation is specific only to those experiences and that specific situation:
what is concrete in one context may not be concrete in another. In other words,
concreteness is domain specific.
This idea of concrete concepts being situated resonates closely with two important
theories from the literature: theorems-in-action and situated abstractions. In
mathematical behaviour, pupils often "choose the right thing to do without being able
to mention the reasons for it" (Vergnaud 1990, p. 20). Observation of such behaviour
suggests the existence of Theorems-in-Action, "those properties of relationships
grasped and used by the student in problem-solving situations, though of course that
does not necessarily mean that they are capable of making them explicit or justifying
them" (Vergnaud 1981, p. 11). Thus the development by pupils of a theorem-in-
action implies that they can operate with relational invanants for specific values of
variables: (To this definition, Balacheff(1987) adds the conditions that pupils should
take into account the validity conditions of the theorem; and that they should have an
expectation of the effect of an action which is matched by the actual effect. If these
two conditions are not met, Balacheff suggests in preference the term "Rule of
Action".)
Theorems-in-action, however, imply no explicit expression of mathematical
relationships (or of attempts to justify them). Once such an understanding develops,
they begin to lose their "action" limitation. As an intermediary stage where pupils
demonstrate an ability to operate beyond the specific mathematical experience and a
conscious understanding of generalised relationships, Noss and Hoyles (1996, p. 122)
describe "situated abstraction". This is not so much an object as the "process of
abstracting in situ", as "(re)thinking-in-progress" (ibid). To perform the process of
situated abstraction, pupils "constructively generate mathematical ideas which are
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articulated in terms of the medium of construction" (Hoyles and Noss 1993, p. 84).
The process is charactensed by the following criteria:
i) they entirely encapsulate a mathematical relationship;
ii) they are bound up by their setting;
iii) they are mediated by the technology in which they are situated and its
associated language;
iv) they lack universality, particularly that element of unmediated abstraction
present in a mathematical discourse;
v) they articulate a general relationship structured by the environment in
which it is expressed;
vi) they are constructed by a learner who may have no access to the semantics
and syntax of general mathematical language, but who is given the opportunity
by the computational environment in which he is working.
To sum up, I wish to embrace a theory of the construction of meaning based on the
concretising of mathematical concepts through the creation of a rich set of connections
between objects, underpinned by children's own experience. This incorporates a view
of the concretisation of ideas as firstly a subjective process whereby what is concrete
to one need not be concrete to another, and secondly a situated process whereby what
is concrete in one situation need not necessarily be concrete in another.
2.3.4 Creating Windows on Meaning: Microworids
and Convivial Tools
I want now to consider how best to obtain a picture of children making connections
between objects, for it is in such a picture that we might hope to find some pointers
towards how children construct meaning. As Wilensky says:
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The pivotal point on which the determination of concreteness turns is not some
intensive examination of the object, but rather an examination of the modes of
interaction and the models which the person uses to understand the object.
(Wilensky 1993, p. 198)
In order to understand the internal construction of meaning, the internal creation of
connections and "modes of interaction" which pupils appear to carry out, we need a
context in which they are able to early this out and a context in which it is possible to
observe them carrying out these processes. We need appropriate external tools
through the use of which something of these internal processes may be revealed.
Noss and bytes suggest that use of computers for programming purposes fulfils this
function, that the computer can act as "a window onto children's thinking and to offer
a means by which children can express themselves mathematically" (Noss and Hoyles
1996, p. 71).
I want to use the idea of a microworid as the basis for exploration of pupils'
construction of mathematical meaning. The term microworid was first used by
"artificial intelligence workers to describe a small, coherent domain of objects and
activities implemented in the form of a computer program and corresponding to an
interesting part of the real world" (Weir 1987 p.12). Since then the term has evolved
in meaning'° but here I adopt the definition put forward by Noss and Hoyles (op cit
p. 65). They suggest that the idea of a microworid "involves an intention to develop
an open and investigative stance" to mathematical enquiry. Within this stance learning
is regarded as "a consequence of breakdowns - incidents where predicted outcomes are
not experienced" and that consequently in order to develop a microworid it is
necessary to predict where such breakdowns may occur. Thus at the core of any
microworid there is "a model of a knowledge domain to be investigated by interaction
with the software". They continue: "Exploration is necessarily constrained but in
ways designed to promote learning; knowledge is not simplified, it is recognised as
10 See Noss and Hoyles (1996 p. 63 - 65) for discussion of the changing meaning of the term
microworld.
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complex, interrelated and evolving in action". An important feature of the system is
its extensibility - "the extent to which the elements of the microworid can be
combined, recombined and extended to form new elements".
Four important components of a microworid as defined by Noss and Hoyles are:
i) the pupil component: the existing understandings and partial conceptions
which the child brings to the learning situation;
ii) the technical component: the software or programming language and a set
of tools which provides the representational system for understanding a
mathematical structure or a conceptual field;
iii) the pedagogical component: all the didactical interventions that take place
during the programming activity; and
iv) the contextual component: the social setting of the activities.
To this may be added the mediating role of the computer (Noss and Hoyles 1996).
Now, given the idea of a microworld in which pupils may carry out mathematical
activities and explore mathematical ideas, the next question from a research angle is
how to observe pupils' work within a microworid.
Noss and Hoyles (op cit p. 54) describe two very different kinds of software which
have appeared in mathematics education circles over the past years. One kind, which
has been highly prevalent in schools and has done little for the cause of introducing
computers into the classroom, simply replicates the sort of thing which is already
familiar from school textbooks but in an animated form: the emphasis is on the
computer teaching the pupil a mathematical process. The other kind points "outward
towards new, more learnable mathematics; towards a redefinition of what school
mathematics might become and who might become involved in it" (ibid). The activity
of programming belongs to the latter kind because it involves the programmer in
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expressing and articulating the mathematical relationships involved: "it is in the
process of articulation that a learner can create mathematics and simultaneously reveal
this act of creation to an observer" (ibid).
It is not a quality of the computer itself which somehow determines how it is used:
The problem with asking questions regarding 'the effect' of 'the computer' is
that such questions presume that the computer itself can somehow directly
affect thinking and learning, that the computer, solely by virtue of its being a
computer, can change the way people think and learn.
(Falbel 1993, P. 29)
The crucial question is that of how the computer is used. In activities such as
programming, use of the computer may create meanings for its user. Such use of a
tool has been described by Illich as convivial:
Tools foster conviviality to the extent to which they can be used, by anybody, as
often or as seldom as desired, for the accomplishment of a purpose chosen by
the user. ... They allow the user to express his meaning in action.
(Illich 1973, pp. 22-23)
It is important to emphasise that there is nothing in the computer - or indeed in any
tool which may be described as convivial - that is inherently convivial: conviviality is
both subjective and context dependent. Noss and Hoyles make two important
observations about convivial tools:
First tools are cultural objects. Tools are not passive, they are active elements
ofthe culture into which they are inserted Secona the extent to which a tool is
convivial is determined by the relationship of user to tool, not by any
ontological characteristic of the tool itself
(Noss and Hoyles, op cit, p. 58)
Thus a microworid, which has at its heart activities centred on programming, not only
provides a rich environment for pupils to create mathematics (much as Papert
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describes in Mindsiornis - Papert 1980) through the use of a tool which has a strong
potential for conviviality, but also provides a means through which an observer may
observe this creation of mathematics.
2.4 CONCLUSION
The three research aims, stated in Chapter One, were as follows:
i) to investigate ways in which children expressed generality using the
programming medium;
ii) to investigate connections between different expressions of generality
made in different modalities and their role in children's creation of
mathematical meaning;
iii) to investigate the role of connections between expressions of generality in
children's attempts to justif' their constructed generalisations.
The literature offers a clear focus for investigation of these aims, centering on pupils'
concretising of mathematical objects through the development of representations and
interconnections between representations of those objects. By looking at how pupils
concretise abstract objects it may be possible to throw some light on their
construction of meaning. Any light that is thrown must be seen within the limitations
of the subjectivity of meaning and context discussed in this chapter.
Three concepts, discussed in this chapter, emerge as central to the theoretical basis of
the thesis:
i) concretion (Wilensky 1993) - objects becoming concrete by virtue of the
learner's relationship with that object;
ii) webbing (Noss and Hoyles 1996) - a structure which learners can draw
upon and reconstruct for support; and
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iii) situated abstraction (Noss and Hoyles 1996) - the way in which learners
draw on the webbing of a setting to construct mathematical ideas and the way
in which that webbing shapes the expression of ideas.
Computer programming is proposed as providing a convivial tool, which pupils may
use in order to create their own meaning for the mathematical relationships with which
they are working; moreover, carefully constructed computational microworids would
appear to provide not only a setting in which pupils may express their emergent
mathematical concepts, but also a window through which it may be possible to
observe children's construction of meaning.
In Chapter Three I look at the literature on proof and proving processes as a window
onto generalisation and justification. I describe a dichotomised slant to research which
gives rise to the apparent existence of a nfl between various types of proof with a
consequent focus on children's failure to carry out proof. I contrast this with a
discussion of research into proof which focuses on what children are able to achieve,
building design issues and foci for research on the basis of this research.
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GENERALISATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
If we want to look at how pupils express formal arguments, we need first to place
them in learning situations which equip them with something to express. By placing
them in situations which are centred around generalising from their own mathematical
experiences, the justification and proof1 ' of these generalisations can then provide just
such an experience of expressing formal arguments. Thus proof, in a broad sense
which includes justification, can provide an important window onto generalisation. A
review of the literature on proof provides the focus for this chapter.
This chapter focuses on two very different approaches which emerge from a review of
the literature. A significant part of the literature focuses on a dichotomised view of
proof, leading to descriptions and analysis of the way students fail to progress in
proof and proving processes. Another section of the literature concentrates on what
students are able to achieve and looks at ways forward from these successes. I shall
look first at the various dichotomies which feature in research on proof and suggest
the consequences of such views. Then I shall look at what students are able to
achieve and describe ways in which my own research is shaped - in terms of design
issues and foci for research - by these fmdings. To begin, however, I look briefly at
definitions and functions of proof.
l use this word loosely for the time being.
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The word "proof' carries a variety of preconceptions both within and without the
mathematical world. As Tall (1989, p. 28) observes, proof can imply "beyond
reasonable doubt" to a judge and jury; "occurring with a certain probability" to a
statistician; and can be the result of empirical investigation to a scientist. The term
"proof' within the mathematical world also embodies a variety of concepts. There are
at least three senses in which the term is used: it is used as a verfIcation or
justflcation of the truth of a proposition; it is used in the sense of an illumination
conveying an insight into why a proposition is true; and it is used to refer to the
systematisation of results, that is the organisation of results into a deductive system of
axioms, major concepts and theorems, and minor results derived from these (Bell
1976, p. 24). Its usual mathematical meaning is the third of these definitions: a
rigorous statement in formal mathematical language derived from axioms or other
already-proven statements.
However, in relation to mathematics, it is, perhaps, useful to think of "proof' in terms
of proving processes, which are concerned with understanding, and proof itself, which
is concerned with conimunication. In fact the French literature (e.g. Balacheff 1988)
makes this distinction in its use of the terms preuve (i.e. the proving process) and
demonstration (i.e. the proof product). Although preuve is not strictly speaking
mathematical proof in the sense used by the Mathematical Community, it is in fact
discussed as a type of proof within mathematics education literature, for example by
Balacheff in his definition of proof types (Balacheff 1988). It is in this broader sense,
encompassing both mathematical proof and proving processes such as the justification
of generality, that the term proof is used here.
It is often said that proof lies at the heart of mathematics, but why is it perceived as
being so important? Tall sees proof as important for two reasons:
) (Local) Based on explicit hypotheses, a proof shows that certain
conseq uences follow logically;
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ii) (Global) Such logical consequences themselves can be used as "relay
results" (Hadamard 1945) to build up mathe,natical theories.
(TaIl 1995, p. 27)
These reasons place emphasis on the verification and systematisation of results: two
aspects rightly associated with formal proof (Bell op cit). However, de Villiers
suggests that the functions of proof are considerably more numerous and varied:
1) verification (concerned with the truth of a statement);
ii) explanation (providing insight into why it is true);
iii) discovery (the discovery or invention of new results);
iv) systematisation (the organisation of various results into a deductive
system of axioms, major concepts and theorems);
v) intellectual challenge (the seif-realisation/fulfilment derived from
constructing a proof); and
vi) communication (the negotiation of meaning and transmission of
mathematical knowledge).
(de Villiers 1995, p. 155)
3.2 PROOF DICHOTOMIES
Much of the literature relating to proof is charactensed by dichotomies, perhaps the
most significant of which is an apparent rift between types of mathematical activity
common (if not in fact predominant) in British (and other) schools, and the
construction of formal mathematical proofs. On the one hand school curricula
advocate approaches to algebraic generalisation and proof which place emphasis on
observation, interpretation and generalisation of physical and visual patterns leading
to empirical investigation,justification and proofs which are reliant on empirical data
and are thus mathematically unacceptable
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The traditional pattern of mathematical proof as the term is used at undergraduate
level and above, is what has been described (Leron 1985a, p. 7) as Linear Proof The
initial proof of lenunas from axioms and previously proven theorems leads on to a
complete proof of the desired theorem. This process may continue through many
layers so that the proof of other theorems in a similar manner leads in turn to the
proof of a larger result. Talking about his proof of Fermat's Last Theorem' 2, Andrew
Wiles says:
You work your way around the room and you begin to feel objects here and
there and suddenly the light goes on and you can see everything clearly. Then
you move into the next room.
Wiles's analogy of groping around a darkened room is apt: when a group of lemmas
has been proved and the light has illuminated one stage in the overall proof, it is time
to move to the next layer which is still shrouded in darkness.
Traditional mathematical proofs belong to the second category, yet most of the
mathematics taught at school in the United Kingdom prior to 'A' level or even
undergraduate courses belongs to the first category. (Proofs of Euclidean Geometry,
formerly taught in this country to 14 year olds and still on many national syllabuses,
such as those of France, belong to the second group). In fact the image promoted by
the U.K. National Curriculum (see Chapter 1) and consequently by commercial texts
used in schools, supports and encourages empirical approaches up to the age of
sixteen, and relegates formal proof to the periphery of examination papers in the years
immediately prior to university entrance. The universities, on the other hand, call for
formal proof methods to appear again on the school syllabuses (LMS 1995).
It is not only in terms of Umted Kingdom "school" and "university" approaches that
12 The Guardian, 8th April 1995.
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the literature is presented as a dichotomy. For example, Balacheff makes a distinction
between two distinct types of proof: the pragmatic, i.e. those which have recourse to
actions; and the conceptual, i.e. those which do not involve action but instead depend
on the formulation of the properties in question and the relationships between them
(Balacheff 1988, p. 217).
Balacheff further subdivides pragmatic proofs into Naive Empiricism, Crucial
Experiments and Generic Examples:
Naive Empiricism
Asserting the truth of a result after verj5iing several cases. It is characterised by a
fatalism and impatience and as a form is resistant to generalisation.
The Crucial Experiment
A case is looked upon as that which will decide whether or not a rule is general, i.e. 'iJ'
it works in the following case, it will always work ".
The important difference between these two classes of proof is that in progressing
from the former to the latter, the pupil is moving from "truth asserted on the basis of
a statement of fact to one of an assertion based on reasons" (ibid. p. 228). A similar
break exists between the Generic Example, which Balacheff sees as a "transitional
stage in moving from pragmatic to conceptual proofs" (ibid. p. 229) and the Thought
Experiment which he categonses as conceptual proof:
The Generic Example
The reasons for the truth ofan assertion are made explicit by means of operations or
transformations on an object chosen not in its own right but as a characteristic
representative of its class. Problems may well be presented here by the dyjicultyon the
part ofpupils to express mathematical relationships either in natural language or in
formal algebraic language.13
13 It is worth pointing out that a generic example is unique to an individual at any one point in time:
it is not possible to talk about something or to teach it as "a generic example", only to consider it as
an example used for its generic properties by a particular pupil at given point in a given task.
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The Thought Experiment
This does not invoke particular situations; instead pupils must make decontextualised,
complex cognitive and linguistic constructions. They must be able to accept an
abstraction as an object to be operated upon in order to construct a proof Frequently
the necessary removal of particularities from a statement may fail to conserve
previously established relationships.
In addition Balacheff describes a further type of conceptual proof:
Calculations on Statements
These have nothing to do with experience: they are intellectual constructions based on
more-or-less formalised more-or-less explicit theories of the ideas in question in the
solution of the problem. Proofs are the result of inferential calculations on statements
and rely on definitions or explicit characteristic properties.
Tall (1995) places proof into three categories: enactive, visual and manipulative.
These correspond closely to Bruner's three modes of learning: enactive, iconic and
symbolic (Bruner 1966). Enactive proof requires physical movement to demonstrate
the relationships required by the proof. "Such a proof invariably involves either
specific examples, or specific examples seen as prototypes of a class of examples"
(Tall op cit, p. 31). It is thus a pragmatic form of proof which may or may not
incorporate the use of generic examples. Visual proof is largely dependent upon
identifring examples as being generic: seeing the general in a particular icomc
representation. The vital role of the teacher in such cases is often involved with re-
focusing the learner's attention by means of visual rearrangement
Manipulative proof is concerned with the manipulation of algebraic symbols and does
not involve physical movement or iconic representation.
There are important differences between Tall's and Balacheffs categorisations. For
example, the difference between enactive proofs and pragmatic proofs is that between
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physical movement and action. The "physical movement" of an enactive proof
involves some sort of rearrangement to show a relationship; the "action" of a
pragmatic proof may involve the testing of numerical examples of a general rule. Thus
both visual and manipulative proofs may contain elements of pragmatism.
In fact Tall's and Balacheffs categorisations serve different purposes: Tall's
categonsation is one of types of proof and is useful in identifying the range of proofs
which might be used in a particular mathematical situation; Balacheffs categorisation
is one of the processes of proof and can be used to identify strategies used by pupils
in particular situations.
Bell (1976) also places emphasis on proof processes, but chooses to categorise proofs
not on the basis of whether or not they involve action but on whether or not the pupil
shows any evidence of deduction. Thus Bell identifies empirical responses to proof,
which are based on action and therefore pragmatic, and deductive responses to proof,
which although largely conceptual in nature, can be linked with action, provided they
also contain some deductive qualities.
Bell makes a detailed subdivision of his two broad categories of proof response. He
divides Empirical responses as follows:
i) Failure to generate examples or to comply with given conditions.
ii) Extrapolation: truth of general statement inferred from a subset of the
relevant cases; any apparent reasons are either assertions that the conditions
have been complied with, or added fragments. The basis of the inference is
clearly empirical.
iii) Non-systematic: finds some of the required cases, no complete subsets,
ignores the requirements to find all.
iv) Partially systematic: finds some partially complete subsets of cases; has
some awareness of the requirement to find all.
52
Chapter Three: Windows on Generalisation
v) Systematic: finds at least some complete subsets of cases, is clearly
attempting to find all.
vi) Check of full finite set of cases.
(Bell op cit, p. 28)
Coe and Ruthven discover, in a group of pupils in their last year of school before
going to university, a view of proof as a kind of "supercheck' - a more rigorous and
comprehensive analogue of testing individual cases to see if a rule works" (Coe and
Ruthven 1994, p. 49). Bell's six types of empirical proof response might be seen as a
continuum from the inadequate - a "subcheck", if you like - to the fully
comprehensive - a "supercheck".
Bell sub-divides Deductive proof responses as follows:
I) Non-dependence: one or more examples correctly worked, but not used to
test the general statement; lack of awareness of connection between conclusion
details of the data,
ii) Dependence: attempts to make deductive link between data and
conclusion, but fails to achieve any higher categoly.
iii) Relevant (general restatement): makes no analysis of the situation,
mentions no relevant aspects beyond what is actually in the data, but re-
presents the situation as a whole, in general terms, as if aware that a deductive
connection exists but unable to expose it.
iv) Relevant (collateral details): makes some analysis of the situation,
mentions relevant aspects which could form part of a proof, possibly
identifies different subclasses but fails to build them into a connected
argument is fragmentary.
v) Connected (incomplete): has a connected argument with explanatory
quality, but is incomplete.
vi) Connected ('side-step'): failing only because it appeals to facts or
53
Chapter Three: Windows on Generalisation
principles which are no more generally agreed than the proposition itself.
vii) Complete Explanation: derives the conclusion by a connected argument
from the data and from generally agreed facts and principles.
(Bell op cit, p. 28)
In fact the first two of Bell's subdivisions seem to be typified by failure to carry out
deduction rather than by its use. Otherwise these subdivisions appear to move from
generic example to conceptual proof. Coe and Ruthven (op cit, p. 44) choose to
divide deductive proofs into two parts: weak deductive (some attempt to suggest an
underlying reason) and strong deductive (an attempt at a clear, logical argument with
reasonably explicit links between the starting assumptions and a clearly defined
solution).
Thus, a significant proportion of authors present proof in terms of a dichotomy, be
that between "school" and "university" approaches or between proof types of their
own definition, such as pragmatic and conceptual, or empirical and deductive.
3.3 CONSEQUENCES OF PROOF DICHOTOMIES
Broad categories of proof presented in the ways described in Section 3.2 lead to a
polarisation of proof types. The consequence of this polarisation is that a large body
of the literature focuses on the product of the proving process and on what children
fail to achieve rather than on the process itself and what they might or can achieve
given more effective learning environments.
The literature is characterised by gloomy litanies of failure. For example, Coe and
Ruthven (1994) suggest that those pupils educated since the publication of the
Cockcroft Report (Cockcroft 1982) tend to use predominantly informal proof
strategies to explain rules or generalisations. This, they imply, has major
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consequences for the perception of proof held by students embarking on university
courses:
i) few students were concerned to explain why rules or patterns occurred, or
to locate them within some wider mathematical system;
ii) students' proof strategies were primarily and predominantly empirical,
with a very low incidence of strategies that could be described as deductive;
iii) students' primary concern was to validate conjectured rules and patterns
which, for most, took the form of testing them against a few examples;
iv) in tackling starting points, students tended to employ routinely a standard
repertoire of investigational techniques from their textbook, primarily designed
for the analysis of numeric data;
v) numeric data generated from a starting point quickly became the object of
investigation, with the original situation being abandoned.
Coe and Ruthven (op cit, p. 52)
From the United Kingdom National Curriculum "programme of study" (described in
Chapter One) it is easy to see why students who have followed it hold these
perceptions of proof.
Even the valuable aspects of school-based investigation and empiricism are not,
however, all they seem. Such work may become routimsed, often to fulfil the
demands of time and assessment: "Through prototypical examples of investigative
tasks, and standardising templates for their conduct and reporting, ... codes [emergent
through mathematics course work] seek to make the process of enquiry more
teachable and test-able" (ibid. p. 52).
Turning now to students who follow "traditional" courses solely in formal, deductive
proof, all is far from well here. Moore (1994) looked at first year undergraduate
students who were following a formally taught course on mathematical proof (with
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little or no experience of deductive proof at school). He found the following:
i) the students did not know the definitions, that is they were unable to state
the definitions;
ii) they had little intuitive understanding of the concepts;
iii) their concept images were inadequate for doing the proofs;
iv) they were unable, or unwilling, to generate and use their own examples;
v) they did not know how to use definitions to obtain the overall structure of
the proofs;
vi) they were unable to use mathematical language and notation;
vii) they did not know how to begin proofs.
(Moore 1994, p. 251)
To this list Lermanet al(1993) add:
i) failure to follow a chain of reasoning;
ii) misunderstanding a mathematical concept;
iii) misunderstanding the language used;
(Lerman et al 1993, p. 259)
where they define "misunderstanding" as "failing to interpret in the same sense as the
teacher".
Students also do not appear to relate other mathematical experiences they have
encountered with the mathematics of proof. In an analysis of students solving
mathematical problems, Schoenfeld (1985) finds that students do not use their
mathematical knowledge because they do not perceive it as useful. Additionally, he
finds that students are all too often unaware of the purposes of proof, perceiving
proof as unnecessary argumentation about the intuitively obvious, or the ritual
verification of something which they are told at the outset is true.
Correct use of mathematical language and notation has long been a stumbling block in
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the understanding of proof. Mathematicians aim for clarity and simplicity in their
proofs and in fact clarity and simplicity of argument are two principal factors in the
acceptance of a proof (Dreyfus and Eisenberg 1986), but ironically, it is in pursuit of
these qualities that mathematicians frequently and deliberately omit large amounts of
details in the exposition of formal proofs (Bell 1976). This is detail which is
unnecessary for a mathematician and which would in fact only serve to cloud the issue
by making it difficult to detect the relevant argument for extraneous detail. Indeed, the
suppression of detail is necessary for acceptance by the mathematical community
(Tall 1995). For the uninitiated, however, use of conventions such as "similarly" to
describe some operation parallel to one previously carried out, can only serve to
exclude. At a higher level, mathematicians conversant in the language of one subset of
mathematics are excluded by the conventions and language of another subset
(Thurston 1995).
There is a second form of "exclusion through omission" and this lies in the assumption
of certain "standard" results. The results, of course are standard to writers of the
proof, and because they are writing for a particular audience for whom the results are
also standard, they may safely assume that they and their audience share a common
bank of references. Yet immediately by doing so they have excluded the wider
audience. This exclusion of the uninitiated may be seen in the familiar sequence of
proofs of Euclidean theorems, once standard fare in British schools. Knowledge is
assumed of all theorems in the sequence once proven, so that anyone "entering the
sequence" part way through must accept previous theorems without proof or be
excluded from the proof currently under consideration.
An interesting example of this is described by John Aubrey in his Brief Life of the
seventeenth century mathematician, Thomas Hobbes'4:
14 Lawson-Dick 1992, p. 150.
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He was 40 years old before he looked on Geometry; which happened
accidentally. Being in a Gentleman's Library, Euclid's Elements lay open, and
'(was the 47 EL libri I. He read the Proposition. By G -, sayd he (he would
now and then sweare an emphaticall Oath by way of emphasis) this is
impossible! So he reads the Demonstration of it, which referred him back to
such a Proposition; which proposition he read. That referred him back to
another, which he also read Et sic deinceps [and so on] that at last he was
demonstratively convinced of that trueth This made him in love with
Geometry.
Whilst many pupil might share Hobbes's initial reaction, it would seem safe to say
that for the majority, the teaching of formal proof alone will not help them reach the
same conclusion.
Additionally many students appear not to see any need for proof and regard methods
such as proof by induction as a "confidence trick" (Anderson 1995, p. 48). Students
even find difficulty identifying what is and what is not a proof: Finlow-Bates
describes the confusion experienced by first year mathematics undergraduates when
shown in the first case an informal proof followed by some examples and in another
case some examples followed by an informal proof. The students described the
examples as the proof of the mathematical statement and were more convinced by
these than by the informal proof, which they variously referred to as "examples",
"comments", "summary" and "notes" (Finlow Bates 1994, p. 349). A tendency for
students to mistrust a formal proof to the extent of checking it against empirical
evidence, has been observed elsewhere (Vinner 1983, Porteous 1990, Simpson 1995,
Chazan 1993).
Van Dormolen (1977) suggests that encountering proof initially through formal
methods may carry the expectation of pupils working at a cognitive level which is too
high for them to have any understanding of the concepts involved
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I am convinced that what in the past was called giving a proof was in fact for
many students a forced operating in the second level' 5 of thinking, whereas
they had not as yet reached or sufficiently explored the first.
(van Dormolen 1977, p. 33)
Simpson (1995, P. 40) paints a picture of incompatibility in his description of two
Routes to Proof: the Natural Route which he defines as "proof through reasoning" and
which leads the student along a path progressing from Exploration to Proof via
Discovery, Finding Patterns, Explaining, Justifying and Formalising; and the Alien
Route which he defines as "proof through logic" which involves progression along a
path leading from Sums to Proof via Drill, Testing, Techniques, Calculations and
Predicate / Propositional Calculus. He suggests that
as teachers increasingly provide experiences from the 'oroof through
reasoning" route - investigative work, modelling, explorations - and move
awayfrom what mathematicians might see as the foundation for the traditional
'vro of through logic" route, we may get a broken route: the foundations of a
'oroof through reasoning" route provided by a school education, followed by
the "top end" ofa 'proof through logic" route.
(Simpson 1995, p. 42)
Simpson's routes seem over-simplistic and it is difficult to agree with the clear cut
division between reasoning and logic that he describes, but in fact the literature goes
further. From presenting these two diverse and apparently incompatible routes, some
authors compartmentalise children's thinking processes into two equally diverse
types. For students, the important development in moving from empirically based
proof to deductively based proof is an awareness of the difference between "asserting
truth on the basis of empirical evidence, and proving it is true by logical deduction
from known facts" (Tall 1989, p. 29). This is a major change in thinking for students.
The empirical gathering of data is a normal, everyday procedure: it is a Constructivist
Van Dormolen is refemngto van Hiele's three levels of thinking (see van HIele Begrip en inzichl,
Purmend, 1973)
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view of the way in which children learn. In an empirical context the most important
consideration is to produce an efficient solution rather than to be rigorous (Balacheff
1988); the emphasis in deductive proofs is conversely on ngour and the production of
knowledge.
The implication here is that empirical and logical ways of reasoning are not only
different but, at least at an early age, virtually incompatible: formal proof is
completely outside the main stream of behaviour, so for a purely empirical thinker,
formal proof has no meaning (Fischbein 1982). (Cobb (1986) refers to "self-generated
mathematics" and "academic mathematics".)
But is it as simple as this? Such a viewpoint leaves many questions unanswered. Do
children in fact gather data empirically more readily than they reason logically? Under
certain conditions might not children at least as readily reason logically as use
empirical methods to gather data?
3.4 BEYOND SIMPLE DICHOTOMIES
The previous section looked at the result of research where the existence of a
dichotomy appeared to be at the forefront of the researcher's mind and where,
consequently, the focus was very much on what children fail to achieve. In this
section I shall look at research where the emphasis is placed on what children are able
to achieve. I begin with a look at generalising activities and how these might be
extended and enriched. Then I describe research which examines means to promote
proof within the school curriculum and to make it accessible.
3.4.1 Generalisation and the link with proving
In the introduction to this chapter I described how I intended reviewing the literature
on proof in order to open a window onto generalisation and justification. In this
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section I explore the link between generalisation,justification and proving.
Mason suggests that "generalisation is the life-blood, the heart of mathematics"
(Mason 1996, p. 74) and from a look at the published texts at least, generalisation
would appear to occupy an important position in the UK primary school curriculum
(see, for example, Blair et al 1976, or more recently Hatch et a! 1992). There are at
least three forms of generalisation (Flare! and Tall 1991 - quoted in Mason 1996, p.
81):
i) expansive: extend the range of an existing schema, assimilating the new
particular in an old generality;
ii) reconstructive: rebuilding, accommodating the old generality to subsume
the new particular;
iii) disjunctive: adjoins the new particular as an extra case.
Two pedagogic considerations would appear to play a part in the effective teaching of
generalisationin the classroom: the use of exploratory approaches which Bell (1996,
p. 184) describes within a problem-based course of algebra; and the willingness and
ability to reflect on the relationship between particularity and generality: "it is
essential that you pause and consider ... the need to read implicit generality in what
often appears to be very particular assertions that are being put forward" (Mason
1996, p. 68). I explore this relationship in Section 3.5.6.
Generalisation occurs in many forms - not all mathematical - and appears to be well
within the reach of comparatively young children (Fe. eleven and younger).
Nemirovsky (1996a) describes work carried out with 9 and 10 year olds'
generalisations of mathematical behaviour shown in graphs, such as the growth of a
plant. He suggests that "it is through the construction of mathematical narratives that
children's experience with change, that is, with the different ways in which change
occurs, becomes the subject of mathematical generalisation" (Nemirovsky op cit, p.
217). Boero found that, under the guidance of teacher-led discussions, 11 year olds
could make "significant observations" concerning the generality and conditionality of
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statements (Boero 1995, p. 10). In fact he hypothesises that it is possible to get
children of this age "constructively involved in approaching statements of theorems in
an adequate educational context, depending on the role of the teacher for what
concerns the approach to the essential, epistemological characteristics of statements
(conditionality and generality)" (ibid p. 2).
All too often, school generalisation activities come to a dead end, however. "Many
students do come to value general and explanatory arguments through ... investigative
activities, but this fertile ground is not exploited to introduce mathematical proof and
face students with the challenge of setting out a mathematical argument in a coherent
and logical manner" (Healy and Hoyles 1998, p. 6). This is a matter of major concern
(and one shared by, for example, Anderson 1995, p. 48), but under the right
conditions there seems to be every reason why pupils' activities could be extended to
introduce mathematical proof. Two ways forward would appear to be through
consideration of verification and of justification.
A number of authors find that the statement of generality and the verification of that
statement are intimately bound up together. For example Mason suggests that: "the
thrust of expressing generality is that students take over more and more responsibility
for recognising and expressing generality, and verifying the associated conjectures"
(Mason 1996, p. 77). Radford makes a similar point: "generalisation as a didactic
device cannot avoid the problem of validity" (Radford 1996, p. 109). Boero goes
further and links precision of generality with verification of validity: "the problem of
the greater precision in the formulation of the statement was intimately weaved [sic]
with the problem of the verification of its validity, even if gradually, through
numerical examples, they started to realise that the property might be true" (Boero
1995, p. 10). Sutherland, on the other hand, suggests that a feature of computer
environments which supports pupils in the development of an algebraic approach to
problem solving in mathematics is the fact that "the computer frees pupils from the
process activity of evaluating an expression, thus enabling them to focus more on the
62
Chapter Three: Windows on Generalisation
structural aspects of a situation" (Sutherland 1995). This opens up the question of
the role of verification in construction: to what extent are the two processes inter-
dependent and to what extent may a computer environment change the balance of
such an inter-dependence?
If investigative generalisation activities are to be "extended" to make a link with
mathematical proof, some element of justification of the generality must be
introduced: "the logical base underlying generalisation is that of justifying the
conclusion. It is a proof-process, which moves from empirical knowledge to abstract
knowledge that is beyond the empirical scope" (Radford 1996, p. 111). Porteous
suggests that this in fact should be central to the curriculum:
The proof types used by children are naturally informal, but it would be a
mistake to devalue them because of this. Proving, in the sense of explaining
generalities, should be part of the normal activity of,nathematics.
(Porteous 1990, p. 597)
The key to justification would appear to lie in the relationship between the means of
expression of generality and the means ofexpression ofjustification of that generality.
Bell cites an example where a pupil expressed relationships between numbers in a
calendar square algebraically and then justified the relationship she had defined. "She
uses the fonnation and manipulation of her expressions not only to express her
conjecture but also to prove or, in this case, to disprove its generality" (Bell 1996, p.
177).
Boero also makes this link. Through consideration of what he defines as relational and
procedural statements of generality and the different approaches to proof to which
these statements lead, he suggests that "in the case of a statement produced (or
assumed) by a student, its proving process may naturally evolve from it as a 'textual
development' of the statement itself' (Boero 1995, p. 2). For example, he found that
from the relational statement a number and the number immediately after have no
common divisors e,xceptfor the number 1, students found all the divisors of a number
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and its next and verified that there were no common divisors except for 1. Although
this did not help the students with justification of the statement, it did help them to
get an opinion of validity. What is important, however, is that the attempt was
"influenced by the formulation of the attempt that they had considered" (ibid, p. II).
An approach to proof which begins with generalisation and verification might begin at
a young age. Almeida(1995, p. 61) outlines three essentially internal proof processes
encountered by the early learner
i) establishing the truth of an assertion on intuitive grounds (e.g. the intuitive
belief that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line);
ii) seeing why a statement is true (e.g. a visual insight into why a geo-strip
triangle is always rigid obtained through construction);
iii) inductive proof (e.g. proving that all objects fall at the same rate on the
basis of empirical evidence).
At this early stage the pupils are merely convincing themselves: there is no
explanatory function to these early proving processes and no means of or need for
communication. But importantly, Almeida suggests that "giving recognition to
prototypical proof practices is a necessary condition to enable the learner to become
aware of (and then later work with) non-empirical proof' (ibid, p. 67).
One approach to the introduction of justification to investigative generalisation
activities might be through comparison of equivalent expressions of generality. Bell
suggests that a development to the situations he describes might be for a teacher to
record pupils' expressions, using examples of the same relation expressed in different
ways: "discussion of this could provide the beginnings of the awareness of the
equivalencies that form the basis of manipulations" (Bell 1996, p. 176). Perhaps this
area might be even more fertile than he suggests: might not the discussion of
equivalencies also form the basis for justification of generality?
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3.4.2	 Contexts	 for	 proving:	 Accessibility	 of
Mathematical Content and Links with the Curriculum
Central to all the examples quoted in § 35. I is the accessibility of the mathematics
being used to the pupil who is expected to use it. All too often proof is taught using
statements involving mathematical concepts with which the learner is still struggling.
It is like asking a learner driver to manoeuvre an articulated lorry into an awkwardly
situated parking space: ask the driver to practise reversing a small, familiar motor car
into the same space and he or she will soon acquire familiarity with the difficulties of
the manoeuvre. In time he or she will be so familiar with the process of reversing into
the space that when general management of the articulated lorry is mastered,
performing the difficult manoeuvre will become a realisable possibility.
Almeida (1995, p. 70) finds that "given the exhortation to justif' an accessible'6
conjecture (such as the sum of two odd numbers is always an even number), the
majority of learners seemed willing to offer an explanation even if some of these may
have been clumsy or insufficiently understood (for example, "an odd number is a
minus and an even number a plus and two minuses give a plus")."
Also, if we want proof to be considered by the pupil as a natural and essential part of
mathematics - as a central element of mathematical culture - it is necessary for
examples of proof to be closely related to the curriculum: in this way there is a greater
likelihood that, when a curriculum topic is revisited, the possible application of a
proof within that topic may present itself spontaneously. If proof is introduced
through isolated mathematical examples, then proof itself may be perceived as an
activity in isolation. Similarly, the mathematical situation should contain an apparent
16 My italics.
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need for proof: "explanation must be necessary, technically and sociologically; if the
result is obvious or ... generally accepted, only a recipe is obtained" (Brousseau 1988,
p. 3).
If we accept the importance of creating a link with the curriculum, it is difficult to
know where ideas such as Austin's example of an addition sum - acting as a generality
ripe for proof- fit in (Austin 1995, p. 75). He proposes givinga pupil the sum
MATHS
+PROOF
T HEME
where different letters stand for different digits. Pupil are required to "find all the
answers and give a proof to show the list of answers is correct." This cannot be
solved easily by an exhaustive proof so, it is hoped, pupils will begin to look for
patterns and from these make generalisations. What message does such an activity
give to pupils? Rather than relating to their curriculum or involving them in the
creation of a generalised expression, it would appear to reinforce the idea of proving
(and indeed algebraic expression) as a pointless game.
In considering the place of the curriculum in relation to proof and processes of proof,
it seems possible that the speed with which it is necessary to cover the curriculum in
British schools combined with a tendency to "compartmentalise" the curriculum,
rarely allows for the depth of study required to tackle proof at anything beyond a
superficial leveL
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3.4.3	 Prerequisites	 to	 the	 Use	 of	 Formal
Manipulation
Austin (1995, p. 76) suggests that prior experience of using the relevant mathematics
is necessary as a prerequisite to formal proof He states that the "first two steps on
what should be the pupil's ascent' 7
 to proof are omitted" and proposes that Step I
should show pupils what a proof is all about and allow them to appreciate
a) that a mathematical proof is an argument just like other everyday
arguments - it involves everyday, sensible thinking,
and
b) that a mathematical proof is an argument unlike all other arguments - it
involves an absolute certainty that other arguments lack.
(It is difficult to see how both these statements can be true: the latter would seem to
be what proof is about; therefore the former is not.) For this step he uses as an
example the following problem, which he claims may be solved by means of a simple
exhaustive proof:
Write the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, in a row so that the sum of any two numbers that
are next to each other in the row is at leastJive. Find all the answers and give
a proof to show your list ofanswers is correct.
Leron suggests that "most non-trivial proofs pivot round an act of construction"
(Leron 1985b, p. 323) and in Step 2 Austin advocates giving pupils the experience,
the feel, of constructing a proof for themselves. It allows pupils to appreciate
a) that constructing a mathematical proof is a creative act,
and
b) this creative act involves hard and careful work.
Austin uses the example quoted in § 3.5.1 of the addition sum
17 Choice ofthe word "ascent" indicates that Austin makes some interesting assumptions.
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MATHS + PROOF = THEME
where different letters stand for different digits, and challenges the pupil to "find all
the answers and give a proof to show the list of answers is correct." This cannot be
solved easily by an exhaustive proof so, it is hoped, pupils will begin to look for
patterns and from these make generalisations.
The act of construction is also highlighted by Goldenberg and Hazzan (1995, p. 109)
who suggest that construction need not be interpreted as physical manipulation of
concrete objects but may include construction through manipulation of symbols
including those which constitute a computer programming language. This ties in
closely with the idea of the subjectivity of concreteness described in Chapter Two'8,
so that what is a dauntingly "abstract" concept for one person may lie sufficiently
within anothe?s experience and have a sufficiently rich set of representations to be
seen and treated by that person as "concrete". What it does not include is the
"deconstructive" proof by contradiction, which contains no element of showing how a
mathematical object is made.
However, since Austin bases his examples on empirical methods of proof (since these
are most accessible to the pupils they are aimed at), the question remains how to
make a transition to conceptual proof methods. Examples where exhaustive proof
becomes clearly impractical, serve to highlight the necessity for conceptual proof, as
do examples which might reasonably be expected to be generic for many pupils, but
they fail to equip the pupil with language or notation for expression, justification or
formalisation.
Another interesting example, this time involving very young children using proof in
" SeeChapter2, § 2.3.2.
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the early stages of mathematics, is described by Davis and Maher. In a study
involving children finding the number of arrangements of two colours in towers of
three, four and five bricks, they observe that organisation of their solutions enabled
the children to develop "proof by cases" (ie. proof by means of empirical testing) and
"proof by mathematical induction" (Davis and Maher 1993, p. lii). No use of
algebraic or any other type of notation is made as all the work is carried out verbally,
so again the exercise appears to come to a dead end: the children have not been
equipped with a language in which to express their ideas in any way more formalised
than that required for the empirical work in which they have been engaged.
The same goes for the Action Proofs described by Sémadéni. She defines them as an
"idealised, simplified version of a recommended way in which children can convince
themselves of the validity of a statement" (Sémadéni 1984, p. 32). The emphasis here
is simply on the children convincing themselves: there is no question of the social
acceptability of a proof or even of Tall's (1989, p. 30) "convince yourself, convince a
friend, convince an enemy" idea, let alone any element of formal deduction. An action
proof of a statement S proceeds as follows:
Choose a special case of S. The case should be generic, not too complicated,
and not too simple. Choose an enactive and/or iconic representation of the
case or a paradigmatic example. Perform certain concrete, physical actions so
as to verify the statement in the given case.
Choose other examples, keeping the general schema permanent but varying the
constants involved In each case ver5 the statement, trying to use the same
method as in 1.
When you no longer need physical actions, continue performing them mentally
until you are convinced that you know how to do the same for many other
examples.
Try to determine the class of cases for which this method works.
(Sémadéni op cit, p. 32)
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This leaves a great many questions unanswered, not least of which is how one ensures
that the special case of S is generic (1) for the pupil concerned. Also the question of
language is not broached at all: in what language is the statement verified (2), being
convinced expressed (3) and determination of the class of cases expressed (4).
Sémadéni has provided an interesting general framework in which to explore
empiricism but it is difficult to know where one might progress from here.
Brousseau suggests that "the passage from natural thought to the use of logical
thought like that which regulates logical reasoning, is accompanied by construction,
rejection and the use of different methods of proof: rhetoric, pragmatic, semantic or
syntactic" (Brousseau 1988, p. 12). The place of construction stands out again, as it
does in Tall (1989) where he suggests that pupils need to have the infonnal experience
of using ideas as a prerequisite to manipulating formal statements. Pupils should
begin by producing convincing arguments in practical situations so that they may
progress to making logical deductions in more general situations (Tall op cit, p. 31).
Empiricism and deduction are combined within the same example: the students'
empirical work is seen not as an end in itself but as the beginning of deductive
reasoning.
As an example, Tall suggests getting pupils to make statements of the form "If I know
something, then I know something else" in cases where the second statement may
hold where the first does not, for example (ibid):
fx+ 1=3, then(x+ 1)(x+ 1) =9;
but f(x + I) (x + 1) = 9, (x + 1) need not be 3.
Use of general statements such as
If x> 5, thenx> 3
which are likely to produce universal agreement, provide some interesting
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possibilities. By labelling 'x> 5' as P and 'x> 3' as Q, it is clear that whenever P is
true, Q is also true. If, however, x = 4, P is false and Q is true; and in the case x = 2,
neither P nor Q are true. Tall suggests that reasoning of this type with easily
understood concepts provides a good introduction to formal mathematical proof.
It seems that whilst a certain amount of research has been carried out into what might
be labelled "introductory activities" to formal methods of proof, not enough thought
has been given to how these activities will progress into formal proof The advantage
of Tall's work over the examples by Austin discussed above is that the preliminary
mathematical experiences which Tall describes contain the mathematical language and
notation needed for the ensuing logical reasoning and deduction. It is where the
language and notation of the formal proof differs significantly from that of the
practical mathematical experience that students are unable to make the transition from
the pragmatic to the conceptual.
3.4.4 Particularity as a Window onto Generality
Seeing the general through the particular is a theme which runs through the literature.
Careful use of particular examples which are representative of their class (generic
examples) appears to enable pupils to see beyond the particular to the general. As
Mason puts it, "particularity has to be used as a window to be looked through, rather
than as a wall to be looked at" (Mason 1996, p. 70). This use of particularity as a
window onto generality is important in the expression of both generality and of proof.
So whilst Mason suggests that "generalisation is usually taken to be an inductively
empirical activity in which one accumulates many examples and detects patterns"
(Mason 1996, p. 77), he also cites Davydov (1990) who refers to "mastery of a single
example that, with appropriate stressing and consequent ignoring of special features,
serves as a generic example from which the general can be read" (Mason, op cit, p.
77).
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Looking at the relationship between generality and particularity in terms of the
introduction of algebraic formalism, Bell suggests that by introducing a letter to stand
initially for a specific value, "we avoid the incomprehension that often arises when
manipulative exercises are given in the absence of the meaning-giving formulation and
interpretation stages" (Bell 1996, P. 179). This thinking may also be seen in the use
of spreadsheets (Sutherland 1992). Thus, through consideration of the particular,
pupils seem able to approach the general.
Where problems exist it is often because there are two types of expression: if these
two languages could be brought closer together or even better incorporated into one
multi-purpose language,then the problems might disappear.
While most of the work in maths education seeks to improve the learning and
communication of mathematics by supplementing or bypassing mathematical
formalism, it is also important to consider at the same time how the formalism
itselfmight be improved to become more communicative of the ideas behind it.
Leron(1985b,p. 321)
Balacheff suggests that "the movement to conceptual proofs lies essentially in taking
account of the generic quality of those situations previously envisaged" (Balacheff
1988, p. 217). He goes on to say that such a movement "requires an altered position:
the speaker must distance herself from the action and the processes of solution of the
problem". This is partly at odds with the view of abstraction discussed in Chapter
Two, where the emphasis is placed on creation of ever-richer meanings rather than a
drawing away from one meaning towards another. However, the importance of the
generic quality of a situation remains.
A number of authors recognise the importance of using generic examples. In an
attempt to make a link between the "natural" empirical process and the "artificial"
deductive process (hints here of Simpson's "routes to proof" - Simpson 1995), Tall
(1979) and Steiner (1976) offer the concept of a generic proof- one which "works at
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the examples level but is generic in that the examples chosen are typical of the whole
class of examples and hence the proof is generalisable" (Alibert and Thomas 1991 )
As an example, Tall gives a generic proof for the irrationality of
We will show that ifwe start with any rationalp/q and square it, then the result
p2 /q2 cannot be 5/8.
On squaring any integer n, the number of times that any prime factor appears
in the factorisation of n is doubled in the prime factorisation of n2, so each
prime factor occurs an even number of times in n2, (For instance, if n = 12 =
22 x3, thenl2!=24x32.)
In the fraction p2 /q2, factoriseji and q2 into primes and cancel common factors
where possible. Each factor will either cancel exactly or we are left with an
even number ofappearances of thatfactor in the numerator or denominator of
the fraction. The fraction p2 /q2 can never be simplfled to 5/8 for the latter is
5/Y, which has an odd number of S's in the numerator (and an odd number of
2'c in the denominator).
(Tall 1979, p. 204)
Tall found that students showed a significant preference for the generic proof over a
"standard" proof by contradiction on the grounds of ease of understanding and lack of
confusion. The generic proof combines empirical examples with deductive reasoning.
Movshovitz-Hadar attempts to make a link between empiricism and deduction, but
starts from another angle: in her generic-example assisted proof she appends an
example "small enough to serve as a concrete example yet large cnough to be
considered a non-specific representation of the general case" (Movshovitz-Hadar
1988, p. 17). She uses as anexamplethe following theorem:
For any nxn matrix, n a positive integer, such that the rows form arithmetic
progressions with the same common difference d, then the sum of any n
elements, no two of which are in the same row or column, is invariant.
The example she uses to assist in the proof is that of an 8x8 matrix. Because the
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proof for the 8x8 case "is kind of 'transparent', one can see the general proof through it
because nothing specific to the 8x8 case enters the proof' (ibid. p. 19). Clearly what
such an approach loses in generality it gains in explanatory power.
As in the earlier discussion of generalisation and justification19, the form and context
of the means of expression pupils are required to use are all important. Mason
introduces an interesting concept: generality in action (Mason 1996, p. 81), that is
children acting as if they perceive generality, although unable to express it. Although
this is an observation of pupils' mathematical behaviour and an interesting
perspective on how pupils use particularity to express generality, it also highlights
the vital importance of pupils having at their fingertips the means with which to
express and fonnalise their emergent concept of generality and indeed justification.
Bell describes an activity called Line Patterns in which students are asked to generalise
relationships between sets of numbers. He observes that "they are generalised
numbers, but have concrete support. The cognitive demand is therefore low. But
these letters are being used in symbolic algebraic statements of generalisation. The
students are using algebraic language in a situation where it forms a natural means of
communication" (Bell 1996, p. 175). What is needed is surely learning situations
which incorporate the means to express the relationships contained within them, i.e.
an auto-expressive language.
Leading on from this point, it is interesting to look more closely at the use of language
in generalising and proving activities. Formal mathematical proof is expressed in
formal mathematical language. In fact, a paradox surrounds the use of language:
informal proof methods use informal language and thus fail to equip pupils with a
mathematical language in which to express their ideas - formalisation is then often
presented as a "tack-on" activity at the end of empirical work; pupils working with
formal proof methods which have formal language at their heart, are often either
' § 3.4.1
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unable to use the language and notation (Moore 1994) or misunderstand the language
used (Lerman et al 1993). In formal proof the language for many - but not all - pupils
is purely a code in which the ritual of the proof is carried out and not a means of
expression.
Goldenberg and Hazzan see a tension between the role of language and the nature of
students' uses of language. The role of language is to bring "focus and abstraction to
actions and processes" (Goldenberg and Hazzan 1995, p. 112), so in the translation of
physical constructions into words, students free their construction from specific
details. The use of different types of language affects students' concepts of the
development of proof:
Informal language captures meanings in ways that students find familiar and
in tune with their intuitions. Formal language helps make description more
precise, but also helps strip it down to those features that are most likely to be
central to reasoning and proof Dfferences between these two styles of
expression may represent hurdles that students encounter when they present
formal arguments.
(Ibid. p. 112)
Balacheff sees a tension between "the language of the everyday, whose main support
is natural language" and a language which "must become a tool for logical deductions
and not just a means of communication" (Balacheff 1988, p. 217). He sees a necessity
to move from one to the other in order to progress from the pragmatic to the
conceptual.
Given this tension between formal and informal language, it is particularly interesting
to look at what lies between the two, in neither the domain of informal languages nor
of formal mathematical languages. In observing a pupil called Chloe, Noss says: "her
proof lives in a world somewhere between natural language and mathematical
formalism; a world which allows abstractions to be formulated and explored by those
who have not yet completed their journey into the rigorous world of mathematics, but
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which carries them a little nearer to it." (Noss 1997, p. 43) Thus looking at how
pupils use the particular to construct and interpret the general provides a useful
window onto the relationship between formal and informal language.
If didactic situations can be devised where the language forms an integral part of the
proving process, then pupils will be equipped with a means of formal expression for
their ideas: articulation by means of the working language of the activity. Expression
of generality and its proof might then itself become an integral part of an activity
rather than an extra activity tacked on after the investigation is at an end. Such an
approach removes the exclusive and off-putting burden of translating a result into
another language. Noss and Hoyles (1996, p. 69) term this use of language "auto-
expression": a computational world which "contains the elements of a language to talk
about itself'. Sutherland identifies Logo as an effective example of an auto-expressive
language in the context of generalisation and justification: "in Logo there does not have
to be a gap between pupils' informal methods and the formal representation of this
method. Within the Logo context, pupils, through interacting with the computer and
discussion with their peer, are able to develop their intuitive understanding of pattern
and structure to the point where they can make a generalisation and formalise this
generalisation in Logo" (Sutherland 1989, p. 341).
The issue of auto-expression, of what is an auto-expressive language, is at thc core of
the whole issue of language for the construction, expression and justification of proof.
Goldenberg and Hazzan (1995a, p. 123) talk about "successive refinements" to the
language of construction "as the complexity and sophistication of the argument
requires them". This is not true auto-expression, but a suggestion that situations can
be created where there is one language existing in some kind of informal version - a
dialect if you like - for the construction phase of a mathematical situation, and also in
a more formalised dialect which is better suited to formal deductive proof. Because
these dialects are part of the same language, "successive refinements" can mould the
first into the second. This view needs caution: not all languages are accessible to
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refinement and if the dialects of construction and discussion are too far removed from
one another, the hurdle of translation rears its head again. Professor 1-liggins
successfully trained Liza Doolittle's accent and enunciation, but initially she let him
down through unfamiliarity with the idioms of her new type of speech: "informal"
language can be refined but may remain unidiomatic if it is too far removed from
"formal" language.
Refinement also carries undesirable overtones of progressing from one outlook to
another rather than the ideal integration of construction and justification. Given the
crucial roles of language, a truly auto-expressive language would be the single most
important factor in linking empiricism and deduction.
3.4.5 Acceptance
Fischbein (1982) identifies three types of conviction held by pupils as to whether or
not a statement is true. These convictions may be based upon formal argumentation
of the type traditionally found in axiomatic mathematical proof; they may be the
results of practical investigation - findings which support a conclusion previously
reached; and they may be of an intuitive, intrinsic type, imposed by the structure of
the situation. This last category Fischbein calls "cognitive belief' (Fischbein op cit, p.
11). In the acceptance of a proof by students, the first type of proof carries little
prominence. In fact rigorous, formal proofs of a theorem are a relatively insignificant
factor in its acceptance (Hanna 1991). Lerman, Finlow-Bates and Morgan (1993) find
that clarity, usefulness, consistency and the extent to which proofs are convincing and
easily understood are all considered of greater importance by students than logical
argument and rigour.
So something needs to be done to make formal proof appear relevant and necessary to
students. One step is for them to "accept" the proof. Mathematicians accept a new
theorem if they understand it, if it is significant and consistent with accepted
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mathematical results, if there is a convincing and familiar mathematical argument for it,
and if its author has a reliable reputation as a mathematician (1-lanna op cit). When
new theorems appear, only those which appear significant will be scrutinised by the
mathematical community and have their proofs checked; others, however
sophisticated their proof, will not be tested if they appear to be insignificant
theorems. "A proof becomes a proof after the social act of 'accepting it as a proof.
This is true of mathematics as it is of physics, linguistics and biology" (Manin 1977).
In fact Volmink(1988) suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on the social
criteria for acceptance of mathematical truth at the expense of purely formal criteria.
Now, this social nature of proof is of importance not only in the greater Mathematical
Community, but also within what one might term the closed mathematical community
of a school classroom or lecture theatre. The idea of acceptance is discussed by
Alibert and Thomas (1991) in the context of scientific debate. In order to make
students see proof as a necessary part of the scientific process, students' scientific
statements are written on the blackboard, thus placing them in the public domain.
These statements are then discussed by fellow students who take a vote on their
validity: those which are validated become theorems; those which are not validated ale
preserved as false statements. This approach to proof coincides with Davis's (1986)
view of proof as "an argument needed to validate a statement; a debating forum" and
Alibert's (1988) view of the importance of creating a scientific debate providing
opportunity to discuss arguments made by a proof.
The idea of acceptance has wider connotations. In the same way that a proof which
satisfies, say, a scientist would not be acceptable to a mathematician as a
mathematical proof, what is acceptable as a proof in one branch of mathematics in one
particular situation may not be acceptable in another mathematical situation: the social
construction and acceptance of proof is dependent upon and shaped by the society
which constructs it. This opens up the question of the relationship between proofs in
differing mathematical situations.
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3.4.6 Explanatory Quality
We have seen that formal deductive proofs are likely to contain little in the way of
explanation as to why a result is true. For example, a proof by induction begins with
a result and involves the manipulation of the symbols in which that result is
expressed; proof by contradiction begins with an "opposite" result and through
symbolic manipulation demonstrates its impossibility. In neither proof is there any
element of explanation as to why the result being proved is true. Proofs which contain
an explanation in addition to merely proving a theorem (but which also contain the
mathematical rigour of a traditional proof) might be used in an attempt to give meaning
for students (Hanna 1989b, Wittman and Mueller, 1988). Thus proofs which explain
play two important roles:
An explanatory proof iliwninates at the same time that it dispels doubt. When
such a proof is used successfully in the classroom, the students acquire not
only a "knowledge that' a knowledge of what is true, but also "knowledge
why ' an understanding ofwhy it is true.
(Hanna 1995b, p. 134)
As an example of an explanatory proof, Hanna (1989, p. 48) compares two proofs of
the theorem that the sum of the first n integers S is given by
n (n + 1)/2
Proof by induction demonstrates the truth of the statement but fails to show why it is
true:
i) Ifn=l,	 Sn1
ii) Ifn=k+1, Sk+1 =k(k+1)/2+k+1
= (k2 + k + 2k + 2)/2
= (k + 1) (k + 2)/2
The result is true for n = / and n = k+ 1, so it is true for every n.
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GauB's proof, on the other hand:
Sn	 = 1	 +	 2	 +...+	 17,
and
Sn = n	 +	 (n-I) +... +
so
2Sn = (n + I) +
	 (n + I) +... +	 (n + I,),
= n(n+I)
and
Sn = n(n+I)/2
is explanatory "because it uses the property of symmetry (of the different
representations of the sum) to show why the statement is true. It makes reference to
the property of symmetry and it is evident from the proof that the results depend on
this property" (Hanna 1989b, p. 48).
A proof only explains when it "reveals and makes use of the mathematical ideas which
motivate it" (ibid, p. 47). Proof by induction, for example, makes use of a standard
mathematical "trick" which may be applied to a wide variety of results, regardless of
the mathematical ideas contained within them. Steiner (1978) talks about a
"characteristic property" of an explanatory proof:
An explanatory proof makes reference to a characterising property of an entity
or structure mentioned in the theorem, such that from the proof it is evident
that the results depend on the properly. It must be evident, that is, that f we
substitute in the proof a different object of the same domain, the theorem
collapses; more, we should be able to see as we vary the object how the
theorem changes in response.
(Steiner op cit, p. 143)
Chazan (1993, p. 383) suggests that "the explanatory aspect of proofs is a useful
starting point for a discussion of the value of deductive proofs."
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3.4.7 Providing an Overview
The problem students encounter in traditional mathematical proofs is partly one of
confusion and a lack of understanding of what the proof is tiying to achieve. The
holistic conveyance of the ideas in a proof, making them intelligible and convincing, is
of greater importance than the formal adequacy of the logic (Hanna 1991). One
method of proof proposed as being easily understood is the Structural Method
described by Leron (1985), that is one where the proof is constructed in levels
proceeding from the top down. Each level is autonomous and contains one idea of the
proof, an idea which enables one to gain an overall view of that subsection. For
example, Level 1 gives a global view of the proof, an 'elevato? allows for informal
discussion (which may itself be a part of the proof) and takes one down to the next
level of the proof. Any necessary lemmas are assumed and proved at the end of the
overall proof This is the opposite of the traditional (bottom-up) proof methods
where all lemmas are proved initially and only when this has been done can the proof
progress. In a Structural view of proof, emphasis is instead placed on giving the pupil
an overview of what is trying to be achieved. Leron outlines the format for structured
proofs as follows:
Introduce the pivot as a system of constraints (i.e. define it implicitly by
postulating its properties);
Without actually solving the system, use the pivot as introduced in step one to
derive the conclusion of the theorem;
Discuss heuristically the solution of the system to find how the pivot might be
constructed;
(Recursion step,) Solve the system repeating steps 1-4 f necessary. That is
construct (or prove the existence of) the pivot, then prove that it satisfies the
postulated properties. If some of the sub-proofs are themselves complicated,
introduce sub-pivots and repeat the four-step procedure.
(Leron op cit. p. 12)
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For the deductive thinker, this approach provides purpose and direction whilst never
leaving the realms of a purely deductive proof It perhaps removes the sense of
groping around in a darkened room described by Andrew Wiles.
3.4.8 Expectations
Healy and Hoyles, in the results of a survey into high-attaining Year 10 students'
views of and competencies in mathematical proof (Healy and Hoyles 1998) offer
some pointers towards extending students' experiences of proof within the school
curriculum. Although they find that students are "unable to distinguish and describe
mathematical properties relevant to a proof and use deductive reasoning in their
arguments" they also say that the majority "also recognise that a valid proof is general
and accord high status to formally-presented arguments" (ibid, p. 6).
Healy and Hoyles go on to suggest that more challenge and more attention to proving
could enhance performance and that this might be achieved through explicit efforts to
engage students with proof "while discussing with them the idea of proof at a meta-
level, in terms of its meaning, generality and purposes. This would involve finding
ways ofbalancingthe need to produce a coherent and logical argument with the need
to provide one that explains, communicates and convinces" (ibid. p. 7). They
conclude: "our evidence suggests that students could well respond positively to the
challenge of attempting more challenging and rigorous proofs alongside informal
argumentation" (ibid. p. 7).
3.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented two contrasting views of the literature on proof: firstly
from a dichotomised viewpoint where emphasis was placed on the product of proof
teaching; and secondly from a viewpoint where the processes of proof formed the
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focus. From this latter viewpoint, a number of important points emerge as being
conducive to proving and generalisingin school mathematics. Messages from research
into proof have important implications for how, from a wider perspective, the
processes of generalisation, verification and justification are taught in school
mathematics. These implications are summarised below and presented partly as
design issues for the study and partly as foci for research:
3.5.1 Design Issues
Design issues fall into three groups: those affecting the participants in the study (i.e.
researcher and pupils) and their respective roles, those affecting the mathematical
activities around which the study was centred, and those affecting the computational
medium in which they were required to work. These issues may be summarised as
follows:
A computational medium:
for construction and expression which incorporates a visual dimension;
which contains a link between the process of construction and a means of
verification of that construction;
• which contains a common language for construction and for expression; and
• which facilitates the use of generic examples.
Mathematical activities:
• in which the need to generalise and justify arises as an integral part of the activity;
• which incorporate manipulation of "concrete" objects as an integral part; and
• the content of which is accessible and related to the curriculum.
Pupil/researcher relationship:
• group organisation which facilitates the ability to make arguments in practical
situations; and
• group organisation which facilitates negotiation of acceptance of mathematical
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statements by the "mathematical community"20 -
These design issues are considered in Chapter Four where the design of the
programming microworid is discussed.
3.5.2 Foci for Research
Research foci may be summarised as follows:
i) The relationship between construction, expression, generalisation and
justification;
ii) The connection between children's visualisation of mathematical
relationships (within the specific learning situation) and their expression of
generality and justification;
iii) The role children's acts of construction play in effecting the abstraction of
mathematical relationships;
iv) Ways in which children's exploration of particularity leads to generality;
v) Ways in which children link ideas at varying levels of abstraction and ways
in which they use these relationships;
vi) How children use "movement" between levels of abstraction;
vii) The relationship between the language of construction, the language of
expression and the children's own natural language within a specific learning
situation;
viii)The role of language in the construction and expression of ideas.
These foci are addressed in Chapter Six and used, in conjunction with initial findings
from the preliminaty phases of the study, to frame questions for research
20 The "community" is made up of the pupils and the researcher, with the researcher occipying an
essential but clearly defined role within that community. This idea is discussed in § 4.4.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DESIGN OF THE
PROGRAMMING MICROWORLD
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapters Two and Three I developed a theoretical framework for the study and
looked at issues which affect the expression of generality and the justification of
generalisations. In this chapter I build on these points in order to put forward a
rationale for the design of the microworid and activities used in the study. The design
of the various components of the study was iterative in nature, that is rather than any
one component being devised, tested in a pilot study and then used as a vehicle for
gathering data in a main study, the final design evolved through the first two phases of
the study, only then reaching the form it was to take in the final and main part of the
study (hence the organisation of the study into phases). Thus, for example, the
various forms of researcher intervention were identified as a result of analysis of the
initial phases. To present a clear picture of the rationale behind the design, the final
design is presented in this chapter; the iterations through which this final design was
reached may be traced in Chapters Five and Six.
In Chapters Two and Three the specification of Specific Learning Situations in which
to observe pupils' attempts at generalisation and justification was discussed. In order
to consider this specification I shall look at the three components of the learning
situation and at the relationship between these components. The components
comprise the participants in the study (i.e. researcher and pupils) and their respective
roles, the mathematical activities around which the study was centred, and the
computational medium in which they were required to work.
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The criteria for consideration within these three components are reproduced here:
A Computational Medium:
for construction and expression which incorporates a visual dimension;
which contains a link between the process of construction and a means of
verification of that construction;
which contains a common langtiage for construction and for expression; and
which facilitates the use of generic examples.
Mathematical Activities:
• in which the need to generalise and justify arises as an integral part of the activity;
• which incorporate manipulation of "concrete" objects as an integral part; and
• the content of which is accessible and related to the curriculum.
PupillResearcher Relationship:
group organisation which facilitates the ability to make arguments in practical
situations; and
group organisation which facilitates negotiation of acceptance of mathematical
statements by the "Mathematical Community"21.
These criteria are addressed in the sections which follow.
21 The "community" is madç up of the pupils and the researcher, with the researcher occupying an
essential but clearly defined role within that community. This idea is discussed in § 4.4.
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4.2 DESIGN OF THE COMPUTATIONAL MEDIUM
4.2.1 Introduction
In this section I consider the design of the computational medium through discussion
firstly of the mathematical focus of the study. This leads into a description of the
rationale behind the setting adopted in the study. Finally I present my reasons for the
choice of Logo as the computational language used by the pupils and describe the
software developed for use in the research.
4.2.2 The Mathematical Focus
Simple function machines were chosen as the vehicle for investigating pupils'
construction of meaning through the statement of generalisation and justification.
Such function machines were familiar from the mathematics texts used at the school
and would have been encountered first when the pupils were approximately seven
years old. Thus pupils would be coming to the tasks with a relatively long history of
familiarity with and experience of using function machines, satisfying the criteria that
the mathematical activities used should be easily accessible and linked to the pupils'
curriculum and that pupils should approach any activities from a basis of their own
experience rather than one of school taught algorithms. Given the mathematical
experience of the pupils taking part and the degree of contact they would have had
with the concept of function machines it was reasonable to assume that this concept
was relatively concrete for most of the pupils. Function, and more particularly
function machines, may be modelled through a variety of representations: given the
right computational medium, pupils could be offered a rich set of models around
which they might construct their own understanding of mathematical function.
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Function machines were also chosen as being an appropriate means by which to
approach both generalisation and justification: verification of the ability of a
constructed function machine to model some pre-defined mathematical relationship
may be demonstrated by repeated testing of cases, yet additionally, generalised
statements may be made based on the algebraic expression of function machines by
means of a relatively rudimentary grasp of algebra. The simple concept of function
machines is, of course, a tremendously powerful one and so there was no problem in
providing through it mathematical experiences which, whilst rooted in their own
experience, would challengethe pupils taking part in the study.
4.2.3 The Setting
As a starting point it is interesting to consider Brousseau's (1981) description of three
situations which encompass corresponding forms of knowledge functioning:
action situations - requiring an implicit use of knowledge;
formulation situations - requiring the making explicit of concepts;
verification situations - requiring the justification of what has been made
explicit.
This model neatly underpins the rationale behind the setting of the mathematical tasks
used in the study. Pupils were grouped in pairs, each member of which had his or her
own computer to work on. Each task took place within a game-like context, whereby
pupils were challenged to construct a procedure from information presented in a
written form, working not in collaboration but in competition with a partner. In this
stage, which constitutes Brousseau's action sitUation, pupils worked independently of
one another on separate computers.
88
Chapter Four: Design of the Programming Microworid
The game context of the setting was designed so as to encourage pupils to ensure
(prove22 to themselves) that their procedure was correct, and to assert (prove to their
partner) that their procedure was either the equal of their partner's or better than it. It
was hoped that the challenge element contained in the game would provide the
motivation for ensuring that pupils would check, to the best of their ability, that their
procedure would always work (within the conditions described in the question). This
checking process, which I termed auto-ver/lcation, normally involved testing of cases
and so provided useful and relevant experience of empiricism. Auto-verification was
in fact an integral part of the construction process: in the "ideal" scenario pupils
constructed a procedure and carried out auto-verification, which, if negative, informed
the re-construction of the procedure, and if positive, confirmed the validity of the
procedure thus completing the first stage of the game.
The next stage of the game required pupils to prove 23 that their partner's procedure
did or did not work (again within the conditions described in the question); and further
to explain, analyse and justif their own procedure construction. This stage contained
two elements: the empirical testing of the partner's procedure, a process which I have
termed altero-verfIca1ion; and the analytical discussion of the written procedures,
which I termed juNt/Ication. Pupils had the opportunity of producing convincing
arguments in practical situations, and in those situations, justification was an integral
part of the mathematics and directly connected to the mathematical experiences
encountered within the task. Justification might occur spontaneously as a result of
the game context of the tasks, or it might be prompted by suitable researcher
interventions24.
"Prove" used here to indicate empirical verification or verbal justification.
23 Again used loosely.
24 See § 4.4.2
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An additional stage in the model was illumination: it was expected that the experience
of construction and proof would inform those same processes in subsequent, similar
tasks. Consideration of this element was not, however, a research aim of the thesis.
Thus, the proposed model contained action, formulation and verification situations (in
the sense described above by Brousseau). The design of the learning situation and the
choice of computational medium addressed potential problems highlighted by Laborde
(1989, p. 35): "The spontaneous formulations of pupils in mathematics often contain
implicit information and ambiguities." Use of the programming language forced the
explicit, unambiguous statement of mathematical relationships and the game or
challenge nature, in which the construction and testing of procedures was embedded,
created both the necessity and the desirability of making any procedure as clear as
possible (for if the mathematical relationships contained therein were self evident by
virtue of the construction of the procedure, then so too was the fact that the
procedure would work and that the pupil had won the game). This description
resonates with a remark made by Laborde:
Two characteristics are used to generate ... a construction [of precise and
unambiguous formulations]: the social dimension of the language activity and
its finality. The pupil's formulation is aimed at a peer who needs it to carry out
a subsequent activity which cannot be carried out without this formulation.
The fact that a peer is addressed encourages the pupils to be careful about the
quality of their formulation so that their classmate can manage the activity
which depends on it.
(Ibid. p. 35)
The "subsequent activity" in this case was the verification (altero-verification) of the
other pupil's procedure, but the relationship between quality of formulation and the
peer as addressee had marked similarities with the thinking behind the game situation
of the tasks.
The necessity both to construct and verify and to justify meant that there was a sense
in which the pupils' work bad a dual focus: whilst construction and verification was
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centred around the computer, the requirement to justify their procedures provided "a
forum where these ideas can be discussed and evaluated away from the computer"
(Hoyles, Healy and Pozzi 1994, p. 214).
The components of the setting are summarised in Table 4.1.
f jPjjI Actkvityji
Introduction	 Pupils receive a stimulus in
the form of a game to
design a Logo procedure
for their partner to use.
Generalisation	 Procedure Construction	 Pupils attempt to
Auto-Verification	 construct the required
Researcher Interventions	 procedure and ensure its
validity
Justification	 Altero-Verification	 Pupils test each other's
procedure to their
satisfaction
Verbal Justification	 In discussion, pupils
justify and explain their
own & criticise their
partner's procedure
Illumination	 In subsequent, related
activities, pupils use
newly acquired knowledge
and skills
Table 4.1: Gomponents of the Setting
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4.2.4 Logo and the Mathematical Concept of Function
The computer can help bridge the gap between formal knowledge and intuitive
understanding:
It stands "betwixt and between the world of formal systems and physical
things: it has the ability to make the abstract concrete"
(Turkie and Papert 1991, p. 346)
Considerable claims have been made for Logo. For example, Ortiz and MacGregor
(1991, p. 47) claim that it provides a "concrete framework" of procedures and visual
images which help to create mental imagely for the concept of variable and facilitate
the application of the concept to other concepts outside the computer environment
(Nelson 1987, Feurzeig 1986); also pupils using Logo retain their acquired algebraic
understanding (Nelson 1987) due to the mental imagery of algebraic concepts they
have developed (Ortiz and MacGregor 1991). These claims are couched in terms
which speak of mappings between external, teacher-imposed representations and also
make reference to transfer of understanding to other representations. Whether doing
"Logo algebra" provides the same understanding of algebra as doing "paper and pencil
algebra" is unclear. Noss suggests that Logo may have a role in forming "primitive
conceptions of algebraic notions" which may form part of a pupil's system of
algebraic understanding and it is this idea that "Logo algebra" may be one element in
the conceptual field25 of Algebra that is adopted here (Noss 1986, p. 354). Certainly
pupils would seem to have to experience variables in a variety of Logo contexts before
any transfer of concepts to "traditional" algebra occurs (Sutherland and Hoyles 1986,
Sutherland 1987). In fact Roberts, Carter, Davis and Feuerzeig (1989) find little
evidence to suggest that transfer of concepts occurs at all.
25 See Vergnaud (1982)
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Logo provides a model of function and variable which is reasonably consistent with
mathematical usage (Noss 1986). Research suggests that there are strong links
between Logo and "traditional" concepts of variable in the context of functions and
function machines. Logo is a functional language, i.e. one which interprets a program
as an "operation formed from simpler operations by functional composition" (Klotz
1986, p. 16). In a sense, any Logo procedure may be said to have an output, which
may include effects on the screen such as drawing and printing. (Indeed the command
FD 100 in turtle geometiy has an output in this respect.) A more restricted meaning
of output is a Logo object which can be passed from one procedure as an input to
another procedure Leron and Zazkis 1986, Sutherland 1987). Such an output is
generated by function machines which closely model "traditional" paper and pencil
definitions of a function. For example, a Logo procedure such as
to I :x
op :x * 2 + 3
end
models the function
f(x) = 2x + 3.
Logo was enhanced by the creation of TAB, which calculated output values for any
input value of a particular function defined in this way.
Simple function machines can be used to introduce ideas associated with formal
algebra. Logo imposes a domain of definition by means of error messages which reject
certain inputs (Leron and Zazkis 1986) and inverse functions can be generated (see
Feurzeig 1986 and Leron and Zazkis 1986). Children's difficulty in accepting lack of
closure (Booth 1984a, Collis 1974) and desire to make all expressions "equal to
something" (Chalouh and Herscovics 1988, Kieran 1983) might effectively be
addressed in a Logo context where they appear to accept lack of closure through use
of simple function machines like the above: 'Providing pupils with relevant Logo
experiences could be an important step in helping them to manipulate "unclosed"
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expressions in the algebraic domain" (Sutherland 1989, p. 337).
4.2.5 Design of the Software
As described in § 4.2.4, TAB made it possible to tabulate values for a function defined
in the way described. For the purposes of this study, this facility was harnessed and
placed at pupils' disposal in the form of the Calculator, a means of trying single
values in a previously constructed procedure (see fig 4.1). Numbers were entered in
the IN box and the input and output appear in the OUT box. For example, the
function mentioned above (op :x * 2 + 3) given the input 5, outputs
5 ..... . 13
Using the Calculator, a collection of values could be built up in the output box. This
simple context combined the advantages of a clear visual display with the requirement
that pupils select and have responsibility for the values, the range of values and the
number of values to be used for verification. In the initial phases of the study a more
complex program was available which could output a series of values within a range of
values for the input and at intervals determined by the pupils (similar to TAB). This
was rejected for the last phase of the study as the responsibility for selecting which
values to use in verifications was largely removed from the pupils who tended to use
the same range of inputs in each successive task26.
This format had the advantage of enabling pupils to verify their procedures
empirically both quickly and easily, thus effecting a close link between the expression
of the mathematical relationship defined by the algebraic language in which the
procedure was written, and the tabular format of the Calculator output which had
close connections with the visual format of function machines as encountered by
26 See Chapter 5 § 5.2.4 for an account of the evolution of the Calculator.
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pupils previously in their school mathematics. Thus the software gave pupils the
opportunity to express their ideas both formally (a condition Hoyles, Healy and
Pozzi (1994) describe as promoting successful group work) and in an informal,
empirical manner.
iteui:
function machine
ii1
[clear	 machine)
Figure 4.1: The Calculator Software
4.3 THE MATHEMATICAL ACTIVITIES
4.3.1 The Tasks
As with other features described in this chapter, the eventual content and order of the
tasks were the subject of much testing and revision, which is described in Chapter
Five. Here the final versions of the tasks are described in the order in which they
appeared in phase III of the study; the full set of tasks appears in Appendix Two.
The rationale behind the choice of function machines is described in § 4.2.2 of this
chapter. Each set of tasks was designed to last approximately one hour.
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Activity Type One: Function Machines
Since all the tasks in the study were based on function machines, the first group of
tasks in the series was designed as an introduction to function machines (a flimiliar
concept) in the context of Logo programming (a largely unfamiliar concept). Pupils
were shown how a simple function machine could be expressed in Logo and then
asked to write procedures to model function machines presented as in Figure 4.2
IN	 Multiply by 2
	
OUT
Add on 1
Figure 4.2: Paper Representation ofFunction Machines
In the subsequent three tasks in the first session, pupils were given a table of values
(from 0 to 10 inclusive) and asked to construct a Logo function machine which
produced these values, e.g. (Task 1.4);
Input	 Output
0	 3
1	 5
2	 7
3	 9
4	 11
5	 13
6	 15
7	 17
8	 19
9	 21
10	 23
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The functions (in Logo andf(x) notation) used in the first session were as follows:
Task	 Logo notation	 f(x) notation
	1.1	 op2*:x+1
	 f(x)==2x+1
	1.2	 op3*:x+2
	 f(x)==3x+2
	1.3	 op3*:x+4
	 f(x)==3x+4
	1.4	 op2*:x+3
	 f(x,)=2x+3
	
1.5	 op4*:x+1
	 f(x)=4x+1
	1.6	 op5*:x+2
	 f(x)=5x+2
Extra	 op:x*:x+2
	 f(x)=x2+2
Table 4.2: Logo notation /f(x) notation comparison for tasks in Session I
Activity Type Two: Amaze Your Friends
The second collection of tasks switched the focus from constructing function
machines on the basis of tables of values to modelling a function machine on the basis
of a written description in natural language of a mathematical relationship. This
relationship was expressed in terms of a puzzle typified by Task 2.1:
Amaze Your Friends .......
Pick a number between 1 and 10. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number
you first thought of Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first
thought of
TheAnsweris .......ONE!!!
Activities such as this clearly extended the idea of a function machine from those in
the first session and introduced opportunities for empirical verification and for
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justification of why the function behaved as it did. Each question was defmed within
the domain of input xc (1, ... 10) in order to avoid division by zero. The expected
procedures in the second set of tasks were as follows:
Task	 Logo notation	 f(x) notation
	2.1	 op(:x*2+:x)/3/:x
	
2x+xfix) =
3x
	2.2	 op(:x*2*24)/4+1	 4x-4 +1
	2.3	 op((:x+2)*48)/:x	 4(x+2)-8fix) =
x
Table 4.3: Logo notation /f(x) notation comparison for tasks in Session 2
Activity Type Three: Consecutive Nu,nbe,c
The tasks in the third session called for interpretation of a number of functions
centred round properties of consecutive numbers. For example, Task 3.1 read as
follows:
Write a Logo procedure which adds the input to the next consecutive number,
e.g. fyou input 5, it adds 5 and 6 and outputs 11.
Here it was anticipated that empirical verification would become more difficult
because empirical results were not well known to the pupils in the way that they had
been in the previous groups of tasks. Thus justification of the validity of a procedure
by analytical means became a more important issue in these and later tasks. (The
issue of the shifting balance between empirical verification and justification is
examined in § 4.3.2). The expected procedures in this group of tasks were as follows:
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Task	 Logo notation	 f(x) notation
	3.1	 op:x+:x+1	 f(x)=x+x+1
	3.2	 op:x+:x+:x+2	 f(1i)=x+x+1±x+2
	3.3	 op :x* (:x- 1)	 f(x) =x (x- 1)
Extra	 op:x*(:x1)*(:x+1)	 f(x)=x(x-1)(x+I)
Table 4.4: Logo notation /f(x,) notation comparison for tasks in Session 3
Activity Type Four: Odds and Ens
The final group of tasks centred around properties of odd and even numbers. These
functions were probably the least familiar to the pupils. For example, the first task
(Task 4.1) was stated as follows:
Write a procedure which will always output an even number, whatever number
you use as an input.
Whilst the fact that even numbers are divisible by two would have been familiar to the
pupils, asking them to generate even (and then, in Task 4.2, odd) numbers in this
fashion would have been a new idea for them. The final problems in this session
(Tasks 4.3 - 4,5) were the most difficult, They introduced two variables and required
pupils to use the knowledge they had acquired in Tasks 4.1 and 4.2 for generating
even and odd numbers to produce functions for generating the sums of two even
numbers, two odd numbers and finally an even numbers and an odd number.
The expected procedures in the fourth series of tasks were as follows:
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Task	 Logo notation	 f(x) notation
4.1	 op:x*2	 f(x)=2x
4.2	 op:x*2+1	 f(x,)=2x+1
4.3	 op(:x*2)+(:y*2)
	 f(x,y)=2x-i-2y
4.4	 op(:xt2+l)+(:y2+1)	 f(x,y)=2x+1+2y+I
4.5	 op(:x*2)+(:y*2+1)
	 f(x,y)=2x+2y+1
Table 4.5: Logo notation /f( notation comparison for tasks in Session 4
The tasks in the latter stages of the study were designed to engender discussion: in
each there were a number of issues which could be raised by the researcher which
might draw the pupils beyond simple empirical verification to using the structure of a
procedure as a tool for analysing its mathematical behaviour. This important feature
is examined in the following section.
4.3.2 The Verification! Justification Balance
The nature of the tasks created a changing role for verification: a series of situations
was created through which it was intended that pupils should feel the need to shift the
emphasis successively away from empirical testing towards analysis. The learning
situation provided both a framework wherein pupils might cany out empirical testing
(i.e. empirical testing controlled by the pupil), and a structured medium through which
they were able to justify, to explain and to structure their ideas.
Initial activities (Function Machines: Tasks 1.1 - 1.3) did little more than present
opportunities for simple empirical verification, but led into those tasks where
exhaustive verification (within the limited domain defined by the question) was
possible (Function Machines: Tasks 1.4 - 1.6). Information was presented in a
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tabular form similar to that which appeared on the computer, so a direct comparison
might be made between question and computer output. (It was, of course, necessary
only to verify two examples in these linear functions in order to demonstrate that
they were correct. Non-linear functions were also included - e.g. the extra task in
Function Machines and tasks in the Amaze Your Friends section - although it was not
anticipated that the type of function would influence perceptions of what constituted
sufficient empirical testing amongst the pupils taking part in the study.)
The second group of activities (Tasks 2.1 - 2.3) also provided the opportunity for
exhaustive verification within the domain defined by the question, but here there was
no tabular presentation for comparison: individual outputs needed to be checked
against mental calculation from the written question details; also the range defmed by
the domain had to be interpreted from the natural language presentation of the
question,
Exhaustive verification was impossible in subsequent tasks, and this, combined with
unfamiliarity with the expected outputs, reduced the relevance of empirical testing.
For example, in Task 3.3 (a procedure for generating the product of two consecutive
numbers), pupils were not instantly familiar with the product of a number and that
immediately preceding it, and consequently had no strong expectation of what their
procedure would output.
With a reduced relevance on empirical testing as a means of persuasion (remembering
still the game-like context of the learning situation and the necessity for pupils to
convince one another of the validity of their procedures), another means of persuasion
now became necessary, and it was here that the emphasis shifted from verification by
empirical means to explanation and justification by consideration of the constructed
procedure. This persuasion was necessarily supported by interventions from the
researcher the researcher's role is discussed in the following section. The shifting
balance between empirical verification and justification is summarised in Table 4.6
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Two or three values	 Function Machines 1.1 - 1.3	 No apparent necessity
tested
Exhaustive	 Function Machines 1.4 - 1.6	 No apparent necessity
Exhaustive; central to	 Amaze Your Friends 2.1 -23 Leads on from
construction process	 exhaustive verification;
brackets initiate
justification
Less relevant as results 	 Consecutive Numbers 3.1 - 3.3 Necessary for
are not well known	 understanding of 3.3
Relevant, but refined use Odds and Evens 4.1 - 4.2	 Simple but convincing
possible
Confusing: results	 Odds and Evens 4.3 - 4.5	 Extension of above, and
totally unfamiliar 	 less confusing than
verification
Table 4.6: The Validation/JusttIcation Balance
4.4 THE PUPIL/RESEARCHER RELATIONSHIP
4,4.1 Introduction
Laborde (1989) describes a number of constraints which influence the didactic system.
Two of these provide useful points for consideration in describing the relationship
between pupils and researcher within the setting:
i) the pupils' concepts, their mode of cognitive development which condition
access to new knowledge; and
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ii) the teacher-learner asymmetry in relation to the knowledge embedded in
teaching situations.
To provide an insight into pupils' existing concepts at the outset of the main part of
the study (i.e. Phase III) I devised a pre-task interview. This interview is described in
detail in Chapter 6 ( 6.3.2) and the full questionnaire appears in Appendix One. An
indication of the pupils' ability level is given in § 6.3.1 (using standardised tests
administered by the school) and where relevant their previous experience of
programming using Logo is summarised.
As Laborde suggests, the relationship between researcher and pupils is one of the
utmost importance. From the outset, the researcher's role was seen as an active one,
with an important interactive part to play throughout the course of the activities. In
Chapter Three, reference was made to the "mathematical community" and, in the
learning situation described in this study, that community is made up of the pupils
and the researcher, with the researcher occupying an essential but clearly defined role
within that community. Thus the role of the researcher is an extremely important one
and one which I describe in considerable detail in the following section.
4.4.2 The Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher was developed and evaluated through the course of Phases I
and II of the study. This role varied widely, depending on the nature of the learning
situation. Whilst the researcher's primary role was usually one of observation, in
research situations such as that described in this study, an active role in the provision
of cognitive support carried almost equal weight. Cognitive support came through
intervention on the part of the researcher, and here important distinctions must be
made between types and purposes of intervention. Intervention, whilst generally
supportive in nature, contains one or more of three elements: instruction, support and
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exploration. Interventions, then, can be categonsed as: those which in some way
instruct pupils; those which support pupils' work with the aim of helping them
progress further, and those which seek to explore more openly pupils' perceptions
and understandings of a concept.
Within each category a number of sub-categories may be identified:
Instructive Intervention
introduction of a new concept may occur at the beginning of an activity or part
way through it and is characterised by direct, un-searching explanation, necessary
to equip pupils with the information to proceed further;
complete explanation generally concludes an activity (or at any rate that part of
the activity which is useful for research purposes).
Supportive Intervention
partial or complete explanation may be used to facilitate the next stage in an
activity;
attention focusing may be used to highlight one particularly fruitful avenue for
enquiry, or a particular bug in a procedure, particularly if the pupil's attention has
lingered unduly on an unfruitful or unhelpful area;
if the learning situation involves a language other than the pupil's natural language,
then a syntactic explanation may remove the problem of awkward syntax
clouding the mathematics which should provide the true focus of the research;
if a pupil makes a statement, a request for clarification by the pupil may
provide a clearer re-statement (for the researche?s benefit) or give the pupil a
second opportunity to correct any mistakes or misleading phraseology previously
used, or even to shift the focus of attention;
clarification by the researcher helps to make clear to the researcher what the
pupil has just said and gives the pupil feedback on whether or not he has
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communicated his ideas clearly. This re-statement may be verbatim (to lead to
clarification) or re-phrased (to re-focus attention);
simple confirmation or rejection gives pupils confidence to plan their next
move;
offered at vital moments to stimulate further activity, encouragement may
involve re-focusing attention;
if pupils are struggling with one particular representation at one particular level of
abstraction, the researcher can offer support by a re-presentation of the idea in a
form which the pupil may find more approachable.
Evploratory Intervention
One of the chief thrusts of the study was an investigation into how pupils' expression
of mathematical concepts was mediated by the computational medium. Spontaneity
was never anticipated as forming a major factor in the initiation of discussion, the
researcher's intervention coming to the forefront in such situations: "Argumentation
does not evolve in a proof spontaneously, but the specificity of the environment to
which the argumentation is related and the direct guide of the teacher may determine
this evolution" (Mariotti 1995, p. 187). The following types of intervention are thus
integral to the initiation and development of fruitful discussion:
• the researcher can use open questioning in an attempt to prompt the statement
of previously unarticulated thoughts, or to open up new avenues for exploration
(in a form of attention re-focusing);
closed questioning can also be used to explore and probe and to re-focus
attention;
re-presentation of an idea can be used to explore pupils' ability to express their
ideas at a more or less abstract level.
The nature of intervention varied according to stage: at the construction stage,
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interventions tended to be more widely instructive and supportive; in the justification
stage there was a shift of emphasis towards exploratory interventions.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have put forward a rationale for the design of the microworid and
activities used in this study, drawing on the issues discussed in Chapters Two and
Three. I have identified the use of activities centering on construction of simple
function machines expressed through the use of Logo within a game-like context as
providing a suitable means of offering a window onto children's expression of
generality and justification. An integral feature of the design of the activities is the
intended balance between empirical verification and verbal justification. The
important role of the researcher has also been highlighted as being of particular
significance.
In Chapter Five I trace the evolution of the design of the learning situation through the
first two phases of the study.
106
CHAPTER FIvE: RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY FOR THE
PRELIMINARY PHASES
5.1 INTRODUCTION: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The principal research focus for the thesis was to investigate how use of a carefully
designed computer programming environment structured children's expression of
generality and the justification of that expression. Rather than concentrating on the
setting out and testing of a predetermined hypothesis, the approach to research was
one involving observation of pupils' thought and learning processes. The main focus
for the research was the observation of pupils engaged in a number of mathematical
activities within carefully constructed learning situations. The methodology chosen
for the study was "illuminative evaluation" where the "primaiy concern is with
description and interpretation rather than measurement and prediction" (Parlett and
Hamilton 1972, p. 8), Such a methodology centres around "observation, interviews
with participants, questionnaires and analysis of documents and background
information, examined within the school context or learning milieu" (ibid. p. 11), The
researcher's role was viewed as one of participant rather than passive observation,
Case studies were made and episodes from these appear in the data analysis chapters
(Chapters Seven - Ten) to illustrate points made in the analysis, Techniques of data
gathering used during the course of the study are described in this chapter together
with descriptions of the initial phases of the study and an account of the evolution of
the learning situation.
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5.2 EVOLUTION OF THE LEARNING SITUATION
5.2.1 Overview of the Phases of the Study
The empirical part of the research was organised into three phases with Phases I and
II used for the iterative refinements of ideas in preparation for Phase III in which the
data used for analysis was collected. In the initial phases activities were devised, tried
out and, where necessary, their content was adjusted or their order re-sequenced.
Phase I
	 Phase 11	 Pre-Task	 Phase III
.:	 lntèrvie*	 :..............
Date of Empirical 	 May 1995 June - July October 1995 October 1995 -
%Vork	 :	 :	 1995	 January 1996
Number of.	 Three	 Four	 One	 Four
Sessions
Number of Pupils.
	
Two	 Six	 Sixteen	 Sixteen
(working in pairs)
Table 5.1: Summary of the Study Phases
Phase I was intended to provide a clarification of the theoretical orientation of the
thesis. It involved looking at possible tasks, their context and their relative timings. It
also looked at the software and provided some pointers for the eventual evolution of
the learning situation. Phase II continued the adjustment of software, fcilitating the
trialing of a new piece of software. It also involved the re-sequencing of tasks. The
main purpose of Phase II, however, was to develop a provisional scheme of
categorisation which would eventually form the categorisation for the analysis of the
main findings in Phase II of the study. A summary of the study phases is given in
Table 5.1. The following sections consider some preliminary thoughts on learning
situations and the balance between teaching and research and then trace the
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development of the learning situation through descriptions of Phases I and II of the
study. The categonsation which resulted from the second phase is described in detail
in Chapter Six.
5.2.2 Preliminary Thoughts: The Research -
Pedagogic Balance
The original conception for the study was one of several self-contained microworlds,
each of which contained instructions for its use and a clearly laid out course of action
for the pupils to follow. For example, a microworld was developed for constructing
procedures to output odd numbers and even numbers (Figure 5.1).
[Task 1•]
________	
IInPut-b0x1 I
(Make-odd]
I Input-box2 I
Figure 5.1: Initial Attempt at Software
The button "Task 1" printed out the first task for the pupils to attempt in the left
hand text bo,c
Odds and Evens I
You have to write a procedure which changes any number into an even
number.
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Call this procedure even.
If you have been successful, when you write a number in the input-box
and press the button 'make-even", an even number will appear in the
output-box.
The button "Task 2" printed out the second task:
Odds and Evens 2
You have to write a procedure which changes any number into an odd
number this time.
Call this procedure odd.
If you have been successful, when you write a number in the input-box
and press the button "make-odd" an odd number will appear in the
output-box.
Although such a self-running format might have a place within the classroom, where
the sole desired outcome might be for pupils to learn about the process of clnging
numbers into odd numbers or even numbers, it falls down n a number of counts as a
vehicle for research, Chief amongst these is that pupils are working within what
amounts to a prescriptive straight jacket of the researcher's perceptions of the task,
rather than in a situation where they are able to pursue their own ideas in directions of
their own choosing. This directly contradicts the position taken in Chapter 2 ("to try
to capture experience of the inner world from the inside ,,, by metaphor and
descriptive frameworks that resonate with other people's experience" Mason 198Th,
p. 208). Also, as Sutherland points out, "most of the potential of programming
within mathematics education will be lost if teachers over-direct students' problem
solutions by an overemphasis on pre-written macros" (Sutherland 1994, p. 186).
Thus very early on, the philosophy behind the construction of the learning situation
was modified to encompass a freer approach in which pupils were given greater room
for self expression.
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5.2.3 Phase I
Pwpase
Phase I of the Study involved observation of two pupils' work during three sessions,
each of approximately one hour. First came a session on function machines, designed
to introduce the pupils to the use of function machines in a Logo context and to the
use of the Tabulator27. In the second session, work involved concepts of odd and
even nwnbers. The pupils first devised definitions of odd-ness and even-ness and
then rules about odd and even numbers under addition and multiplication, When this
had been done, they were asked to write Logo procedures which modelled their
previously written definitions and rules, The third session was in two parts, focusing
on generalisation of number puzzles of the type "pick a number, add 2, multiply by 3
.,." and on defining and operating on consecutive numbers in the context of Logo
function machines, These activities are summarised in Table 5,2,
Session .
	 .	
. .:	 .	 .......	 Activity :	 . .
One	 Creating simple function machines from natural language descriptions and
tables of data
Two	 Creating Logo procedures to model definitions of odd-ness and even-ness
Three	 i) Generalisation of number puzzles
ii) Defining and writing procedures to model relationships between
consecutive numbers
Table 5.2: Phase JActivities
27 The sofiware designed fbr the study.
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Subjects
The participants, Joe and Daniel, were both eleven at the time of Phase I and in their
final year of primary school. Daniel enjoyed and was good at mathematics, whilst Joe
was about average for his year group in the standardised NFER28
 tests used at the
school. In their previous work with Logo, Joe had shown a greater willingness to
experiment with the computer and to make guesses which might well lead to the
wrong solution, whereas Daniel proved to be more cautious and more methodical.
Their previous experience of using Logo is summarised in Table 5.3.
Drawing shapes in direct mode	 'Use of Logo primitives: FD, BK, RT, LT,
HOME, CS, LIFT, DROP, ST, HT,
SETPC
Use of REPEAT for drawing regular	 Use of REPEAT
polygons
Use of Logo procedures to name	 Use of TO .......and editor
previously drawn shapes
Drawing shapes with fixed number of	 Procedures containing variables
sides and fixed angle, but variable side
length
Drawing shapes with fixed side length and Procedures containing variables
fixed angle, but variable number of sides
Spirals	 Self-naming procedures, recursion
Table 5.3: Pupils'Previous Experience ofLogo (Phase 1)
National Foundation fbr Educational Research
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Observations
Several important points emerged from Phase I relating to the tasks, the learning
situation and the ordering of the tasks.
Session One
In Session One an interesting dichotomy emerged relating to the use or otherwise of
turtle geometry. Should a link be made between operations on a variable in a function
machine context and the use of a simple variable in a turtle graphics context? For
example, might an intermediary step be the introduction of procedures such as
to square :side
repeat 4 [fd :side * 2 + 3 rt 90]
end
On the other hand, given the pupils' total lack of reference to turtle graphics examples,
their apparently hazy recollection of the use of variable in that context and their quick
acceptance of :x as a variable in the context of function machines, was there any need
for pupils to have previous experience of turtle graphics in order to use function
machines? Certainly, familiarity with Logo procedures was clearly necessary, but
even that familiarity might be learnt within a function machine context.
Daniel and Joe had considerable experience of turtle geometry and with nothing to
compare them with, the issue seemed important at this stage. In Phase II of the study
there was a spread of experience and inexperience (and in Phase Ill by chance exactly
half the pupils had experience of turtle geometry and half had none or next to none)
and no appreciable difference was observed between the programming ability of those
with experience and those with none, This was not a main theme of the study, but
the implication from casual observation would appear to be that previous experience
of programming in the context of turtle geometry had little or no effect on pupils'
ability to program function machines in Logo. Certainly all pupils were treated as
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"beginners" in programming in all three phases of the study and taught about the use
of variable with the assumption of no prior knowledge.
That said, once the pupils had embarked on the tasks, a reasonable degree of practice
in writing function machines seemed necessary to ensure familiarity with the language,
practice not afforded by the order of the tasks at this stage. Thus, in order to provide
this practice, the number puzzles in part three were placed directly after the initial
section on function machines.
It was hoped that the various tasks would engender interaction between discussion,
paper and pencil work and use of the computer. As it turned out, Joe and Daniel
appeared to do most of their working out in their heads and used Logo merely to
translate their previously worked out solution into the required format. The
Tabulator served as a checking device at the end. This implied a problem with either
the difficulty level or nature of the tasks, or indeed with the Tabulator software.
Given the scale of Phase I of the study it was difficult to reach conclusions about the
appropriateness of the level of difficulty, so it was decided to monitor this and the
use of the Tabulator closely in Phase II.
Session Two
The pupils' mathematical knowledge was greater than anticipated, so that they were
able to work out definitions and rules on paper and actually found interaction with the
computer in places a hindrance rather than a help, For this reason, this was in many
ways the least fruitful session. In fact, as far as the Logo work was concerned, the
pupils seemed out of their depth. This led to the decision that a position later in the
programme of tasks for the work on odd and even numbers would yield more of
interest to the research from the point of view of their familiarity with and therefore
willingness and ability to use the computer.
Observation of work carried out in Phase I provided a system for coding pupils'
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responses to the tasks. This system is summarised in Table 5.4 (some examples being
taken from later in the study). This coding was then trialed in Phase II.
_wTflll	 IJJ
term-by-term analysis 	 pupils discussed a
	 'Daniel: Because look; it'c :t
procedure in terms of its	 plus :1 would be ... urn
constituent parts, very	 say you had 4 that would
often pointing at individual be Sand then it wouldjust
terms on the computer 	 add :t again. It would only
screen,	 add the one you started
_________________ _________________ with.
empirical verification	 pupils checked that a
	 Sean: Now what should the
procedure produced an
	 output be f ii works?
expected outcome either	 Sandy: 9 + 10 is 19.
through mental calculation (They tried 9 in the
or by means of running the Calculator and gave an
procedure on the
	 output of 19)
____________________ computer. 	 ____________________
procedure construction	 the construction of a
computer program on the
_____________________ screen	 ______________________
natural language	 everyday, typically	 Joe: Every time you get a
spoken, language used in number and you times it by
the description of
	 eight it comes out even.
__________________ mathematical ideas
	 __________________
formalisedlanguage	 language concurrent with
	 Sean: The reason it hasn't
some accepted	 worked is because you told
mathematical formalism
	 it to add 6 to :m. It says
such as gx,y) functions,	 the next consecutive
number, so it wouldn't be
:m +6, would it? It's
more likely to be something
____________________ ____________________ like op :m + (:m + 1).
equivalent procedures
	 procedures which
	 to mmm :p
performed the same
	 op :p * 2
function but were	 end
expressed differently,	
to ilil :y
op :y + :y
________________ end
Table 5.4: System for Coding Pupils' Responses
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informed construction and procedure construction	 Richard: Well what I did, I
verification	 which was somehow	 looked at the veryfirst one
shaped by what had gone and il 0 and I saw that it
before it.	 came out 3. So Iput in 2
times, then the side and
then I added ifor starters.
And that came out as - I've
forgotten what that caine
out as. It didn't work, so
then Iput in - Ikept the 2
limes the same but I
changed the p1us to 2
instead of I and it was one
number away. Then Iput 3
there and it did work
Table 5.4 (contd): System for Coding Pupils' Responses
Session Three
In this session a lack of rigour became apparent in the pupils' work, particularly in the
boys' attempts to express their ideas verbally. From a desire to make pupils think
about what they were saying, the idea of a game context for the study emerged. In
such a context, the two pupils would be competing with one another and it would be
necessazy for them to convince one another of their mathematical discoveries through
the power of their verbal reasoning (thus demanding a greater degree of rigour). Such a
context would also have the power of eliminating the element of 'pleasing si? which
was also noticeable in Phase I.
The function machines which were constructed by Joe and Daniel in the "Amaze Your
Friends" problems constituted an obvious extension of the basic function machines
developed in the first session. For this reason it was decided to place this section as
the second activity in later phases of the study. It was interesting to note that the
pupils clearly very much enjoyed this work as it related to puzzles they had already
come across, thus creating close links with their school curriculum.
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In summary, Phase I of the study helped to determine a new order for the tasks,
summarised in Table 5.5:
Session (
	
.	 Activity .......
One	 Function Machines: Creating simple function machines from natural
language descriptions and tables of data
Two	 Amaze Your Friends: Logo generalisation of number puzzles
Three	 Consecutive Numbers: Defining and writing procedures to model
relationships between consecutive numbers
Four	 Odd and Even: Creating Logo procedures to model definitions of odd-
ness and even-ness
Table 5.5: Phase IlActivities
In addition, the game-like context for the tasks was born and the difficulty level of the
tasks and the use of the Tabulator became two major areas for review in Phase II.
Data Collection
Each session was audio-taped from beginning to end and the result later transcribed.
The researcher observed the sessions closely and made field notes, recording in
particular what the pupils were typing onto the computer (including iterations in
procedure construction) and other interactions with the computer (for example
pointing at specific terms on the screen). All procedures created by the pupils were
retained as Logo files and a print out of these was used to aid the transcription.
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5.2.4 Phase II
Purpose
The main purpose of Phase II was to review the use of the Tabulator software,
developed as a result of Phase I, to consider the difficulty level of the tasks and, most
importantly, to begin to form categories which would be used for analysis in the final
phase of the study.
Adjustments in Light of Phase I
In Phase II of the study, each of the three groups worked for approximately an hour
at each of the four sessions, The first session remained unchanged from Phase I and
dealt with writing and then devising function machines. This session remained
subsequently unchanged in Phase IlL The second session centred on the Amaze your
friends type of problem and was identical to the set of tasks used subsequently in
Phase 11129 with the addition of an open question inviting pupils to devise their own
puzzle. This was dropped from Phase III due largely to lack of time: in fact in Phase
III of the study no pupils had time to go on to this question. The third session dealt
with consecutive numbers and in addition to the Phase III question contained the
following:
d) Here's an "Amaze Your Friends" type puzzle using consecutive numbers:
Pick a number between one and ten. Add on one. Multiply this new number
by itself Call this nwnber AnswerA
Now go back to the number you first thought of Multiply it by the number that
29	 Appendix Two.
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is two bigger. Call this new number Answer B.
Now take Answer B away from A nswerA.
Try dfferent values for the input (use the Tabulator). What do you notice?
This question was also dropped from Phase III due to lack of time and also due to the
complexity of the question and the degree of explanation and intervention needed from
the researcher. It was felt that the remaining tasks provided enough data of sufficient
quality to warrant the omission of this task.
The final set of tasks, centering on the properties of odd and even numbers, was
substantially remodelled between Phases II and III. In Phase lithe computer-based
work was prefaced with a number of questions designed to ascertain some idea of the
pupils' existing understanding of odd and even numbers. In Phase ifi these, along with
other questions relating to the other parts of the study, were collected together in the
pre-task interview. The computer-based part of this section was confined to a single
open-ended question:
e) What happens when you add, subtract, multiply and divide odd and even
numbers? Can you think offive or six sentences to say what happens. You
could begin
çdC	 em44 (49€
In the event this proved to be too open ended, with the result that either what the
pupils produced was of little interest, or the researcher was involved (as in the final
consecutive numbers task) in an excessive amount of intervention. Consequently the
series of structured tasks used in Phase III of the study was devised. Changes to the
tasks as a result of Phase II are summarised in Table 5.6.
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Session	 Activity.	 Changes :.
One	 F unction	 None
Machines
Two	 Amaze Your	 Removal of final open-ended question inviting pupils
Friends	 to devise their own puzzle
Three	 Consecutive	 Complex puzzle question removed
Numbers
Four	 Odd and Even	 a) verbal questions removed to pre-task interview
b) original open-ended question amplified and made
more specific
Table 5.6: Changes to Phase IlActivities
Subjects
Phase II of the study involved observation of six pupils working in three groups of
two. Each group worked for approximately an hour at each of the four sessions. The
pupils who took part in Phase II were from a greater range in tenns of age and ability
than those in Phase I, or indeed those in Phase III itself. Sean and Sandy were both
able mathematicians30, but Matthew and Richard were less so, with Richard below
average, according to his class teacher, These boys were all aged ten at the time of the
study. The third group consisted of Scott and Daniel who were thirteen and twelve
respectively at the time of the study. Whilst Scott was reasonably able
mathematically, Daniel was well below average. (It may be apparent that all the
pupils used this far were boys. This was due to their availability and willingness to
give up their own time to take part in the two studies. However, the pupils who took
part in Phase III were boys and girls in equal number. The distribution of boys and
Gauge of ability here was based on comments from class-teachers backed up by NFER test results.
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girls is summarised in Table 5.7)
Boys	 I Girls••
Phase! :.
 II	 2	 I	 0
PbasellIl
	
6	 I	 0
Phaselli II	 8	 I	 8
Table 5.7: Distribution ofBoys and Girls taking parts in the Study
Observations
The main points to emerge from Phase I concerned the setting up of the game context,
the difficulty level, the order of tasks and the role of the computer software. These
issues are addressed in the following discussion of Phase II, and other issues are
touched upon which emerged in the course of Phase II and later provided foci for
observation and research in Phase III.
Construction and Verification
Evidence from Phase II suggested there was considerable interaction between pupil
and computer during the construction phase. The rarity of examples of pupils using
the computer merely as a means of recording their ideas coupled with the high
frequency of this behaviour in Phase I suggested that the level of difficulty of the
tasks was just about right, if children of comparable ability were to take part in the
final phase of the study. The process of auto verification (discussed below) emerged
as an important element in the construction process and implied that the processes of
construction and verification were less two discrete processes than two elements of
one process. Types and frequencies of verification would also need to be considered.
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At an early stage it became apparent that verification had two elements: verification
by pupils of their own procedures for the purpose of improving the construction of
their procedure; and verification by one pupil of another's procedure. Whilst, given
the environment in which the pupils were working, it seemed that the latter form of
verification (what I have termed altero verification) was an ordered, discrete process,
the former type of verification (auto verification) was an integrated element in the
construction of the Logo procedures which made up the study.
Perhaps the most apparent distinction which emerged through Phase II was that
between verification which fulfilled the requirements of the question and that which
did not, Analysis of this distinction proved to be clouded by the software (as was
feared in Phase I) and re-development of the Tabulator was required.
The Tabulator software tabulated and output values of a function within a range
defmed by the pupil (Figure 5,2), Whilst a useful and effective teaching tool, this
failed as a research tool for the purpose of opening a window onto pupils' emergent
understanding of what constituted empirical verification. Built into the Tabulator was
the means to regulate both the range of the input values and the difference between
successive inputs, This meant that it was possible to consider, for example, single
values in isolation, a range of values ascending in integers, or successive even integers
(by setting the initial value to, say, 2 and the interval to 2),
In practice, however, the range of values for the input tended to be left unchanged and
therefore no thought was put into which and how many input values were needed (in
the pupils' eyes) for adequate verification of the procedure to occur, In fact since
most pupils appeared to forget about the facility to change the range of input values,
they treated the values previously set as constant, unchangeable and as the range of
values necessary for verification, In the Amaze Your Friends tasks (Tasks 2,1 - 2.3),
no pupils in Phase H recognised that the range defmed in the questions ("Pick a
number between 1 and 10") and the range of inputs previously set in the Tabulator
122
Chapter Five: Research Methodology for the Preliminary Phases
(inputs between 0 and 10) were at variance. (Here the range was important as an
input of zero led to division by zero in some procedures).
Procedure name
Initial ir
value
Interval
between
inputs
Final inj
value
Display of inputs and outputs
Figure 5.2: The Tabulator Software
The Tabulator, with inputs treated as unchangeable, also filed to make adequate
distinction between odd and even inputs in the Odds and Evens Tasks (Tasks 4.1-
4.4). Here it was important to consider independently the effect of odd and even
numbers and it was important for pupils consciously to select, test and observe the
effect of odd numbers in their procedures as distinct from even numbers. Whilst the
Tabulator in its invariant form included both odd and even inputs, they appeared in
numerical rather then type order.
Now, it could be argued that pupils were misled by the previously set values and that
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if no values were set in the first place, pupils would be forced to consider their own
values for each verification. Phase II suggested, however, that once a set of values had
been arrived at (and it tended to be values from 0 to 10 since the Function Machines
examples were illustrated with tables of values with inputs from 0 to 10), then pupils
showed no inclination to change them.
In short, then, the Tabulator, through its misuse (or, more precisely, uninformed use),
filed to give pupils control over, and even responsibility for, their own verification.
Yet the visual impact and the potential for selective inputs were features worth
making use of. What was needed was something which combined visual impact with
the necessity to consider and select input values. To meet these demands the
Calculator was developed (Figure 5.3). Based on, but much simpler than the
Tabulator, this only allowed the selection of one input value at a time, but had the
advantage of displaying and retaining input and corresponding output values in a large
textbox in the order in which they were entered, so that, for example, a table of inputs
from I to 10 or a collection of even inputs and their corresponding outputs could be
built up f1hat was what the pupil saw as the appropriate set of inputs for ver^cation
in a particular case.
function machinej
[çar-in 
.1
[clèifunction machine]
Figure 5.3: The Cakulator Software
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Justification
Phase II certainly appeared to suggest that justification, be it through spontaneous
discussion or through researcher-given prompts, developed the ability to make
reasoned statements about procedures which went beyond trivial tenn-by-term
descriptions, to draw out general statements from the consideration of specific
examples, and to talk in a generalised way about procedures without reference to
specific examples, and to express notions ofjustification.
The important focus for Phase III would be identifying the role of the computer in
facilitating these activities.
Some pupils experienced confusion in the Amaze Your Friends problems over the
difference between specific examples and the general case; if in the initial oral
examples they had chosen, say, 7 as the input, then there was a temptation to use 7 in
the procedure as the number to be operated upon. This anomaly (which I later refer
to as semi-generalisation31 ), rather than posing a problem as I first feared it would,
turned out to be an important source of data in the analysis of Phase III,
It became increasingly clear that in the majority of cases, justification and verification,
whilst easily discernible in analysis, were difficult to separate in practice. The
distinct phases outlined in the model of the components of the setting 32 simply did
not occur as such. This did not invalidate this model, but highlighted potential pitfalls
during the analysis phase. It implied importantly that whilst analysis of construction,
verification and justification might be carried out in isolation (at least initially), the
relationship between these elements would also be of importance, and that the
31 SeeChapter8, § 8.2.
32 Table 4.1
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common themes running through these elements would provide foci for analysis. The
balance between verification and justification came through strongly as an area for
further investigation.
Researcher Intervention
The precise nature of the role of the researcher emerged through the course of Phase II
and this role is described in detail in Chapter Four 33 . Although an introduction was
envisaged at the outset of each task, the number of additional interventions which
were needed at further points during the construction phase, which was originally
seen as being free of inteijections, was not envisaged. As has been described above,
certain tasks were modified or dropped because of the difficulty level and the
consequent need for excessive researcher intervention. Expectations of spontaneous
discussion ensuing from the verification process proved exaggerated; in reality, the
situation was too staged to allow a great deal of spontaneity 34
 and it was often
necessary to illicit pupils' views by means of careful intervention. The rationale
behind the interventions is also examined in Chapter Four.
One intervention which became standard was in connection with the use of brackets.
Although all children had encountered and used brackets in the course of their school
mathematics lessons, they had not previously encountered them in a Logo context and
an inteijection proved necessary in the course of the Amaze Your Friends tasks (Task
2.1). This was done at a point where pupils had produced an otherwise correct
procedure but were getting apparently inexplicable answers due to the lack of
brackets. The inteijection was simple: pupils were asked to work out the following
two expressions
(2x3)+1 and 2x(3+1)
SeeChapter4, § 4.4.2
Although important exceptions to this are discussed in Chapter Ii, § 11.7.1.
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and then the following two:
(2 + 3 + 5)/5 and 2 + 3 + (5/5)
It was then suggested that they consider the use of brackets in their procedures. A
second intervention concerned the use of brackets within brackets, i.e. the
enumeration of the innermost set of brackets first35
In summary, the following points emerged as foci for analysis in Phase III of the
Study:
• types of verification and choice of values used;
• frequency of verification;
• relationship between verification and construction;
the role of the software in the verification process;
• the changing role of verification;
• semi-generalisation;
relationship between justification and verification.
Data Collection
The processes of data collection in Phase H of the Study remained the same those in
Phase I:
• audio-tapes taken from beginning to end and the result later transcribed;
• close observation of the sessions by the researcher,
• field notes made by the researcher (recording what the pupils typed and how they
interacted with the computer);
Logo files of pupils' work made and printed out as an aid to transcription.
This was referred to as the Inverse Dinner Party Analogy, given that use of brackets is precisely
opposite to the use of cutlery at a dinner party consisting of several courses.
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5.3 CONCLUSION
In Chapter Five the evolution of the learning situation has been charted from early
ideas through the initial two phases of the study to the point where the final phase
was ready to be undertaken. The main points of development concerned:
i) the difficulty level and order of the tasks;
ii) the codmg of the data;
iii) the emergence of the game-like context;
iv) the evolution of the software to enable a better insight into children's
creation of meaning; and
v) the role of the researcher.
In the next chapter, a new theoretical framework is discussed, arising as a result of
these initial phases. This is followed by a description of the methodology of the main
study (Phase III), after which an initial analysis of the main study data leads to the
formulation of research questions.
128
CHAPTER Six: FRAMEWORK AND
METHODOLOGY FOR THE MAIN
STUDY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the foregoing chapters of the thesis I have identified some important theoretical
concepts through a discussion of literature on representation and abstraction (Chapter
Two), I have explored the literature proof and processes of proof in order to gain a
perspective on processes of generalisation and justification (Chapter Three) and I
have described the design of the programming microworid used in the study (Chapter
Four).
Chapter Six looks, Janus-like, back into the old and forward into the new back in the
sense that as a result of some initial findings from Phases I and II of the study
(described in Chapter Five), I shall draw together strands from the preceding chapters
in order to present my own theoretical stance which will then provide the focus for
research in the final phase of the study; and forward in the sense that I shall then
describe the methodology for the final phase of the study and identify broad
categories for analysis of data which then form the remaining chapter headings of the
thesis, The various elements of this chapter will also be brought together to frame a
set of research questions.
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6.2 TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AS A
RESULT OF ANALYSIS OF PHASES I AND II
In the introduction to the thesis I used what I termed the S-column metaphor to offer
a possible alternative to the ordered progression through layers of meaning in some
predefined sequence which characterises so many theories of learning and which,
consequently, epitomises so many commercial mathematics texts and courses for
school children. I suggested that rather than ordered vertical progression through
layers of ever more abstract knowledge - entry to each layer being dependent on
complete mastery of that preceding it - children might acquire meaning through
examples of situated knowledge which simultaneously incorporated several layers of
abstraction. The emphasis here would be not so much a progression from one layer to
the next, but the interplay between layers. This I represented pictorially by a narrow
column cutting through the broad strata of knowledge - a bore-hole - (Figure 6.1) to
signifr at once the limited nature of the concept confined to its specific situation, and
the inclusion within that concept of multiple levels of abstraction.
Figure 6.1: Model S - Speqflc Naive Schemata: situated "bore holes" are shown
cutting through the strata ofordered knowledge
Since then, in Chapter Two, I have described Wilensky's subjective definition of
concrete (and abstract) and his use of the term concretion, developing a theory where
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children construct meaning in an apparently unique fashion, building their own mental
representations and making all-important links between these representations, within
the important parameters of situation and context. Within this theory, then, I am
suggesting that meaning is subjective and that perception of what is and what is not
concrete is similarly subjective. In Chapter Two I also described the webbing theory
developed by Noss and 1-loyles (1996). As part of this theory they take a view of
abstraction which - resonating closely with Wilensky's ideas - extends the S-column
metaphor to view the process of abstraction not as the replacement of one kind of
meaning by another but rather as the creation of connections between ways of
knowing. Meanings "become reshaped as learners move the focus of their attention
onto new objects and relationships within the setting" (p. 49). I want to concentrate
particularly on ways pupils use these new objects and relationships in their attempts
to express proof and generality, using the idea of a "web of meaning" as a framework
within which to make sense of these activities. This in fact is what Noss and Hoyles
term situated abstraction, that is where learners draw on the webbing of a setting to
construct mathematical ideas, and where the webbing shapes the expression of those
ideas. Thus the three theories of concretion, webbing and situated abstraction
underpin the theoretical basis of this thesis.
Now, the hierarchic ordering of representations - an interpretation perpetuated by the
S-column metaphor - becomes more and more at odds with this developing theoretical
basis, for it would appear difficult to reconcile such a hierarchy of representation as
depicted in the strata of figure 6,1 - an observer's uniquely subjective creation - with
the uniquely subjective creation of meaning and concreteness of each pupil as I have
described in this thesis, However, there is still a question of the place of local as
opposed to global hierarchies in understanding how pupils link their representations,
so for this reason I prefer to leave the question of hierarchy open until the concluding
chapter.
At the centre of the theoretical basis I have described - and at the centre of the
131
Chapter Six: Framework and Methodology for the Main Study
research focus for this thesis - lie children's representations of knowledge and the
ways in which they link these representations. It is not my wish, however, to
describe these constructs as "representations" and their connections "translations"
between representations, as with these terms comes a theoretical stance which I have
previously rejected36
 where the focus for research is on mappings from one external,
teacher-imposed representation to another. As has already been described, this view
of representation and abstraction is at odds with the pupil-constructed theory of
representation which lies at the heart of this thesis - and indeed the very term
representation lies uncomfortably with the idea of unique creation of ideas as opposed
to the replication of those of another. A further problem of terminology arises since
to remain entirely in sympathy with the webbing metaphor and also with Wilensky's
essentially subjective definition of abstract and concrete37
 it becomes difficult to
describe certain objects as being "more abstract" or "less abstract" than certain other
objects.
So in order to defme a terminology consistent with the theoretical framework, I want
to adopt the terms Expression of Meaning and Connections to signify the ways in
which pupils express their developing meanings in different forms, and the means
through which they connect these different expressions. I shall also use the verb to
re-express to signify the expression of a mathematical relationship in a new form.
Thus in general terms the focus for research in this study may be described as how
pupils shape meaning and this is viewed in terms of the creation of expressions of
meaning, their re-expression and the connections made between them,
How, then, do generality and justification fit into this theoretical framework? The
overall aim of the thesis was stated in Chapter One as follows:
36 See Chapter 2, § 2.2.2.
See Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3.
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To observe children's creation of meaning through the expression of
mathematical generality and through the justification of that generality.
Thus the focus for the thesis is on how children were able to express generality and
justification and on how, by forging connections between these expressions, they
concretised the concepts of generality and justification. The construction of a learning
situation which incorporated a programming microworid and the active participation
of the researcher was designed to create webbing which allowed them to generalise and
justify, the webbing shaping those generalisations and justifications. Thus the aims of
the thesis may be stated as follows:
i) to investigate ways in which children expressed generality using the
programming medium;
ii) to investigate connections between different expressions of generality
made in different modalities and their role in children's creation of
mathematical meaning;
iii) to investigate the role of connections between expressions of generality in
children's attempts to justify their constructed generalisations.
Thus the concept behind the design of the learning situation was to place within
pupils' reach a number of means through which they might explore, generalise and
justify mathematical relationships: the construction of function machines in a formal
computer programming language; the empirical testing of constructed functions within
a competitive environment; the tabular display of ordered pairs; the verbal and
empirical justification (in natural or other language) of constructed functions, within
both a competitive situation and a collaborative situation, the latter involving both
pupils and researcher. It was my wish not to force my expressions of meaning of the
tasks I had set on the pupils who were canying them out, but at the same time it was
necessary to balance this desire with the need to make available to pupils a variety of
possible means of expressing their ideas.
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Now, Noss and Hoyles (op cit) confine their discussion of the webbing theory largely
to an exploration of what I have defined as expressions of meaning, rather than to the
means of making connections between these expressions of meaning. Focusing on
how pupils create connections between expressions of meaning for generality is an
important and necessary development towards gaining further insights into how
children make sense of and express generality and justification within a situated
context. It is through focusing on the creation of connections that this thesis aims to
extend the notion of webbing and of situated abstraction.
The research foci from Chapter Three provide useful pointers to areas which may
provide glimpses into pupils actively engagedin the activity of creating expressions of
meaning for generality and justification. Chapter Three highlights the following foci
for possible research, Partially rephrased in the new terminology defined in this
chapter, these are as follows:
i) The relationship between construction, expression, generalisation and
justification;
ii) The connection between children's visualisation of mathematical
relationships (within the specific learning situation) and their expression of
generality and justification;
iii) The role children's construction of programs plays in effecting the
abstraction of mathematical relationships;
iv) Ways in which children's exploration of particularity leads to generality;
v) The creation of connections between expressions of meaning;
vi) The role of connections in the shaping of meaning
vii) The relationship between the language of construction, the language of
expression and the children's own natural language within a specific learning
situation;
viii)The role which computer-mediated language plays in the construction and
expression of generality and justification,
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From consideration of these foci from Chapter Three and from tentative findings from
the initial phases of the study, the following five research questions emerge:
1) How does the use of empirical verification mediate the expression of
generality through the construction of formalised procedures?
ii) How do tensions in the balance between empirical verification and
justification mediate the creation of connections between expressions of
meaning?
iii) How and to what extent does formalised language act as a means of
connection or dislocation between expressions of meaning?
iv) How does the contrast and comparison of equivalent procedures shape the
exploration of structure within mathematical relationships?
v) How does the computer mediate the creation and use of generic examples
as a bridge between the specific and the general?
As a preliminary to attempting to answer these questions, I felt it necessary to carry
out an initial analysis of the data from the final phase of the study. This was in order
to look at ways in which pupils appeared to express generality and justification in
their work so as to build up a picture of some of the possible elements in individual
webs. Although meaning is subjective and consequently each web is unique, there
was every reason to suppose that individual webs would contain similar expressions
of meaning, The identical learning situations in which pupils worked and the similar
mathematical backgrounds from which they came suggested some commonality of
means of expression, This initial analysis appears in Section 6.4 and leads to a
refinement of the research questions,
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6.3 METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PHASE III
In this section I look at the organisation of the third and final phase of the study.
6.3.1 Subjects
Phase III of the Study involved eight pairs of children, selected largely on the basis of
standardised scores obtained in NFER 38 Mathematics Tests administered annually by
the school the children attended (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Pupils participating in Phase III ofthe Study
These scores place all children involved above the average (100), with most within the
top five percent. The children were all aged nine or ten at the time of the study and
volunteered to take part in the study, which was carried out in the children's own time
National Foundation for Educational Research
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(lunch hours and after school or at weekends). The nine year old children had a little
experience of turtle geometry having been taught the previous year by the researcher
who was also a teacher at the school; the ten year old pupils had no experience of
Logo. Pairings were chosen by the pupils on the grounds of friendship and consisted
of four pairs of boys and four pairs of girls, two each from Year 5 (Groups B, C, D
and H) and two each from Year 6 (Groups A, E, F, and G) 39. During the research
sessions (each lasting approximately an hour) each group attempted one of the four
sets of tasks.
6,3,2 The Pre-task Interview
Each child received an individually administered pre-task interview which was
recorded on audio tape. The interview had four objectives. It sought to gain an
insight into:
pupils' understanding of the mathematical concepts involved in the study tasks;
pupils' ability to express their ideas in natural language or any formalised algebraic
language of which they had knowledge;
• pupils' perceptions of what constituted empirical testing; and
• pupils' ability to explain and analyse mathematical relationships.
To achieve these objectives, the interview was divided into seven sections, the main
focus of each being as follows:
explanation of how simple function machines work;
working out of a rule for generating a set of tabulated values and describing criteria
for being sure it works;
U.K. compulsory school education is currently spread over twelve years: pupils enter school at the
age of 5 and subsequently spend Years 1 - 6 at primary school and Years 7 - 11 at secondary school
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• mentally calculating a string of operations and explaining why the answer is
constant whatever the starting number;
• definition of consecutive numbers;
• recognition and definition of even numbers;
• recognition and definition of odd numbers; and
• generalisation of changing odd to even (and vice versa) and generation of odd and
even numbers.
Results of the interviews were used to inform subsequent analysis of data and
references to the interviews appear in the data analysis chapters. The full
questionnaire appears in Appendix One.
6.3.3 Summary of Tasks
The rationale behind the tasks is described in Chapter Four, and the evolution of the
tasks is described in Chapter Five. Table 6.2 contains a summary of the final order
and content of the tasks used in the main study. The complete set of tasks is shown
in Appendix Two.
Table 6.2: Summary of main study tasks
(although there are a number of local variations in organisation).
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Session Three: Consecutive Numbers.
Task 3.1	 A procedure to output the sum of two consecutive numbers
Task 3.2	 A procedure to output the sum of three consecutive numbers
Task 3.3	 A procedure to output the product of two consecutive numbers
(described as a number and the number preceding it)
Extra A procedure to output the product of three consecutive numbers
(described as a nwnber and the numbers following and preceding
it)
Session Four: Odd and Even
Task 4. I	 A procedure to output an even number
Task 4.2
	 A procedure to output an odd number
Task 4.3	 A procedure to output the sum of two even numbers
Task 4.4	 A procedure to output the sum of two odd numbers
Task 4.5	 A procedure to output the sum of an even and an odd number
Table 6.2 (contd): Summary of main study taskc
6,3.4 The Role of the Researcher
The important role of the Researcher is discussed in Chapter Four( 4.4,2)
6.3.5 Collection of Data
Pupils were observed working at the computer-based tasks and field notes were made
during these sessions. Each session was audio-taped and the recording later
transcribed onto paper. This transcription constituted both a record of their work and
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a record of the researcher's intervention and the pupils' responses to those
interventions. In addition, computer files of the pupils' programs were retained and
printed out.
6.3,6 Phases of Analysis
Analysis of the data took place in three stages. Following the empirical sessions of
the study, each session was transcribed in full using the audio tapes, the files of Logo
procedures and the researcher's handwritten notes in conjunction. This done, detailed
case studies of each pair's work were made, shaped by the emergent categories for
analysis described earlier in this chapter. One such case study is reproduced complete
in Appendix Three.
The eight case studies were then used as a pool of data from which to draw pertinent
examples for the ideas discussed in Chapters Seven to Ten. Each example used within
these chapters is prefaced by a brief description of its content (presented as the title
in an underlined format).
Explanatory note on the presentation of data in the thesis
Much of the children's work involved the empirical verification of procedures. This
frequently involved writing a procedure, testing it using the Calculator, rewriting the
procedure and so on. Where this occurred and is relevant to the analysis, iterations of
construction and verification are shown as follows:
op :u * 5 + 2
Input	 Output
10	 52
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op :u * 5 + 1
Input	 Output
5	 26
op :u * I
Input	 Output I
4	 41
op :u * 1 + 1
What this shows is that the pupil constructed the procedure op :u * 5 + 2 and tried
the value 10 in the Calculator. This gave the output 52, displayed as an input/output
pairing. Because this was incorrect, the pupils changed the procedure to :u * 5 + 1
and tried the value 5 which produced the output 26. And so on. Such a method of
presenting the data was felt to be more concise and easier to analyse for trends and
patterns.
6.4 INITIAL ANALYSIS OF DATA
This section is an initial analysis of the data from the main study, Its purpose was to
get a feel for the data, to provide categories for analysing the data and to refine the
research questions.
Early on in the study, the expectation that pupils rarely worked within neatly-defined
expressions of meaning was confirmed. There was an "untidiness" in most pupils'
working patterns in that they were constantly re-expressing their ideas in different
forms. As such it was difficult to define categories for purposes of analysis in terms
of individual expressions of meaning: the overlap between expressions of meaning was
so great that it was necessary to begin with a few broad delineations and to look for
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further categorisations within these. These broad delineations, chosen as a result of
the initial phases of the study, were as follows:
• Construction and Verification
• General and Particular
• Equivalence
• Language Types and Roles
6.4.1 Construction and Verification
Consideration of the data from the initial phases of the study suggested that a view of
construction and verification as two distinct phases in the expression of generalisation
and proof was misguided. In fact the relationship appeared far more complex and on
the basis of Phases I and II it seemed more sensible to look on verification and
construction as two elements of one greater process of informed construction, These
two elements appeared bound together, one directly influencing and informing the
other, If this was so, this complex relationship between acts of construction and
empirical verification, and ways in which the computer mediated these two elements,
provided an important window onto how pupils made connections between different
ways of expressing meaning.
It also became apparent that construction/verification was not one "stage" in some
linear model of expression and justification, but rather an element integral to the whole
process of generalisation.
Turning first to the relationship between construction and verification, Sarah, in Task
4.2 (in which she was required to write a procedure which would output odd
numbers) adopted an approach in which construction and verification were closely
linked. She began with the common assumption that multiplying by three would
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produce an odd number and typed in the following procedure:
to usa :u
op :u * 3
end
She tried the following two values in this procedure:
Input	 Output
2	 6
3	 9
Not satisfied (rightly) with this, she reconstructed her procedure a total of nine times.
The verification appeared to inform her re-construction and after this first attempt she
reconstructed her procedure whenever she got an even number as an output. She tried
the following second line in the procedure usa:
op :u * 5
and then the following values in the new procedure (shown here with their
accompanying outputs):
Input	 Output
57	 285
10	 50
op :u * S + 2
Input	 Output
10	 52
op :u * 5 + 1
Input	 Output
5	 26
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op :u * 1
Input	 Output I
4	 41
op :u * 1 + 1
Input	 Output
10	 11
102	 103
5	 6
op :u * 2
Input	 Output
5	 10
op :u * 3
Input	 Output
0	 0
4	 12
op :u * 3 + 1
Input	 Output
3	 10
op :u * 3 + 0
Input	 Output
45	 135
2	 6
This example pointed to the formation of meaning through the complex dual process
of procedure construction and verification. Sarah adopted a loose strategy: three
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times she tried fixing the multiplicative factor (as 5, 1 and 3) and then experimenting
with the addition of various numbers (including zero). Unfortunately, in the case
where the addition of an odd number would answer the question (i.e. when she chose
two as the multiplicative factor) she failed to experiment and passed on to another
coefficient of :u.
In this example verification informed construction to a certain extent; in others there
appeared to be little or no connection between construction and verification, which
nevertheless remained integral parts of one process. What other forms might this
relationship take? It was felt necessaiy to obtain a full picture of this complex
relationship and the computer's role in its mediation. So this relationship between
construction and verification formed one significant categoly for analysis in Chapter
Seven. Part and parcel of the construction-verification relationship was the
connection between this use of structure, in verification and re-construction, and the
expression of structure through the expression and justification of generality. In
Chapter Seven I look at the part structuring elements had to play in construction and
verification as a window onto connections between expressions of meaning.
A related feature was that of the relationship between use of the computer to verify
procedures and the use of mental arithmetic for the same purpose. For example, Tom,
in Task 2,1, verified his procedure using the computer and then checked this
verification mentally. The task was given as follows:
Amaze Your Friends .......
Pick a number between 1 and 10. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number
you first thought of Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first
thought of
The Answer is .......ONE I!!
145
Chapter Six: Framework and Methodology for the Main Study
He expressed this in terms of a Logo procedure:
to nat :v
op(:v 2 + :v) /3/ :v
end
and checked that this worked by means of empirical testing of cases:
He followed up this testing on the computer by trying out some of the same values as
above mentally, using his written procedure for guidance;
Tom:	 Seven times two plus seven equals 19, divided by three. Eh?
Researcher: Are you happy with that?
Tom:	 Oh, I'll try a different number. Six, times two is twelve, plus
six is 18, divided by three is six, divided by six is one. Oh.
Fifty times two is 100, add 50 is 150, divided by three is 50,
divided by 5Ois one. It works.
There appeared to be a tension here between expectation and verification: if the
expectation was not "built into" the question or easily ascertained, then the provision
of an expectation and the accompanying verification of results became a factor. Thus
the relationship between mental calculation and computer verification was another
interesting element in the wider relationship between construction and verification.
In Chapter Four40, the intended shifting balance between empirical verification and
justification was discussed. The preliminary phases of the study suggested that this
shift did in fact take place: the important issue here was how this shifting balance
40 Section 4.3.2
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influenced the expression and justification of generality. As the balance shifted, did
pupils perceive a need for justification? Would encountering problems in the
execution of meaningful empirical verification lead to a desire for an apparently more
satisfactory form of explanation? If this proved to be the case, might the creation of
situations where there was a manufactured tension between empirical verification and
justification create connections between these two expressions of meaning?
Thus the relationship between construction and empirical verification contained a
number of interesting features. In summary, these included;
• term-by-term analysis - analysing the behaviour of a function;
• the computer's dual role in the verification process;
• visualisation of structure through procedure construction and verification;
• empirical verification as an integral part of the construction of procedures;
• verification versus justification - connection through tension?
6,4,2 General and Particular
A central and recurring theme in the pupils' work was the ever-shifting balance
between particular and general. Take, for example, Tom's explanation of why the
puzzle
Amaze Your Friends .......
Pick a number between 1 and JO. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number
you first thought of Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first
thought of
The Answer is .......ONE /1!
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output one. In the pre-task interview he had offered the following explanation:
Tom:	 Really, you'll get one because you're taking the number youfirst
thought of and you're limesing it by two and adding on which i.s
just like timesing it by three, and then dividing it by three and
then ofcourse fyou divide it by itselfyou'llget one.
After constructing the procedure
to nat :v
op(:v*2+:v) /3/:v
end
and verifying it empirically (see above), he gave a similar explanation, although with
the small addition of a specific example (input = 5) at the end;
Tom:	 Really, by multiplying by two and adding on the first number
you thought of then itjust like multiplying it by three. And
you're dividing it by three, so you've got the number you first
started off with And divided by the number you first started off
with -five divided byfive - andfive divided byfive is one.
Fortunately (for research purposes) his partner David had not been paying attention
so there was the opportunity for Tom to repeat his description. He apparently
thought that James could not follow such a generalised description so used a specific
example to illustrate it;
Researcher: Did you get that, James?
David:	 I didn't hear it.
Tom: I'll show you, I'll show you. It says pick a number between one
and ten, times it by two. So, say it was seven, you'd get a seven
putting on another seven. Add on the number you first thought
of which is seven -you're adding on another seven which is
three sevens. So it's just like mult:plying it by three. Divide by
three and you get seven, divide by the number youfirst thought
of- seven divided by seven - is one.
David:	 Iget that.
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This description was less generalised than the previous descriptions in that it made
use throughout of a specific numerical example to illustrate how the procedure
worked. However, this vaLue whilst apparently specific (i.e. = 7) was not chosen for
its specificness. Rather, it was chosen as a value typical of its class. The seven-ness
of seven was of no interest here: it was the fact that seven was perceived to behave
typically that made it Tom's choice. It was, in fact, an example chosen for the genus
of seven,
This example is typical of the study in showing the considerable amount of interplay
between general and particular expressions, mediated by the computer. The shift
between general and particular appeared to be another relationship which might open
a window onto ways in which pupils made connections between elements of the web,
and this relationship forms a focus for analysis in Chapter Eight.
6.4,3 Equivalence
The design of the learning situation facilitated a variety of solutions to each task, and a
variety of routes to those solutions. The following example shows two procedures
which were equivalent. This simple example of equivalence shows Sophie's and
Jenny's procedures for generating even numbers (Task 4,1): both explained how their
procedures worked and they saw that either procedure would work equally well.
Sophie and Jenny wrote the following procedures, respectively41,
to mmm :p
op :p * 2
end
41 Details of construction and empirical verification and not included here.
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to jill :y
op :y + :y
end
In discussion they compared their procedures and concluded that they were
equivalent:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Jenny:
Can you explain, Sophie, what you have done and why you
have done it like that.
The nwnber that you put in is timesedby Iwo, because whether
it's odd or even, ifyou times it by two it will always come out
as an even number.
Jenny, what have you done?
Well, I've done the same as Sophie, really, but I've put add the
same number as you put in instead of timesing it by two.
Does it matter which you do?
No.
No.
The contrast and comparison of procedures appeared to be fertile ground for the
exploration and analysis of how pupils expressed and structured their ideas of
generality. This perspective is explored in Chapter Nine.
6.4.4 Language Types and Roles
The role of language appeared to be central to the connection of disparate elements of
the web, so that analysis of this role forms a major part of the data analysis chapters.
A number of fruitful areas for investigation presented themselves.
Using the example of Tom and David working at Task 2.1 42, a variety of language
types and uses may be discerned. In the pre-task interview, Tom described the
puzzle's constant output of one as follows:
Quoted above in Section 6.4.2.
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Tom:	 Really, you'll get one because you're taking the number you
first thought of and you're timesing it by two and adding on,
which is just like timesing it by three, and then dividing it by
three and then ofcourse fyou divide it by itselfyou'llget one.
This was a natural language explanation described entirely in general terms and was
what might have been expected from the more mathematically experienced pupils at
this stage, given that Tom had had experience of neither traditional paper and pencil
algebra nor Logo programming as possible alternative means of expression. By the
discussion stage at the end of Task 2.1, the web of meaning had grown. Tom had now
encountered the natural language statement of the question and written his own
version of this question statement in a formalised algebraic language (his Logo
procedure), After procedures had been verified empirically and further discussion had
occurred, the researcher asked Tom to consider what he had written in his procedure.
Researcher: Can you explain that in terms of the procedure you've done on
the computer, then?
Tom:	 [looking at the screen] Well, number times two plus number is
three of the numbers. Divided by three is the number and
divided by the nwnber is one.
If for "number' we were to read some standard algebraic symbol such as x, Tom had
proved that the puzzle would always come to one in concise, formal, algebraic
language. In fact this statement was in a kind of dialect of formal algebraic language,
but it was a dialect of the language of construction, Thus Tom had expressed
generality and engaged in a proving process in the language in which he had
constructed the mathematical relationship (or at any rate in a dialect version of that
language).
Weaving through this example are the multi-faceted roles of language, roles which
appeared to influence and be influenced by all parts of the learning situation, and
which were shaped by the mediating influence of the computer, Not least amongst
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these was the part discussion took in the creation of meaning, and as part of that
discussion, the catalysts for engendering discussion, chief amongst which was the
researcher.
The role of language, which is explored further in Chapter Ten, appeared to
encompass at least the following aspects:
• a tool for the construction of mathematical relationships;
• a medium for the expression of mathematical ideas;
• a resource for discussion and analysis;
• a means of formalising mathematical relationships;
• a means of communication.
These four areas of construction and verification, general and particular, equivalence
and language types and roles provide foci for analysis,
6.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE REMAINDER
OF THE THESIS
The aims of the thesis, as described in Chapter One, were defined as follows:
i) to investigate ways in which children expressed generality using the
programming medium
ii) to investigate connections between different expressions of generality
made in different modalities and their role in children's creation of
mathematical meaning;
iii) to investigate the role of connections between expressions of generality in
children's attempts to justify their constructed generalisations.
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From the initial analysis of data from the main study ( 6,4), a number of research
questions may be framed which address these aims.
The role of empirical verification featured prominently in the children's work
reviewed, in terms of its relationship with the construction process and with analysis
of a function's behaviour. This empirical verification, an accessible and prominent
feature of the microworid, appeared to underlie pupils' ability to construct procedures
and to express generality, and provided an insight into how pupils created their unique
expressions of meaning, Tensions between empirical verification and the use of
justification, underpinned by analysis and even deduction, also appeared to offer an
insight into how pupils constructed connections between expressions of meaning.
Two related research questions emerged
How did the use of empirical verification mediate the expression of generality
through the construction of formalised procedures?
How did tensions in the balance between empirical verification and justification
mediate the creation of connections between expressions of meaning?
These questions are addressed in Chapter Seven under four organisational themes:
i) the act of symbolisation - the role of construction in creating meaning for
generality;
ii) analysis of structure - how this was facilitated by the programming
medium;
iii) construction strategies - detailed examination of different ways in which
pupils constructed their procedures, focusing particularly on their use of
empirical verification;
iv) perceptions of verification - pupils' perceptions and expectations of the
role of empirical verification and the relationship between verification and
justification.
153
Chapter Six: Framework and Methodology for the Main Study
A feature of children's work in the initial analysis of the main study was the use of
generic examples, so a resultant feature of the research was to look at ways in which
children appeared to create and use generic examples in order to provide a bridge
between specific and general. The related research question was:
How did the computer mediate the creation and use of generic examples as a bridge
between the specific and the general?
This question is considered in Chapter Eight under the following themes:
i) semi-generalisation - a form of webbing already identified as effecting
construction of generality;
ii) generic structuring - a term introduced to describe ways in which the
structure of a procedure was explored through the use of generic examples,
Children's exploration of the equivalency of procedures appeared to provide a focus
for examiningthe structure of mathematical relationships and again provided an insight
into children shaping their own meaning. This focus provided the following research
question:
How did the contrast and comparison of equivalent procedures shape the
exploration of structure within mathematical relationships?
This question is addressed in Chapter Nine through consideration of ways in which
pupils used equivalence to explore mathematical relationships.
Finally the use and role of language,be it natural, algebraic or computer-programming,
and be its purpose one of construction, explanation or communication, was a
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dominant theme throughout. Of particular interest was the use of language which was
in some way mediated by the setting and a particular focus of the research was this
mediating role. This prompted the following research question:
How and to what extent did formalised language act as a means of connection or
dislocation between expressions of meaning?
This question is explored in Chapter Ten under the following organisational themes:
i) comparing the use of natural and formal language - formal language as
opposed to natural language used as a common means of expression and
communication within the context of the study;
ii) naturalised formalism - a tenn introduced to describe how mathematical
relationships were frequently shaped by the structure of formal procedures
but expressed in natural language.
Thus the following four chapters consist of analysis of the main study data. In these
chapters I draw out ways in which children express meaning for generality and
justification and identify connections they make between their expressions of
meaning.
Chapter Eleven is the concluding chapter and in it I draw together strands from the
analysis of the data in an attempt to answer the research questions. In addition I
make some implications for teaching and learning and suggest areas for further
research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONSTRUCTION AND
VERIFICATION
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter Seven is the first of four chapters which examine the study data and from it
develop themes relating to the research questions. In this chapter, the relationship
between construction and empirical verification, which appeared central to the
process of generalisation and proof within the learning situations defined in this
study, is examined in detail. In Chapter Six I outlined an example where verification
appeared to inform construction, albeit to a limited extent; here I explore the
relationship between construction and verification, so obtaining a full picture of this
complex relationship and, importantly, the computer's role in its mediation, As
suggested in Chapter Four, the connection between the use of structure, in verification
and re-construction, and the expression of structure through the expression of
generality and proof is an integral part of this relationship and one which I explore.
The part structuring elements have to play in construction and verification as a
window onto connections between expressions of meaning is also an important focus
of this section. A related feature is that of the relationship between use of the
computer to verify procedures and the use of mental arithmetic for the same purpose.
The chapter begins with two important areas which emerged from phase HI of the
study as providing connections between expressions of meaning. These were acts of
symbolisation and the analysis of structure. Each area is discussed by means of
looking closely at data from the study and factors which influenced their execution are
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identified. The third section focuses on construction strategies employed by the
pupils and the final section looks at pupils' perceptions of verification, discussing
pupils' use of empirical verification in conjunction with their own expectations of a
function's behaviour, and the balance between empirical verification and justification.
7.2 THE ACT OF SYMBOLISATION
In this section I look in detail at two examples where the act of symbolisation was
central to pupils' ability to express their mathematical ideas and show how it
connected two diverse expressions of meaning for generality.
Example: Sophie and Jenny finding the visual structure of their p rocedures helpful in
shaping their description and in clariring the mathematical relationship contained
therein - 50 (F 2. 1)
In Task 2,1, Sophie and Jenny both wrote similar procedures:
to Jenny :h
op (:h * 2 + :h) /3/ :h
end
These had been constructed by means of a series of attempts which had been tested
empirically for various values of input using the Calculator. For the moment the
details of this act of construction will be skimmed over: they are taken up again in
Section 7,4, In the discussion that follows verification, the structure of the procedure
provided a focus:
Researcher: Can you say why it always comes out as one?
Jenny:	 Urn, because you...
This method of numbering was adopted in the original transcription of sessions from audio tape and
from the researcher's notes.
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Sophie.
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Because the number you get has always got either a Iwo or a
three in it and a Iwo and a three, you times it by Iwo and divide
it by three.
How do you mean it's always got a two or a three?
When you... Say the number was ten When you times it by
two which is 20, it's always got a two in it4 and then you add
ten again which comes to 30. So the first number's always got a
two in it and the second number's always got a three in it.
Right, Isee what you mean.
So you're timesing it by three and then you're dividing it by
three so it comes out.
But it doesn't come out as the same number, it comes out as
one.
Jenny:	 Well then you divide it by its own number so that makes it one.
Researcher: Had you worked that out before or does looking at the Logo
procedure help you to work that out?
Sophie:	 Yes, the Logo procedure.
Researcher: How?
Sophie:	 It's more spaced out so I can see it clearer.
Jenny:	 It reminds you of what the sum is.
This extract provides two interesting insights into Sophie's thinking:
Firstly, the visual appeal of the procedure; it was spaced in such a way (structured)
as to allow Sophie to consider, identify and express how it functioned, Sophie was
referring to the symbolic procedure structure rather than the natural language structure
of the written question she had worked from initially. One of the functions of
mathematical symbolism is to present relationships in as clear a way as possible, and
it is this function that Sophie had identified here, Although in this example she may
have expressed her ideas through use of Logo symbolism (i.e. using terms such as ";h
times two"), from what she said it would seem that her description of what the
function did is largely shaped by consideration of the symbolic procedure rather than
of the natural language statement. Her descriptions were in a kind of fonnalised
natural language which commonly served as an intennediary language between the
4' i.e. divisible by two.
i.e. divisible by three.
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natural language of the question and fonnal algebraic expression46.
Secondly, there is Jenny's statement that it provided a fixed, clear, concise record of
"what the sum is". This, of course, is another function of mathematical symbolism.
Because Jenny had constructed the symbolism herself, it was richly endowed with
meaning. For her - for both of them - the translation into symbolic form was a helpfid
act, creating clarity. This makes an interesting comparison with conceptions of formal
symbolism which are characterised by mistrust and misunderstanding. Use of
mathematical symbolism which is accompanied by little experience of the associated
mathematics would seem to create this mistrust and misunderstanding; the learning
situation experienced by Jenny and Sophie where an act of construction used the
symbolism as an integral part of a "concrete" mathematical experience, appeared to
create not just an acceptance of symbolic mathematical expression, but a perceived
need for it.
The act of symbolisation for some students created a connection between a problem
expressed in natural language and the expression of that problem in formal algebraic
language. There was a connection, then, between the visual nature of the algebraic
function and use and expression of its structure. What was it that caused pupils to
become aware of the visual structure of a procedure? It would appear to have been
the term-by-term construction of the procedure and the computer-centred verification
of that procedure which in turn required (or encouraged) term-by-term analysis of the
function's behaviour. The power of this act of symbolisation - the building of
procedures on the computer screen - extended beyond simply forging links between
two expressions of a mathematical statement to the transformation of symbols into a
new means of expression.
This idea of an intermediary language is developed in Chapter 10, § 10.3.
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Example: Tom manipulating the relationships defined b y a procedure in order to
express a proof - 39 (I-I 4.4)
In the work carried out by Group H in Task 4.4 the researcher steered the discussion
towards consideration of the output from the sum of any two odd numbers. At first
the two boys established that the sum of two odd numbers is an even number by
drawing on their own experience of summing two such numbers in the verification
phase of procedure construction:
Researcher: What sort of number do you always get?
David:	 An odd number.
Tom:	 Is that right?
Researcher: Go back and have a look [at the results of verfIcation on the
screen].
Researcher: It's odd plus odd, so what does that come to?
David:	 Odd p1 us odd has to be odd.
Tom:	 No. Nine plus nine is eighteen.
David:	 Oh yes.
Tom:	 An odd plus an odd is an even.
The researcher then asked them to explain this, focusing their attention on the
procedure which Tom had already constructed:
to bob :k :j
op :k * 2 + 1 + :j * 2 + 1
end
Researcher: Why is it always an even number? Can you say by looking at
your procedure ?
Tom:	 I know. An odd number add an odd number. An odd number
is an even number add one - plus one. Add another even
number plus one equals another odd number, but you have two
even numbers, but you still have the two little ones left over and
that makes another even number.
Researcher: So you end up with how many even numbers, then? Three even
numbers. Do you understand that, David?
David:	 I wasn't really listening.
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David's apparent lack of concentration (or his disinclination to admit to a lack of
understanding) was fortunate, as it gave Tom the opportunity to repeat his
explanation. In fact he restructured it:
Tom:	 David, I'll show you [pointing at the procedure]: to make an
odd number you need an even number plus one. So what you
do is you add two even numbers, but because they're odd
numbers you have to add the one - the two little ones still left
over. So from an even number you count one on to an odd
number and another one on to an even number. See?
David:	 Yes.
The first explanation might be written more formally by saying
If	 k*2 isevenVkcZ,
then k*2+lisoddVkEZ.
Thus the sum of two odd numbers may be written
(x*2+ l)+(y *2+1),
which can be written
(x2)+(y *2)+ I + 1.
Since I + 1 is even, this makes three even numbers and the
sum of three even numbers is another even number.
Tom's "repeat" explanation to David was markedly different. Expressed in a similar
format, it might read
If	 (k*2) isevenVkcZ,
then (k*2)+lisoddVkEZ.
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Thus the sum of two odd numbers can be written
(x*2)+(y *2)^1+ 1.
Since (x*2)+(y*2)iseven,
(x*2)+(y *2)+ I isoddand
(x*2)+(y *2)+ I + I iseven.
In both explanations Tom established the evenness of even + even (although from
different starting points). In the first explanation he then focused on the fact that I +
1 = 2, an even number, In the second, he began with the fact that even + even is even
and then counted on one to make an odd number and another to make an even number
(interestingly using the "alternate" idea of even and odd numbers which David
described in his pre-test interview: this explanation must have resonated with David).
How had Tom developed the facility to manipulate the structure of this procedure?
To answer this question it is necessary to go back to Tasks 4.1 and 4.2 through which
he had developed an understanding of oddness and evenness. In Task 4.1 (the
construction of a procedure which outputs an even number) he constructed the
following procedure:
to reg :w
op :w * 2
end
This was done almost spontaneously: pausing only for thought, Tom typed the
procedure straight onto the computer screen. He then tested the procedure with an
input of 7 in the Calculator which gave an output of 14, In all he tried the following
five values:
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Following this verification he declared
Tom:	 All you have to do is times it by two: it couldn't be simpler.
The researcher asked him why this was so:
Tom:	 It's easy, though, because every even number is divided by two
- can be divided by two. That means you can divide - you can
times every single number in the whole world by two, which
means that every single number in the whole world you can
make an even number by timesing it by Iwo. Because
everything is divided by two. Is nought always divided by
two? I know what I'm saying.
Researcher: Can you say that again? Why does your procedure make even
numbers?
Tom:	 Because even numbers are divided by two, then that means that
every single number times two will make an even number,
because it would be like dividing an even number by two.
Although Tom may have known this before (and the evidence from his pre-task
interview indicates this to be the case) he appeared excited by demonstrating and
expressing his knowledge through procedure construction and discussion. He was re-
expressing his ideas in a manner influenced by the form of the procedure: it is in this
way that this expression differs from that of the pre-task interview. He also
constructed and verified a procedure in a similar manner in Task 4,2 (the construction
of a procedure which outputs an odd number), Using the following procedure
to sid :s
op :s * 2 + 1
end
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he tried six values for the input in the Calculator
On being asked to construct a second procedure which would serve the same function
he wrote
to jim :1
op :1 * 2 + 243
end
and tried the following values:
Input	 Output
5	 253
4	 251
400	 1043
Thus Tom demonstrated his understanding of the generality of his procedure. He
commented:
Tom:	 So as long as it's got an odd number on the end it's airight.
Thus in Tasks 4,1 and 4.2 Tom had implicitly established the following Lemmas (here
re-expressed):
i VkEZ,(k*2)iseven
iiVkEZ,(k*2)+lisodd;
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From these, in Task 4.4 he had constructed and proved the Theorem
(x*2)+ l+(y *2)+ I isevenVx,yEZ.
He proved this theorem through the manipulation of his procedure. He did not
manipulate the symbols as such, as might be the case in a traditional paper and pencil
example, but manipulated the relationships defined by the symbols in natural language
(in what I shall describe as "naturalised formalism" 47). Here the symbols had acquired
a meaning different from the traditional symbols of paper and pencil algebra in two
ways: experience of constructing and verifying the Lemmas had transformed the
symbols into a means of expression; and the verification process had endowed the
symbols with a history of several specific numerical examples, although they
remained a generalised expression of a mathematical relationship. Thus, using the
symbols as both a means of expression and as abstractions of a recently concrete
experience, Tom was able to restructure his procedure (i.e. manipulate its symbols)
into a new form from the structure of which its proof became clear. This, of course, is
the process of formal proof. The difference here is that the restructuring of the
theorem statement necessary to its proof was facilitated by the expressive quality of
the abstract symbols, albeit expressed in "naturalised formalism" rather than in the
language of construction itself.
From these two examples, the act of symbolisation emerges as an important
connection between mathematical statements expressed in very different forms
(namely natural language and formal algebra) and between formal mathematical
statements and expressions of generality, the starting points for which are those
formal mathematical statements.
See Chapter 10, § 10.3
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An important influence on an ability to symbolise appeared to be the relationship
between construction and verification, a relationship which was prominent in the
computer-based learning situation designed for this study. Before looking at this
important relationship in depth I want to look at some examples where pupils
explored the structure of the procedures they had constructed and how, through this
exploration, they made generalisations about their procedures.
7.3 ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE
In this section I describe three examples which show how children's analysis of their
own procedure construction was influenced by the process of construction supported
by empirical verification, by the tabular presentation of verification data and by term-
by-term verification.
Example: Edward's symbolism acquiring meaning through iterative construction and
empirical verification -105 (G 3.3)
Task 3.3 involved writing a procedure which multiplied the input by the integer
immediately preceding it. In his attempt at this task, Edward wrote a procedure
which was correct in all respects apart from his use of brackets:
to jerrrr :j
op (:j * :j) - 1
end
Edward attempted to veri!y this empirically using the Calculator and then continued
to attempt to position the brackets correctly. At each step the verification informed
his next adjustment to the procedure construction. So after trying an input of 8,
which resulted in an output of 63
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Input	 Output
8	 63
Edward adjusted his procedure as follows
op (:j *) :j - 1
and continued testing values and adjusting his procedure:
Input	 Output
8	 -
op (:j * :j) - 1
Input	 Output1.2	 3
op :j * (:j - 1)
Input	 Output
8	 56
2	 2
When Edward was asked to explain his procedure he did so in a way directly
influenced by the preceding construction and verification:
Edward:	 It's 
.
J times and then the second part is say, wn, :j take one is to
do with that number, so it's :j timesed by :j take one, but ... it's
take one from the second :j so that instead of it being eight
times eight, it's eight times seven, because there's one taken
awayfrom the second :j.
Edward's explanation of the procedure referred directly to its structure, a structure
which had become clearly defined through the process of positioning brackets. It is
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through that process that he had come to appreciate the difference between
(:1 *	 - I
and
* (.1 - 1)
and why one modelled the task and the other did not. The learning situation required
pupils to formalise mathematical relationships in the form of a Logo procedure: the
construction and verification processes in this example shaped their understanding of
the structure of that procedure with the result that they were able to discern the
difference small adjustments to the symbolism could make. The effect of
manipulating symbols could be seen clearly through the empirical testing of different
values of the input.
Edward seemed to have learnt through using the learning situation that
61*J)J ^j(i-l)
For Edward the symbolism appeared to have acquired layers of meaning through his
experience of procedure construction 48. Term-by-term analysis of the procedure and
systematic restructuring, supported by verification, appeared to promote his ability
to generalise, to analyse and to justify.
It is interesting to speculate about the possibility of introducing standard algebraic notation and
demonstrating this inequality: such a step might well follow because the symbolism involved is the
same language as that with which he has constructed his procedure and the result is one which he has
just demonstrated empirically.
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Example: Ben's justification of a mathematical relationship influenced b y the visual
qualities of the verification- 45 (D 4.5)
In Task 4.5 (summation of an odd and an even number), Ben constructed the
following procedure:
to mixed :a :b
op (:a * 2) + (:b * 2 + 1)
end
and tried the following input values using the Calculator:
The interest here clearly lies in Ben's choice of pairs: 0, 1 and 1, 0; 1, 4 and 4, 1.
When the researcher asked the pupils to explain how their procedures worked, Ben's
response was shaped by his verification of the procedure:
Ben:	 Sir, sir, ij'you put two numbers ... whatever order you put two
numbers in, the output will always be the same.
Ben was clearly excited by this discovery, the discovery of the Associative Law of
Addition in action. He was saying that a and b are interchangeable, that
op(:a*2)+(:b*2+1)
and
op(:b*2)+(:a*2+ 1)
are the same thing. The discussion continued:
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This analysis of the structure of the procedure would appear to have shaped the
proof of why the procedure always output an odd number. The proof was restated
as a generic example:
Researcher: Yes. Can you say whether that always comes to odd or even
Ben.	 Odd
Researcher: An even number plus an odd number.
Ben:	 Yes.
Researcher: Why?
Ben:	 Well, as I said before, every odd number is an even number add
one, so it would be two even numbers together make an even
number and then add one makes an odd number.
Matthew:	 Yes.
Researcher: Good Can you be a little more explicit? Can you say a little
more?
Ben:	 Oh, I'll give you an example. Ifyou hadfour addfive, it comes
to nine which is an odd number, because it's the same as four
addfour - you add two even numbers together is an even
number - eight, and add on one.
Researcher: You saidjust now that you've got an even number plus an even
number makes another even number plus one makes an odd
number. Can you just say what are the even numbers there.
Ben:	 Oh, :a *2and:b *2.
This example brings together a number of different threads. Firstly, Ben's verification
of his procedure demonstrated the fact that the order in which the inputs were placed
made no difference to the output: Ben's investigation of the behaviour of the inputs
appeared to be influenced by the tabular output of the Calculator, making the result
particularly clear to him. Secondly, discussion and analysis of the structure of Ben's
procedure highlighted the relationships which were needed for the ultimate expression
of proof. Ben's construction and verification highlighted a mathematical property of
his procedure which he investigated further through analysis of his procedure and
which he finally proved.
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Example: Rachael's and Hannah's rehearsal of the behaviour of the function under
specific values appearing to highlight the structure of the function - 3 (B 2.1)
In discussion of why the procedure in Task 2.1 produced a constant output, Rachael
and Hannah were not able to explain immediately, any more than they had been in the
pre-task interview. For them, simply working with the computer had not been
enough to enable them to make abstract mathematical statements. But from vague
descriptions outlining some sort of intuitive theory:
Rachael:	 Well, is it because you're adding loads ofnumbers and then you
see how many numbers you take away and then you take away
exactly the same numbers in a different sum.
Hannah:	 Every number you start with, you just sort ofadd it on and then
you just take it all away again.
the structure of the Logo procedure (and the focus that structure provides for their
verbalising) and careful intervention from the researcher provided sufficient support
to build up a clear expression of why the procedure produced an output of one every
time.
to freda :y
op (:y * 2 + :y) I 3 / :y
end
Researcher:
Rachael:
Researcher:
Rachael:
Hannah:
Rachael:
Hannah:
Rachael:
Hannah:
Rachael:
Hannah:
Why does this always come to one?
Do you choose the number, and add a certain number and then
take away the number you first started with to get back to that
number?
Try a number in it.
[pointing at the procedure] Say three. Three times two is six.
Add.y.
Nine.
Then divided by three.
Three.
Divided by three is one.
Try five.
Five times two addfive is fifteen. Divided by three is three...
Because whenever you divide it always makes three.
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Rachael:	 Six times Iwo: twelve...
Hannah:	 When you're there [after /3] you'll always have three.
Rachael:	 It always comes to three.
Hannah:	 Yes.
The girls had found a rule, so the researcher asked them to demonstrate its validity:
Researcher: Give me an example, then. Take five.
Rachael:	 O.K. Five timesed by two is ten, add the number you started
with.
Hannah:	 Five.
Rachael:	 Fy'ieen. Divided by three is three.
Hannah:	 Three.
Researcher: Divided by three is three?
Rachael:	 Oh, five.
Such was the pupils' strength of belief in the rule they had devised that they did not
appear even to notice this simple error. In order to encourage the girls to analyse their
procedure, the researcher focused their attention on an important part of that
procedure:
Researcher: Have a look at this first bit: :y *2 + :y. Ifyou times a number
bytwo...
Hannah:	 You're doubling it.
Researcher: You're doubling it and add on the number again. You multiply
by two and add on the number you first thought of
Hannah:	 Is it the same as timesing by three?
Researcher: Can you go any further?
Hannah:	 And then fyou divide it again you get back to your number.
Rachael:	 And then fyou divide by your number you get one.
In this example the structure of the procedure seemed to become apparent through
rehearsal of the behaviour of the procedure under specific values of the input.
Looking now at the three preceding examples, chosen to illustrate how pupils
explored the structure of their procedures, it may be seen from the first example that
analysis of the procedure structure appeared to be facilitated by the process of
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construction! verification in which Edward engaged. The characteristic of that process
here was the iterative nature of the (re)construction and verification which proceeds
throughout the extract. In the second example it was also the construction/verification
process which facilitated analysis of procedure structure, but here it appeared to be
the tabular format of the verification which was significant in shaping Ben's analysis
of the procedure. In the third example the feature of verification which predominated
was a term-by-term approach, where use of the computer did not appear to feature
highly.
Thus exploration of structure, an important connection between formal mathematical
expression and the expression of generality about that mathematical statement,
appeared to be influenced by the construction and verification of procedures, and
particularly
i) iterative (re)construction and verification
ii) the tabular presentation of verification
iii) term-by-term verification
7.4 CONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES
Given that the construction/verification relationship appeared to be a major influence
both on the ability to symbolise and on the ability to explore the structure of
procedures (two connections between expressions of meaning), I want in this section
to look more closely at the construction/verification process, with particular emphasis
on construction strategies employed by pupils, the part empirical verification played
in them and the ways in which the computer was used to mediate these processes.
Construction strategies were characterised by both the degree and the nature of
interplay between the processes of construction and verification, and by the value
which information derived from the verification process was accorded. Two broad
types of construction strategy emerged: those based on a process of trial and error,
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where pupils used the computer to construct successive iterations of a procedure; and
prior mental construction, where a more or less correct procedure was worked out
mentally and the computer used merely as a means of recording the procedure,
perhaps with some element of verification. Both these broad categories included
examples where empirical verification informed re-construction of a procedure, and
examples where it did not.
7.4.1 Trial and Error
Perhaps the highest degree of interplay was evident where pupils adopted a trial and
error approach. In some cases verification did not inform subsequent procedure
construction, beyond simply demonstrating whether a procedure gave a correct or
incorrect output. The computer was used as a convenient means of evaluating inputs.
Frequently trial and error was structured by a template (appropriate or otherwise)
determined by the experience a particular pupil had had with questions of a similar
type.
Example: Sarah using a template to model her procedure construction but failing to
inform subsequent empirical re-construction through verification -95 (C 1.5)
Sarah's strategy in Task 1.5 was to select one input value and simply to attempt to
generate that number within the template she had accepted as the norm. She began by
typing into the computer the following procedure:
to a :t
op :t * 2 + 4
end
This was because the previous example, and the example initially given to pupils by
the researcher, was of the form
op :x * 2 + C
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She chose 10 as her input value and stuck to this value throughout the Task.
Empirical testing of her first procedure gave an output of 24:
Input	 Output
10	 24
The succession of procedures she wrote, and more particularly the verifications she
attempted, apparently failed to inform revisions of the procedure. The following
sequence gives some idea of this seemingly random choice of procedure re-
construction, each one constructed within the more generalised template
op :x * a ± C
So, multiplying by two gave twenty something, multiplying by three gave thirty
something and multiplying by six gave sixty something:
to a :t
op :t * 2 + 8
end
Input	 Output
10	 28
to a :t
op :t * 3 + 6
end
Input	 Output
10	 36
to a :t
op :t * 6 + 4
end
Input	 Output
10	 64
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Yet it did not occur to her that multiplying by four would give her forty something
(the goal). Instead, she subsequently latched onto a multiplicative factor of six and
attempted to "close in" from there, still failing to reach the correct solution49
In some examples, using a template in this way allowed pupils to stumble on correct
solutions: not by complete chance, but by a kind of chance which existed within the
parameters of the template. A benefit of working with the computer here was the
ease of verification it afforded: construction and verification become integrated into a
greater act of construction, that is verification became part of the construction process
and not an extra phase through which pupils had to pass 5°. The interplay between
construction and verification would also appear to have shaped pupils' understanding
of the structure of procedures. The constant rehearsal of values in a procedure and
the search for bugs in that procedure forced pupils to examine each term and its
relationship with other terms, and to analyse this relationship in terms of how it
affected the behaviour of values of the input.
However, use of a template also had drawbacks. The template structure could
actually hinder the natural expression of pupils and give them the impression that all
procedures must conform to the format defined by the template. This was
unfortunate because one of the strengths of the learning situation was the non-
uniqueness of solutions and, more importantly, routes to solutions 51 . The template,
whilst supportive, might also constrain pupils into conforming to a pattern which
might not be appropriate and which they might not feel to be entirely appropriate.
This was frequently the case where pupils misunderstood a question or had no clear
expectation of the output from any input they tried. It is important to note that
It seems unhelpful to quote the example in full here.
5° Although in this particular category of construction, verification did not inform procedure
construction.
51 See, for example, discussion on Equivalent Procedures in Chapter 9.
177
Chapter Seven: Construction and Verification
successful and effective use of the computer required an expectation of likely outputs
from the inputs chosen52.
The degree of interplay between construction and verification was also high where
each successive attempt at a procedure was informed by the construction and
empirical testing of the previous attempt. Sarah's attempts (above) using trial and error
were largely random: Sarah failed to adjust her strategy in the light of information
which could be gleaned from the successive testing of her procedures. Informed trial
and error was characterised by the interplay between two elements: construction and
verification. The validity of the construction was confirmed or rejected by the
verification process; the verification process itself informed the next phase of
construction. In fact the two elements were inextricably linked, attention passing
continuously from one to the other until the process was successfully verified and the
construction phase was at an end. Informed trial and error was essentially an iterative
process: it was characterised by an initial procedure written through guess work or
based on a template, with each subsequent iteration informed by the previous
verification.
Example: Kimberley's re-constructions informed by empirical verification - 89 (A 1.6)
In task 1.6 Kimberley made what appeared to be a guess at a procedure using the
standard template:
to monty :x
op :x * S + 7
end
It seems clear that the initial procedure was largely guess-work and not worked out
carefully in her head, as even her first input value using the Calculator (x = 3) did not
give the expected output:
52 The question of expectation of output is discussed in § 7.5.2
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Input	 Output
2	 22
Since this had given the output that should be associated with :x = 4, she tried that
input53
input	 Output
4	 27
She then reconstructed her procedure and tested the same values:
to monty :x
op :x * 4 + 7
end
Input	 Output
3	 19
4	 23
She wanted the output when :x = 4 to be one less, so adjusted her procedure
accordingly:
to monty : x
op :x * 4 + 6
end
Input	 Output
4	 22
This worked, so she tried another value
In fact Kimberley bases her re-constructions first round the testing of :x = 3, then :x =4.
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Input	 Output
5	 26
which did not. At this point, unfortunately, she gave up. However, each
reconstruction was informed by the foregoing verification: there is a feeling of
gradually homing in on the correct procedure, even though in this case it was never
actually reached. Kimberley referred to this feeling of homing in on the answer when
she said later on:
Kimberley: I was getting closer but I couldn't work it out.
7.4.2 Prior Mental Construction
Construction strategies in this category differed from what has been described above
as an iterative trial and error approach, in that the pupil thought of a likely procedure
first mentally, then typed it onto the screen and then, either, by means of verification
of that procedure, adjusted it until it was correct, or simply made a "token"
verification and no adjustment.
The important word here is likely, the intention being to convey some element of
deliberate forethought to the initial procedure. Trial and error approaches (whether
informed or not) were characterised by the guessed nature of the initial procedure
construction, which was often based on a template. The key elements of this
approach, then, were initial mental construction of a procedure and amendments to
that procedure informed by verification.
Example: Kathryn constructing a procedure mentally before using the computer - 97
(C 2.2)
In Task 2.2 (the second of the Amaze Your Friends puzzles), Kathryn began by
clarifying the meaning of the question and making her first attempt:
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Kathryn:	 What does it mean by double?
Researcher: What do you normally mean when you talk about doubling
something?
Kathryn:	 It means add another one onto it.
Sarah:	 Add one on.
[Pause]
Kathryn:	 I know.
She wrote down the following procedure quickly, fluently and silently as if typing out
something already clear in her mind:
to fgtyuight : v
op (:v * 2 * 2) - 4 + 1
end
This done, she verified her procedure using the Calculator with the following input
value and corresponding output
Input	 Output
4	 13
and checked through the procedure again mentally to see why it had not worked. She
re-read the question, apparently saw her omission and amended the procedure
(interestingly removing the brackets first, as if to concentrate on one thing at a time):
op :v * 2 * 2- 4 / 4 + 1
She tried to verify this on the computer:
Input	 Output
4	 16
Under the (correct) impression that all the terms were now correct she made another
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attempt at introducing brackets:
op(:v * 2 * 2)- 4/4+1
and verified this
Input	 Output
4	 16
Informed by this attempt at verification, her second attempt yielded success
op(:v*2*2 
-4)/4+1
and she verified the now correct procedure:
This example shows how a pupil built up the procedure on the computer screen from
a starting point which had been thought through mentally without using the computer.
The computer's role here was first as a means of jotting down her idea, and second as
a means of testing that idea. Importantly, the computer would still run the procedure
even in its partially correct state. This meant that the pupil could "home in" on the
correct procedure by iterative verification/reconstruction. The verification of these
partially correct procedures informed construction of the pupil's next version of the
procedure.
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Example: Hannah and Rachael discussing use of the computer for constructing
procedures - 94 (B 1.2)
Researcher: Do you think that doing it with the computer makes it any
easier?
Hannah:	 Yes.
Rachael:	 Yes.
Researcher: Why do you think that is?
Hannah:	 Because the computer does all the work for you!
Researcher: What does it do for you, then?
Rachael:	 Well, it does the sum foryou.
Hannah:	 It can't always be right, I suppose...
Rachael:	 So you've got to work it out before.
Researcher: Can you think what it is that makes it easier to do on the
computer than in your head?
Hannah:	 It makes me more confident. You can like type stuffdown but in
your head you've just got to try and think of it.
Rachael:	 Ifind it easier to write stuJJdown so you can actually read it.
Researcher: Why do you think writing down helps you?
Rachael:	 Because you can see.
Hannah:	 Because you can see the numbers.
Given the fact that in this case there was little interaction between pupil and
computer in the sense of a construction-verification-adjustment-verification sequence
(not reproduced here), these answers are interesting. The pupils described the
process of verification and recognised that the computer had limitations: although it
would do the work for them, they had first to know what answer to expect. The
second half of this exchange is of particular interest. Hannah put forward the notion
of a medium which was able to extend her working memory: a tool which allowed her
to fix her ideas, if only temporarily, on the screen. Rachael was making a similar point
when she described being able to read rather than mentally envisage her ideas. Tied in
with this was the ability to see inputs and their accompanying outputs. Rachael said,
"because you can see": perhaps by this she meant because you can detach yourself
from the mechanics of calculating the problem and look at its structure clearly, free
from the burden of mental calculation.
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For some pupils, verification only appeared to be carried out because it was perceived
to be part of the game: a ritual which had to be gone through to satisfy the researcher.
Verification was largely nominal and inconsequential.
Example: Ben's non-use of the computer for purposes of construction and verification
- 99(D1.5)
Ben was asked how he had constructed his procedure in Task 1.5:
to five :e
op :e * 4 + 1
end
Researcher: Can you say how you worked your procedure out?
Matthew:	 Ifyou times one by a particular number, like one you get...
Ben:	 When Isaw that [the pair of values (0, 1)]! instantly thought it
was times any number add on one and I saw that [the pair of
values (1, 5)] and thought times four, add on one.
Researcher: And how did you check those?
Ben:	 I checked one or two of them in my head and then I did them on
the computer.
Researcher: Can youjust describe what the procedure does.
Ben:	 Times four add one, really.
Researcher: Can you describe what the different bits do in it?
Ben:	 Well, all these here are odd numbers.
Matthew:	 So it's probably going to be an odd number to times.
Ben:	 They're going up in fours, except starting on one.
Ben's ability to work out simple functions was exceptional amongst members of the
eight groups of the study, but he neatly described the process many of the pupils
went through who were able to construct a rule mentally before attempting anything
on the computer. The writing of the procedure on the computer screen was here a
translation from a rule he had constructed in natural language: the computer had no
role in the construction of the rule; it was used merely to record the translation and,
almost as an after thought, a few values were tested. They were not tested to check
that the rule was correct, but to check that the translation of the rule was correct.
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Using the computer, for Ben at this stage, was an additional part of the task: one
which actually added to the complexity of the task.
The role of empirical verification in these examples varies. The next section looks
briefly at pupils' perceptions of the role of verification and then focuses on two
verification-related issues: expectation of result and the shifting balance between
verification and justification.
7.5 PERCEPTIONS OF VERIFICATION
7.5.1 Pupil Perceptions of Verification
Verification was a complex and widely varying process. The evolution of the
Calculator to provide pupils with a means of verifying procedures easily and quickly
and to present inputs and outputs in a clear, tabular format which was nevertheless
under the control of pupils, has been described in Chapter Five 54 However, pupils'
perceptions of what constituted adequate verification varied with task and time:
different tasks produced different degrees of empirical verification and what was
perceived as adequate varied in degree as a result of pupils' interaction with the
learning situation, i.e. experience of the programming medium, of the mathematical
content of the tasks and of the process of verification itself Interesting comparisons
may be made between pupils' perceptions of adequacy in the pre-task interview and
the actual verification carried out in tasks similar to the interview questions. In
general the degree of empirical verification carried out in the actual tasks was less than
that advocated in the pre-task interview.
See ChapterS § 5.2.4
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Pupils displayed consciousness of wanting to make their choice of values in empirical
verification representative in some way. This could take the form of a spread of
values within the domain defined by the question. In the fourth set of tasks
(construction of procedures which output odd and even numbers), some pupils
displayed an appreciation of the need to try a representative sample of both odd and
even numbers, whilst other pupils failed to appreciate the need even to distinguish
between the two types of input. A common belief held by pupils was that the use of
large numbers in the verification process was somehow more demanding than the use
of small numbers.
Some pupils began with exhaustive verification (sometimes in line with thoughts
expressed in the course of their pre-task interview), but as they became familiar with
the learning situation, their verification became partial. Some pupils were directly
prompted by the learning situation, particularly by the presentation of the data in
tabular form and by the instruction to pick a number between one and ten (in the
second set of tasks) into attempting exhaustive verification of the domain defined by
the question. It should, however, be noted that since most of the functions used in
the four sets of tasks were linear, there was generally, of course, no need to test more
than two values (as has already been noted). Some pupils developed strategies
involving the use of a specific number of input values but it seemed unlikely that
these were based on anything more than guesswork and experience.
Occasionally pupils strayed outside the domain defined in the question: some did this
without any apparent awareness that they were going beyond the requirements of the
question; some treated such departures as mistakes (which they frequently were in
typing a value for the input) and ignored them. Only in some of the second set of
tasks did testing values outside the domain cause a problem since here the possibility
of division by zero arose.
186
Chapter Seven: Construction and Verification
7.5.2 Verification and Expectation
In examples where the result was familiar or clearly stated (e.g. Task 2.1 where the
output was always one) or where the output could be checked off against a printed
table of values (e.g. Tasks 1.4 - 1.6), verification was a simple process of checking the
computer output against the expected output. In examples where the result was
unfamiliar (e.g. in addition of consecutive number examples - Task 3.1 - 3.3),
verification became a duality involving both the ascertaining of the value that was to
become the expectation and its testing. This appeared to take one of two forms: either
the computer verification would precede the pupil's mental check, so the computer
output became the expected outcome; or the expectation was derived from
calculations performed mentally (or otherwise) by the pupil, and then verified on the
computer.
Example: Tom's use of computer verification as a creation of expectation and as a
check of mental calculation - 85: H 3.2
Tom had constructed a procedure for Task 3.2 (the sum of three consecutive
numbers):
to odo :k
op :k + :k + 1 + :k + 2
end
He described his thoughts audibly as he worked, beginning by making a prediction
through mental calculation:
Tom:	 So f it was three you put in: seven. Twelve. It ought to be
twelve.
He then checked this prediction, now the expected outcome, by verification on the
computer:
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Input	 Output
3	 12
For the remainder of the verification of his procedure, Tom chose to precede his
mental calculations by verification on the computer.
input	 Output
7	 24
Tom:	 Seven, add eight is 15, add nine is 24. Yes.
Input	 Output
1	 6
Tom:	 The Calculator says six: one add /wo is three, addfour is six.
Yes.
Input	 Output
8	 27
Tom:	 Eight, add nine is 17, add ten - I'm happy.
7.5.3 Verification and Justification: a Shifting
B alance
Changing expectations of the outcome of empirical verification led to a shift in the
balance between justification and empirical verification.
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Example: Rachael's shift from empirical verification to justification effected b y the
difficulty of mental calculation -6 (B 4.4)
When Rachael tried values in Hannah's procedure for Task 4.4, she had to go through
an elaborate feat of mental calculation to interpret what was happening. Here she had
only the following set of values (which she had chosen herself), resultant from her
attempt to verify Hannah's procedure using the Calculator software, and the question
statement on which to base her analysis:
Input	 Output
10	 11	 43
Researcher: What do you think?
Rachael:	 I?! try it again. Two times ten is 20 add one is 21. Two elevens
are 22, and 2! add 22 is 43. I thought it came out as an even
number.
Researcher: An odd number plus an odd number.
Rachael:	 One add one is two.
Researcher: Yes.
Rachael:	 And three add three is six, andfive addfive is ten, and seven
and seven is 14. Oh, I know what I've done. Oh, no. (Pause)
Oh no, she's done it wrong..., hasn't she? Iforgot to add the
one, because two elevens are 22 add one is 23, and 23 add 21 is
44. So that one's wrong.
Researcher: The thing is, is it producing an even number?
Rachael.	 No.
For the computer verification to be effective, the pupil would have to go through
mental calculations of a complexity which would admit errors. Rachael actually found
it much easier to explain, with little reference to specific examples, where Hannah had
gone wrong when she saw the procedure on the computer screen:
to wwww :x :y
op (:x + :y) * 2 + 1
end
Rachael:	 Oh, I know what you've done. She's thought that you were
getting Iwo odd numbers and then it comes out as an odd
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number, because you did roughly the same as last time, but
you've added one. Like, you take two numbers like three add
four is seven, times by two is fourteen, and you add one,
fifteen. 'Cos it could work on that one -just on the first one,
the even one, without the adding one, but it wouldn't work with
the one because you've got to get out an even number 4fyou
add two odd numbers together.
Now this was hardly a perfect explanation of why Hannah's procedure was wrong,
although it was an adequate explanation of why the output was an odd number rather
than an even number. But it was important in that Rachael was explaining how the
procedure worked rather than relying on empirical testing. Resort to explanation
rather than testing was typical of a number of examples from the data where
verification had become largely meaningless due to the difficulty of mental calculation
or to unfamiliarity with expected outcome. In this example, the difficulty level would
appear to have pushed a pupil towards justifying her procedure in terms of natural (or
other) language rather than attempting to verify it with input-output pairs which
carried little meaning.
7.6 CONCLUSION
Consideration of the data from Phase III of the study so far points towards three
expressions of meaning through which pupils articulated their mathematical ideas.
The first is a natural language statement of a mathematical relationship, by which I
mean some mathematical idea which has been expressed in everyday language, but
which nevertheless conveys the import and integrity of an equivalent statement in
algebraic language (although inevitably in less concise a form). The initial question
statement of each task in the study was expressed in such language, but here, of
course the expression of meaning was the researcher's not the pupil's. However it was
the starting point for all tasks and an expression which pupils had to use, albeit not an
expression of their own creation. Natural language statements featured highly
throughout the study, either as starting points for tasks or as expressions of meaning
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made within a task by pupils themselves.
The Logo procedure which lay at the centre of each task was another expression of
meaning. A Logo procedure is a formalised statement of a mathematical relationship
expressed in algebraic language. Re-expression of natural language statements in terms
of a formalised Logo procedure was the central action of each task in the study. The
connection between these two expressions of meaning appeared to be the act of
symbolisation which constituted each re-expression. Closely related to the act of
symbolisation was the analysis of the structure of a procedure. This exploration of
structure was itself a connection, this time between a formal Logo procedure - a
formalised statement of a mathematical relationship expressed in algebraic language -
and the expression of generality about that relationship. Thus pupils appeared to
express meaning in at least three ways: through natural language statements, through
Logo procedures and through generalisations about those Logo procedures (or even
about the natural language statements). Acting as connections between these three
expressions of meaning were acts of symbolisation and the analysis of structure.
How did the computer mediate the creation of these connections? Central to both
acts of symbolisation and the exploration of structure was the construction process of
procedures on the computer. The construction process formalised mathematical
relationships and structured them. This structuring process provided the starting
point and focus for further analysis of the procedure. Construction of a procedure
was also important in that through it pupils gained ownership of the mathematical
problem. The process of writing a procedure, even of making a simple translation
from natural language to symbolic language, appeared to give pupils an involvement
with the task which was not achieved when the task began with a symbolisation
which had been carried out by someone else. The act of symbolising seemed to be of
central importance. It is through this act that symbols became concrete, and this
concretisation effected subsequent manipulation of the symbols.
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However, it was not through construction alone that symbolism acquired meaning and
structure was explored. Where the construction process used was one where
verification informed construction, it was the interplay between construction and
verification which revealed and highlighted the structure of the procedure. Term-by-
term analysis and systematic restructuring supported by verification appeared to
promote pupils' ability to generalise, to analyse and ultimately to prove. Systematic
verification highlighted mathematical relationships and how those relationships
behaved with varying values of the input. Importantly, verification endowed symbols
with a history of specific examples and values. Furthermore, pupils manipulated
symbols in an empirical context with the constant possibility of validating the result
of that manipulation. This experience appeared to equip them with an ability to talk
about these symbols and to manipulate them in contexts removed from the immediacy
of the construction/verification environment, namely in discussion about and analysis
of the structure and generality of the procedure in the justification stage of the task.
In Chapter Eight I look at the relationship between the particular and the general, a
relationship which has already emerged through this chapter's discussion of
generalised Logo procedures and specific numerical verifications of those procedures.
In particular I focus on how pupils used particularity in order to express generality.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PARTICULAR
AND GENERAL
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Having looked at the relationship between construction and verification in Chapter
Seven, I move on in this chapter to a second significant relationship which emerged
from analysis of the study data. An important component of many pupils' work
during the study was the relationship between the particular and the general.
Frequently this relationship was characterised by ambiguity: at one moment pupils
might be thinking and speaking in particular terms about a procedure and the way it
behaved in a particular circumstance; the next they might be making a general
observation about the procedure and how it behaved in a set of circumstances. This
chapter concentrates on how pupils used ambiguity between the particular and the
general to express generality, and how this relationship was mediated by the
computer.
From analysis of children's work I identify two forms of webbing, which I describe as
semi-generalisation and generic structuring. Semi-generalisation was a means of using
a procedure, general only in terms of a strictly limited domain, as a framework within
which to express complete generality. Generic structuring was a means of structuring
and exploring a procedure through the consideration of generic examples.
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8.2 SEMI-GENERALISATION
To explore semi-generalisation I want to focus on an example taken from Phase III of
the Study. It features the members of Group G (Nicholas and Edward) working at
Task 2.1 in which they were required to write a procedure to model the puzzle
Amaze Your Friends .......
Pick a number between 1 and 10. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number
you first thought of Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first
thought of
The Answer is .......ONE !!!
The approach to the question adopted by both Edward and Nicholas demonstrated
how the computer might provide support to enable pupils to work at a level at which
their ideas were only partially thought through and later to "tighten up" these
emergent concepts. It demonstrated what Wilensky describes as concretion, i.e. "the
process of the new knowledge coming into relationship with itself and with prior
knowledge, and thus becoming concrete" (Wilensky 1991 p. 201) The computer
allowed them to work simultaneously at a specific and a general level; it enabled them
to work in such a way that they could see the general in the particular.
Example: Edward using semi-generalisationto web his construction of generality - 54
(G2.1)
Edward read the question carefully and immediately typed the following procedure:
to jem :d
op :d * 2 + S / 3 I S
end
He then tested this with an input of 5 using the calculator. It gave an output of
10.33334:
194
Chapter Eight: Particular and General
Input	 Output
5	 10.33334
This was not a fully generalised procedure because particular values had been used
within it for what should be general terms. He could not believe that this was wrong
(and of course within a domain where the input - : d - has the single value 5 it is
correct, brackets apart) so checked his workings, comparing the printed words with
his procedure on the screen:
Edward:	 What did I do wrong? Think of a number: yeah. Put it in,
times it by two: yeah. Add on the first number you thought of
yeah Divide by three: yeah Divide by number you first
thought of yeah. I'll by again: put in five, press Calculate.
He tested this again with an input of 5 using the calculator. Again it gave an output of
10.33334:
Input	 Output
5	 10.33334
Edward:	 No! I don't want that answer, I want one.
At this point there was a choice of routes open to Edward: making the procedure fully
generalised and then sorting out the brackets; or making this partially generalised
procedure work through the use of brackets and then making it fully generalised.
Either approach was possible because for the computer to function (and, by
extension, to inform Edward's re-constructions), it was not necessaiy that everything
should function perfectly at one and the same time. The ability to preserve and use a
partly completed structure in its half unfinished state meant that attention might be
focused on one aspect or another as appeared more appropriate. Here, provided the
domain remained as one where the input (:d) had the single value 5, Edward could
begin by bracketing his partially generalised procedure, and later on shift his attention
to its generality. As this was the approach Edward adopted, the researcher gave him
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the first input on brackets55
. Edward experimented with the positioning of brackets,
verifying his procedure each time with an input of five. The strategy he adopted was
trial and error, the criterion for success the proximity of the output to one. The
procedure, however, remained partially generalised. The iterations in Edward's design
are shown here with his accompanying attempts at verification (the value he used as
an input paired with the corresponding output) and any comments he made:
op :d * (2 + S I 3)/ S
Input	 Output
5	 3.666666
Edward:	 Pm getting closer.
op :d (* 2 + S / 3)I S
Input	 Output
5	 5
Edward:	 I'm so close.
op (:d * 2 + S / 3)I 5
Input	 Output
5	 2.333334
(op :d * 2 + 5 I 3)I S
Input	 Output
5	 11.66666
op (:d * 2 + S / 3 I) 5
" See ChapterS, § 5.2.4
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Input	 Output
5	 )inwrong
place injem
op (:d * 2 + S I 3) I S
Input	 Output
5	 2.333334
Edward:	 I'm getting even closer.
The researcher gave the second input on brackets and Edward straight away wrote
op (:d * 2 + 5)/ 3 I 5
He verified this empirically and expressed his satisfaction:
Input	 Output
5	 1
Edward:	 Yes.
The first stage was complete. The researcher now shifted the focus of attention to the
lack of generality by adopting a form of exploratory intervention57:
Researcher: What about other numbers?
Edward:	 [Pause] I know what I've done wrong. Get rid of that 5....
[unintelligible muttering]
Edward immediately replaced the two fives with variables (:d)
op (:d * 2 + :d) /3 / :d
SeeChapter5, § 5.2.4
See Chapter 4 §, 4.4.2
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and verified that his procedure worked for a variety of input values:
The apparent ease with which Edward completed the task suggests that the shift of
attention had already begun: perhaps as he worked on the brackets Edward was
beginning to question what would happen with other inputs.
In this example, Edward worked through three stages: the focus for the first was the
structure of the procedure; in the second attention shifted to questions of syntax; in
the third the question of generality became the focus58.
In this example Edward constructed a procedure which was only partially correct.
What singled it our from other partially correct procedures, however, was that
although it functioned correctly for only one input value, its general structure was
nevertheless largely correct. The procedure was in fact semi-generalised.
Semi-generalisation was characterised by an approach to construction whereby a
partially correct procedure was created and used as a basic framework - a partly-
functioning prototype. This model was then improved bit by bit: pupils' attention
might shift from one aspect to another and they did not need to tacide all aspects of
the procedure simultaneously in order to correct the procedure. They could test the
validity of a partially correct procedure within any parameters they defined as
58 This was not a unique route and one of the strengths of working within this learning situation was
the variety of solutions and paths to those solutions available to the pupil.
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necessary for the procedure to be semi-generalised, for example a severely limited
domain of input (commonly confined to one value). The importance of the computer
was its role in capturing the working model in a kind of limbo which nevertheless
made available the possibility of empirical validation. Completion of the procedure
then became a process of homing-in, again supported by easily achieved validation.
The contrast with paper and pencil methods is striking.
By defining the domain in this way, a procedure was as generalised as necessary for
further work on that procedure, be that work further efforts towards complete
generalisation, or further work on the structure of the procedure. The computer
preserved this "semi-generalised" procedure and as long as the input remained
constant, it could be seen as an object which could itself be manipulated. The
advantage is that of being able to adjust an already functioning machine in order to get
it to work properly, over that of trying to get the machine to function in the first
place.
The generalisation of the procedure might not proceed beyond this level, or it might
happen that when the bugs in the procedure had been removed, the pupil would in
fact make the procedure fully generalised. This might also occur as part of the
justification process, so a semi-generalised procedure provided a good focus for
discussion.
Semi-generalisation provided a connection between two expressions of meaning,
namely between the statement of a mathematical relationship in natural language
(usually the question statement) and the expression of that mathematical relationship
in formalised algebraic language (i.e. the Logo procedure).
199
Chapter Eight: Particular and General
8.3 GENERIC STRUCTURING
Continuing with Nicholas's and Edward's work in Task 2.1, I want now to focus on
ways in which pupils bridged the gap between specific evaluations of their procedure
and the articulation of general statements about that procedure.
Example: Edward and Nicholas using specific examples to explore the general nature
ofa procedure -55 (G 2.!)
In Task 2.1 Edward and Nicholas used their formalised procedure as a resource to
express their proof of why this puzzle always comes to one. They worked through
several examples using specific values, but here the pupils were using them as a means
of describing general patterns of behaviour through consideration of the particular.
The degree of generality changed as the work proceeded, sometimes with a shift of
attention focused by the researcher. The example began with a consideration of
Edward's procedure described above:
to jem :d
op (:d * 2 + :d) /3/ :d
end
Researcher: Can you work out from that why it always comes to one?
Nicholas made an initial attempt at an explanation which set the discussion in motion
and acted as a base line from which the pupils could only move up:
Nicholas:	 Whenever you put three or whatever the number is, it just
cancels out.
Edward began to generalise but instead referred to an example:
Edward:	 Because whenever you put a number in ,fyou times it by two,
it'll equal - say Iput in seven, it would equalfourteen and divide
by three, it would equal [laughs and stops].
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Researcher: Try again, because I think you were on the right lines.
He used another example, this, like the last, chosen for its generality rather than its
specificity:
Edward:	 Just say that the number was five, times by two equals ten,
then addfive equals fifi een andthen you divide it by three so
that equals the number you started off with. Then ifyou
divide by the number you started off with, it will always equal
one.
The researcher then attempted to prompt Edward to generalise his explanation from
the specific case of five: he shifted attention away from the particular towards the
general.
Researcher: Can you say why it always equals one? You say it works with
five.
Edward went on to prove the result, expressing his ideas by means of naturalised
formalism59:
Edward:
Researcher:
Edward:
Researcher:
It works with any number ... [looking at the procedure on the
screen] because whenever you times a number which you
started off with by Iwo then add the number you started off
with, it c more or less like timesing by three.
Right. Carry on.
Because then you divide it by three, equals the number you
started off with - it's just like doing the three times table. Then
fyou divide by the number you started off with it will always
equal one.
Great.
In this example Edward used specific examples (i.e. evaluations of procedures using
particular values) in order to understand the general nature of that same procedure. I
want to refer to this phenomenon as generic structuring: generic because it made use
An idea I develop in Chapter 10, § 10.3.
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of examples which were chosen not for their specific values, but as representatives of
their class; and structuring because it was used as a means of shaping experience of
specific empirical verification into the statement of some general statement, or for the
examination and clarification of a partially-emergent generalisation. Generic
structuring was a process: it was the connection between two expressions of meaning,
namely the verification of a procedure with a specific value and a generalised
statement about that procedure, expressed in natural language, formal algebraic
language, or indeed in naturalised formalism.
It is not necessarily straightforward to define what did and what did not constitute
generic structuring. Tiying out a numerical example in a procedure could work at two
levels: it could be merely the verification of that one particular example; or it could be
the exploration or explanation of the structure of the procedure through the testing of
a value. When the latter was the case, use of this example became generic structuring
for the pupil because through the example's particularity he or she was able to see
something of the procedure's generality.
Example: Luke using generic structuring to explore how his procedure would work for
the class of cases of which his value was representative -47 (E 2.2)
In an attempt to explain why the input and output in Task 2.2 were the same number,
Luke, who had written the following procedure:
to plom :p
op (:p * 2 - :p) - 4 I 4 + 1
end
questioned how his procedure functioned
Luke:	 Times by two and times by two again... What happens f it won't
divide byfour? What happens fyou get a number like nine?
Researcher: What does happen 4fyou get a number like nine?
Luke:	 So fyou put in a number like one: times two is two, times two is
four. It always comes to even, won't it. Ifyou put in an odd
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number it always becomes even. So it won't - it'll always divide
by four...
Use of generic structuring - and it clearly was generic since Luke had chosen the
number one to represent odd numbers (presumably for ease of calculation) in
preference to the nine which he first mentioned - had made it clear to Luke that
whether the input was odd or even, it would be made even by the first operations in
the procedure - a fact he equated here with divisibility by four. He had not made the
explicit statement that the input had become a multiple of four, but it would seem
from his consideration of this generic example that this is precisely what he had
discovered.
It is not always easy to know whether use of an example cited by pupils was for
them a case of generic structuring (i.e. whether the example was generic), or whether
they were merely rehearsing how a function operated with a particular value for the
input. (This rehearsal of a function's operation, of course, was an important point
along the route to understanding why the function operated as it did.)
Example: Establishing what constituted genericity in Rachael's discussion of her
procedures -44 (B 4.4)
In Task 4.4 (the summation of two odd numbers), Rachael was able to explain her
own procedure
to qwer :k :1
op (:k * 2 + 1) + (:1 * 2 + 1)
end
in terms of a numerical example:
Rachael:	 Well, you have your number and you times it by two, and ifyou
have the number three, two times three is six and add one is
seven, and that comes out as an odd number always. And then
you have your next number, eight: two eights are sixteen, add
one is seventeen. And then youjust add those together. And
they will come up as an odd number.
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Is this example generic? Were the particular values of the inputs used in such a way
as to describe the generality of the procedure (ignoring the fact that the final statement
was incorrect)? Insofar as Rachael used the input three to make the point that "two
times three is six and add one is seven, and that comes out as an odd number always,1'
this might be counted as an example of generic structuring: she was establishing the
oddness of : k * 2 + 1. However the remainder of her explanation said little about the
structure of the procedure or the general nature of its output: "And then you just add
those together. And they will come up as an odd number." Although this example
has generic elements, it is largely a description of what happens when two particular
values are used as inputs.
Later, with support from the researcher, Rachael produced another description:
:k *2. Is that even or odd?
Even.
Even.
What about :1*2?
That would be even as well. Four times two is eight.
What have you got left?
Adding one.
Adding two ones.
Which makes?
Two.
Two. So you add two onto it and it comes out as an even
number.
Can you explain that again.
Well, you have your number and you do like :k times two -
could beJIve:Jlve times two is ten. And then on the :1 times two
- six - six times two is 12. You've got two ones left over so one
add one is two and you add two to that so it comes out as an
even number.
Is this example generic? Again her explanation made use of particular values: nowhere
did she state explicitly that :k * 2 and :1 * 2 produced even numbers, but her
description of the behaviour of the function with using two particular values
demonstrated this (and whether consciously picked, her choice of one even and one
204
Chapter Eight: Particular and General
odd input added weight to the generic nature of the example). The example continued
with an element of analysis, i.e. the separation of the two ones, their summation and
the conclusion that their sum would add a further even number to the existing even
numbers (these last five words not stated explicitly). The use of particular values in
this example demonstrated both how the function behaved as it did and why: this,
then, is generic structuring.
An essential element of generic structuring was the rehearsal of procedure behaviour
under specific values of input: it was through this process that examples changed from
specific to generic. How was this rehearsal facilitated? Central to rehearsal of
procedure behaviour was the procedure itself. Now, whilst an algebraic function in a
paper and pencil context could serve the same purpose, the difference between that
context and the learning situation developed in this study is the fact that pupils had
ownership of and familiarity with the procedure they were using because they
themselves had constructed it: the act of symbolisation was their own.
Pupils appeared to use generic structuring in a variety of ways. In many examples
pupils attempted to express their ideas in entirely general terms. If this proved too
difficult, they used generic structuring as a kind of reference point to which they could
fall back, and from which they could embark on their generalised description once
again: rather like attempting to recite a poem from memory, a quick glance at the
overall structure of the poem when one's memory fails, restores enough to complete
the recitation.
Example: Ben dipping into the particular to structure his generalised explanation - 11
(D2.2)
In Task 2.2, Ben had constructed the following procedure
to astound :a
op ( (( ( :a*2) * 2)- 4)14) + 1)
end
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During subsequent discussion, Ben described why the output always equalled the
input. He began by discussing it in a generalised form in natural language,but when he
got confused he resorted to a generic example:
Ben:	 Double it, double it again
Matthew:	 Whatever you put in
Ben:	 Oh yeah Ifyou double it and double it again, it should come
out four times. And then take away four. You take away four of
the, ah ... [pause] Say that the number you put in was one, it
would come out as four; take away four. It would take away
one from each of the numbers.
In the last sentence Ben was attempting to express his description more generally
again, and in fact from here, the researcher tried to get Ben to re-express his ideas in
the language of the procedure:
Researcher: Try using :a as the number you are multiplying by. Would that
help?
Ben:	 Ifyou hadfour times :a and take away four... Ifyou've got four
:a's, then it would be a bit like taking away one from each :a.
And then ifyou divide it, you would have :a without the one on
the end And fyou add on one you get back to the number you
started with.
Researcher: DfJIcult to explain, isn't it.
Ben:	 Yes!
The use of a generic example had enabled Ben to restructure his explanation in more
general terms: the process of generic structuring.
Clearly the researcher's role was important here. In the same way that here use of the
language of the procedure was suggested, so the use of generic restructuring could be
prompted by the researcher (although it had to be borne in mind that what was
perceived as generic by the researcher might not be perceived as such by the pupil).
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In this next example, generic structuring provided a means of exploring the structure of
Rachael's procedure (which summed an odd and an even number), and the exploration
of structure led to a conceptual re-structuring of the procedure, necessary for an
appreciation of why the procedure behaved as it did.
Example: Rachael using generic structuring to restructure her procedure conceptually -
109 (B 4.5)
In Task 4.5 Rachael had constructed the following procedure:
to ussssss :x :y
op (:x * 2) + (:y * 2 + 1)
end
Researcher: Why does this always come out as an odd number?
Rachael:	 Oh.
Hannah:	 Because...
Rachael: Well, you have one number,JIve, and you times it by two which
gives you ten and then you have another number, six. Times it
by two - twelve - and add it on. So one an odd number, one
even. You add them together and you get nine.
On being asked again, Rachael made the following statement:
Rachael:	 Because you times it by two first and then you times it by two.
Then you've got one left over and you add the one.
What is interesting here is that the first statement was not in fact an exact model for
the second. It was not a case of the formulation of a generic example forming the
model for a situated abstraction. The statement "one's an odd number and one's even"
came directly from trying values in the
(.•x *2) + (.y *2 + 1)
structure; the second statement restructured the procedure as
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(:x *2) + (.y *2) + 1,
the all-important re-grouping necessary to appreciate the oddness of the expression.
But how did R.achael get from one to the other?
She appeared to have taken out the "times it by two" statements from the first
statement and isolated them. Perhaps it was the rehearsal, the verbalisation, the
repetition which highlighted a pattern (or in this case a common property) which
might be isolated and detached from its surroundings. When this was seen as an
object - a chunk of evenness - Rachael could generalise the effect of the addition of the
extra one. Rachael had in fact concretised the chunk and was able to manipulate it as
an object in its own right.
8.4 SUMMARY
This chapter highlights two important connections between expressions of meaning,
two forms of webbing which pupils used to construct mathematical meaning. Both
were concerned with the fluid, ambiguous relationship between particular and general.
The first - semi-generalisation- made use of the ability to construct a procedure which
would work only for one value of input, but, under certain circumstances, would
behave as if it functioned for all values. Thus semi-generalisation provided a
connection between the statement of a mathematical relationship in natural language
(usually the question statement) and the expression of that mathematical relationship
in formalised algebraic language (i.e. the Logo procedure) through the breaking down of
the construction task into manageable chunks, the partially generalised procedure
behaving in a manner which precisely and usefully modelled the final generalised
construction.
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The second connection - generic structuring - made use of the relationship between
particular examples, generic examples and generalisations about formalised procedures.
Through the restructuring of a procedure, the structure of which use of generic
examples illuminated, generic structuring provided a connection between the
formalised mathematical relationship defined in a Logo procedure (backed up by
empirical testing) and generalised observations on that mathematical statement (albeit
generalisation which existed within a situated context).
Having in this chapter considered the relationship between particularity and
generality, in Chapter Nine I move on to look at the role which exploration of
equivalent procedures played in creating meanings for generality and in attempting to
justify that generality.
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CHAPTER NINE: EXPLORATIONS
OF EQUIVALENCE
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter Eight focused on the important relationship between general and particular.
Another interesting and prominent feature of pupils' work throughout the study was
the construction and analysis of equivalent procedures. Chapter Nine looks at pupils'
construction of equivalent procedures and charts how discussion of equivalence
appeared to lead to a deepening awareness of mathematical concepts. I describe how
pupils were able to make situated abstractions of a number of mathematical
relationships through discussion of equivalence, and suggest that these examples
further support a view of abstraction as the creation of connections between
expressions of meaning as opposed to a view which sees abstraction as the moving
away from the "concrete" through an externally-imposed hierarchy of abstraction.
9.2 ROUTES TO EQUIVALENCE
Although each task may have had an obvious solution in the eyes of someone with
more extensive mathematical experience than the pupils concerned, the construction of
the learning situation facilitated alternative solutions and alternative routes to those
solutions. Also, given the "competitive" element of the learning situation, where pairs
of pupils independently constructed procedures, there was likely to be a degree of
divergence in the procedures they constructed. This divergence provided an
interesting source of discussion for researcher and pupils. Why did these two
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procedures have the same output? What was the relationship between two
superficially different algebraic expressions of the same mathematical relationship?
From the researcher's point of view, the interesting question concerned what pupils
would discover in their attempts at answering these questions, since the comparison
and analysis of equivalent procedures appeared to provide fertile ground for the
development of mathematical concepts, and how the computer mediated these
discoveries.
Equivalence was not always the result of independent working, however - what one
might call chance equivalence.
Example: Ben making a prediction about the nature of his partner's procedure and
analysing why this prediction and his partner's actual procedure were in fact
equivalent - 18 (D 3E)
Matthew made the following attempt at the extra task in the third set of tasks:
to aboo :a
op ((:a - 1) * :a) + 2 * :a
end
Ben tested his own set of values in Matthew's procedure as follows using the
Calculator:
From scrutiny of these values, Ben predicted that Matthew's procedure had the
function
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op :a * (:a + 1)
He explained this as follows:
Ben:	 What this is doing is it's timesing :a, the input, by the number
above it, :a + 1.
Researcher: You're saying it's :a times (:a + 1). O.K., have a look at
Matthew procedure.
Although this was not Matthew's function, Ben was able to explain, partly through
generic structuring, and partly through analysis of the formal procedures using their
language of construction as the means of expression and communication, that what
Matthew had written was equivalent to what Ben had imagined:
Ben:
Researcher:
Ben:
Researcher:
Ben:
Researcher:
[looking at the procedure] Yes.
Can you explain it.
:a - 1 times :a. Say the input was three, :a - / is two, times :a is
six. Urn, the times :a. That would make six.
[clarifying what Ben is pointing at] You mean (:a - 1) times :a.
Yes, that's six. I think what would happen ... Yes it would add
on Iwo times :a, which would make it twelve. [Conclusively]
And that is three times four.
Which is the same as saying what you said - :a times (:a + 1)60.
Ben was articulating, with no knowledge of formal algebraic manipulation at his
disposal, the equivalence of
(al)*a+2*a and
a*(a+ 1)
In fact he was making a situated abstraction. Ben's analysis was dependent on the
context: his prediction was made on the basis of scrutiny of Matthew's tabular
The Researcher finished off Ben's unstated conclusion.
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verification (the tabular display acting, it seems, as a powerful means of visual
organisation); his exploration relied heavily on the use of generic examples whilst
being expressed partly in the formal language of construction.
Example: Ben expressing the spontaneous desire to construct and test a procedure
which he already had in mind and analysing the reasons for its equivalence with a
previously constructed procedure, leading to a situated abstraction of a mathematical
relationship - 17 (D 3.3)
In Task 3.3 Ben constructed his first procedure spontaneously:
to con3 :a
op (:a - 1) * :a
end
He verified this using the Calculator with the following pairs of values:
Ben described his procedure as follows:
Ben:	 Well, it just does :a minus one first and times it by :a, really.
and
Ben:	 So it would be the input - I mean one number less than the input,
and then it timeses it by :a.
Matthew:	 It timeses it by the input.
Ben himself asked to construct a second procedure:
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Ben:	 Sir, could! do another procedure which is different but does the
same thing?
Researcher: Mm, you can. Have you thought of one?
Ben:	 Urn, yes.
He wrote the following, a procedure he had clearly already worked out in his head:
to con3x :a
op:a*:a:a
end
What had prompted this procedure? Although it was equivalent to con3, it no longer
modelled the question statement (i.e. the product of an integer and the preceding
integer). This implied that Ben had constructed this new procedure based on the
number relationships he had identified in the four pairs of values resultant from his
empirical verification of his procedure. If this was the case, then it highlights the
importance of the visual nature of verification: Ben was very capable of verifying
procedures such as con3 and con3x in his head; it is, however, less certain that he
would have spotted the relationship necessary for construction of the latter had he
not verified the former on the computer using the tabular nature of presentation which
the software made possible. The nature of the empirical verification appeared to
shape Ben's awareness of the existence of an equivalent procedure. He gave some
indication of this consideration of numerical relationships using the tabular
presentation of his own verification in his next statement:
Ben:	 Urn, I was thinking of... I thought f it was :a times :a, what
would you have to take away:just sort of experimenting. And,
urn
Matthew clarified what Ben had said in his own mind:
Matthew:	 So it squares and takes whatever you've thought of
Ben:	 Takes away, so ... flong pause] it's hard to explain. :a times
one less than :a. Ifyou times :a by itself andthen ... You times
:a by itself and you take away - so you?! have lots of:a's, and
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you fake away one of the :a's so it'll be urn ... So the output will
be the same as :a times (:a - 1). It's hard to e.xplain.
Ben had explained the equivalence between his two procedures by analysis and
description because he did not possess the formal manipulative algebraic skills to
show by the "usual" means that
a2 - a = a (a - 1).
Again, he was making a situated abstraction. Flis analysis began from enquily into the
relationship between a2 and a(a - 1). a2 became his starting point and thence he
adjusted his procedure. This was done in his head and the procedure which he
eventually typed on the computer was the final correct version. He then tried four
values in order to test the procedure. The learning situation had enabled him to write
what for him was an obvious first procedure, which acted as a bench-mark against
which he could investigate another procedure which he had at the back of his mind,
derived from the verification data. Experience of constructing, verifying and
explaining the procedures gave him the means to express why they were equivalent.
The exploration of equivalence was a connection, but not in exactly the same sense
that this term has been used previously where it has denoted the linking of distinct
expressions of meaning. Here the link was between a mathematical concept and a
deeper, richer understanding of that concept, plus, in some cases, a link to other
related mathematical concepts. Now in fact this use of the tenn connection is not
dissimilar to the previous use: here the edges between expressions of meaning became
a little blurred; the mental image of a connection acting as a neat bridge between two
expressions of meaning was subsumed into one consisting of many links within and
between mathematical concepts.
Thus in this previous example, through creation and analysis of a procedure
equivalent to his first, Ben had moved from modelling a function which multiplied an
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integer by the previous integer (as stated in the initial question), to a function which
was equivalent but based on the relationship between ordered pairs of the first
function, to an explanation of the equivalence of the two functions. In fact the
equivalency was a statement of the Distributive Law of Multiplication. What the
exploration of equivalence in this situated context appeared to do was to develop for
an individual pupil a set of deep structural relationships for that initial function, and,
by the same token, make the newly discovered mathematical relationships concrete, in
the sense that these relationships were richly and meaningfully connected to other
relationships with which an individual pupil was familiar and had had experience of
symbolisation and empirical verification.
To illustrate further the power of explorations of equivalent procedures to build
connections between expressions of mathematical relationships, I want to look at two
groups' work in Task 3.2, which asked pupils to find a function which sums three
consecutive numbers.
Example: Tom's exploration of equivalence leading to a situated abstraction of an
additive relationship - 64 a) (H 3.2)
Tom's first procedure
to odo :k
op :k + :k + 1 + :k + 2
end
was one which suggested that on reading the question Tom immediately perceived the
structure of how to generate successive consecutive numbers and was able to express
this structure in the organisation of the terms in his procedure. He explained the
procedure to David:
Tom: O.K. Five, plus five plus one, which is six, so ii will be five plus
six. Plus any old number plus Iwo which will be five add two is
seven, so it will be five plus six plus seven. See?
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David:	 No.
This presentation of the procedure was explicitly structured in that terms were
grouped and ordered. One might expect a pupil with knowledge of traditional paper
and pencil algebra to use brackets to help define this structure
x + (x + I) + (x + 2)
Tom did not use brackets but it emerged from later discussion that he had considered
their use and that these brackets would have been used in a way similar to that of the
traditional paper and pencil pupil. In the following exchange he described how
consecutive numbers were generated and began (although unfortunately interrupted)
to describe how his brackets would have been used:
Researcher: David, fyouputfive in there [pointing to odo], which part
would be the five?
David:	 That one [pointing at the first :k].
Researcher: So where's six, then?
David:	 The second :k?
Researcher: No, :k is going to be five fyouputfive in.
Tom:	 You see you're adding one onto :k, making six. I thought you
might need brackets because it's :k + :k + i is eleven...
At this point he was interrupted by David. Where might Tom's train of thought have
led from here had he not been interrupted? It seems reasonable to conjecture that
Tom had intended bracketing k + k + I as the first part of his procedure to be worked
out, and perhaps k + 2 as the next, giving the following structuring:
(x+x+ J)+(x+2)
or even
x+(x+ l)+(x+2)
It certainly appeared to be this structuring that he had in mind when he began to
explain the procedure to David (in the extract above). David, however, saw the first
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part of the structure differently:
David:	 Ifthat's five, though...
Tom:	 it makes the same thing anyway!
David:	 if that's five, it's addfive again and that makes frn, then one,
that makes eleven...
Here he was thinking of a structure which might be represented as follows:
(x + x) + I +
Tom took up his train of thought:
Tom:	 Plus :k is 15, plus two is ... No, plus five is sixteen, pius two is
eighteen.
David:	 Yes.
Tom:	 So whichever way you want to put it, it makes the right answer.
This structuring makes a good starting point for the consideration of equivalence,
since
x+x+ I
is seen originally by Tom as
x+ (x+ I)
and by David as
(x + x) + 1.
By the end of the discussion both have taken part in expressing the procedural
equivalent of the following equality:
x + (x + I) = (x + x) + 1,
i.e. the Associative Law of addition.
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Example: Tom and David articulating a further additive relationship through
consideration of equivalence- 64 b) (H 3.2)
After his first procedure Tom was challenged to write a second. This time, rather
than structuring it as the sum of discrete expressions, each describing one in a series of
three consecutive numbers, he chose to group the variables together and the constants
together:
to qwark :h
op :h + :h + :h + 1 + 2
end
Tom continued the discussion on equivalence by describing qwark:
Tom:	 Because even fyou add all those [pointing at variables :h in
qwark] up together rather than saying five plus five plus one is
six,five plus six plusfive plus two is seven -five plus six plus
seven -just add all of them together.
Researcher: So, what's qwark, then?
Tom: Because it works both ways with just adding things... Because
whichever way you put it, it's adding all ofthem together. That
one works just the same, sofiveplusfiveplusfive is fifteen. So
it could have been plus two plus one.
David:	 Exactly the same thing written in a different way.
Here he was attempting to articulate the following relationship:
x+x+1+x+2=x+x+x+1+2
Tom was expressing the Commutative Law of Addition when he said, "Because it
works both ways with just adding things," and he used it to explain why his
procedures were equivalent
David was brought back into the discussion through a procedure he had written but
rejected during the construction process:
op :x + :x + :x + 3
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Researcher: David, can you tell me one of the procedures that you did?
David:	 Iput any number add one and add one again.
Researcher: But what did you have before that?
David:	 Rather like that, actually [pointing at qwarkJ.
Researcher: You had :x + :x + :x + 3. Would that have been a/right, do you
think?
Tom:	 It would have worked It ought to have worked Did it work?
Researcher: It gave five which came out as 18.
Tom:	 Five which came out as 18: but did it work for all the others?
[PaueJ
Researcher: He triedfive and then gave up. So do you think that would
have worked?
Tom:	 ft ought to have done. Yes.
Working with the computer enabled Tom to explore equivalent ways of expressing the
same relationship. He appeared to begin by tackling the problem through a highly
structured approach, considering the use of brackets to define individual terms. By
writing a second (and considering a third) equivalent procedure, he realised that it was
possible to rearrange the order of terms, in fact grouping terms in other ways. Tom
had discovered through constructing procedures and testing their validity, that it was
possible to rearrange the (added) terms in a procedure without affecting its function.
Example: Edward and Nicholas considering equivalence between multiplication and
repeated addition - 58 G (3.2)
Task 3.2 was expressed as follows:
Write a Logo procedure which adds three consecutive numbers, e.g. ifyou input 3, it
outputs the sum of3, 4 and 5.
Discussion of Nicholas's procedure written in Task 3.2
to loo :k
op :k + :k + :k + 3
end
led onto a spontaneous request to investigate equivalent procedures:
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Edward:
Researcher:
Nicholas:
Researcher:
Edward:
Nicholas:
Researcher:
Edward.
Nicholas:
I know a shorter way you could do it. You do double dot
whatever you want to put in, then you put times three, then add
three.
Right.
Will that be right?
Do you think that would work?
Yeah.
I'm not sure.
Do you want to try it?
Yeah.
O.K.
Edward wrote the following procedure immediately:
to jerrr :k
op :k * 3 + 3
end
and tried a single value in it:
Input	 Output
3	 12
Nicholas wrote the following:
to hj :j
op :j * 3
end
again tlying a single value:
input	 Output
1	 3
Nicholas:
Edward:
Nicholas:
Researcher:
Edward:
Researcher:
Nicholas:
Edward:
Researcher:
Edward:
Is yours right?
Yeah
Mine's wrong, then, isn't it?
Have a look at your procedure, them
wrong with it?
Oh yeah.
Can you say, Nicholas?
Urn.
I can, I can.
Go on, them
You've got to add on three at the end
Can you work out what's
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Nicholas:	 Add on three? So times three, add three?
Edward:	 Ten times three equals 30, add three equals 33.
Researcher: Which one do you think is better?
Edward:	 Urn, the whatever letter, times three add three because it
shorter and quicker.
Nicholas:	 Ifind the other way better.
Researcher: You think it's shorter and quicker.
Nicholas:	 Yeah; but 1 don't understand this one.
Researcher: Do you understand the first one?
Edward:	 It's just a shorter version because instead ofputting, say it was
three, three add three add three, you just put times three, instead
ofadding it three times. It's the same thing. Like in a maths
test would you rather have six add six add six add six than
Nicholas:	 Six times four.
Edward:	 Six times four.
The two procedure types (additive and multiplicative) were of different degrees of
abstraction from the original expression of the task. Nicholas understood the
procedure he wrote initially:
op :k + :k + :k + 3
which more closely modelled the idea of adding on consecutive numbers, but could not
understand Edward's more mathematically concise procedure
op :k * 3 + 3
The former procedure more closely modelled Nicholas's thinking process - the
practical add on, add on method which Nicholas had described as his method of
constructing the procedure. He had concretised this expression of the mathematical
relationship, but as yet Edward's expression remained outside his collection of
concrete expressions of meaning. Construction of the latter procedure required
recognition of a mathematical relationship which at that point was outside his
experience.
Looking at Examples 64 a), 64 b) and 58, it is possible to discern five ways in which
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the mathematical relationship around which the task was built was expressed. These
were the original natural language expression of the question and four differing but
equally well-behaved Logo procedures constructed by the children:
k+k+1+k+2
k+k+k+1+2
k+k+k+3
k *3 3
Expression I (Natural language statement
of question.)
Expression 2 (Tom's first procedure)
Expression 3 (Tom's second procedure)
Expression 4 (David's, Nicholas's &
Edward's first procedures)
Expression 5 (Edward's second
procedure)
This collection of expressions provides an interesting perspective on the uniqueness
of each pupil's web of mearnngs. For each pupil, a different collection of expressions
had become concretised through its construction and verification. For Tom, the
concretion process incorporated expressions 161, 2 and 3; Edward's collection of
expressions comprised 1, 4 and 5; David's and Nicholas's I and 4. Such variance
does not correspond with hierarchic views of abstraction involving a "moving away"
from the "concrete", but rather resonates closely with a view of abstraction as the
creation of meaning through the forging of connections. This suggests that within this
learning situation, the concretion of expressions of meaning was dependent not on
61 Although the natural language statement was an expression "imposed" by the researcher.
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passing through the stages of some externally imposed hierarchy of abstraction, but
rather on the building up of connections between other concrete expressions of
meaning with the consequent strengthening of the web of connections.
9.3 CONCLUSION
Thus equivalence appeared to be an important connection, not so much between
distinct expressions of meaning - although this might be the case - but between and
within mathematical concepts, connecting various closely related expressions of
meaning together in order to build up a tightly-knit collection of concretised ideas.
This chapter helps to sharpen our understanding of the nature of connections.
Paradoxically this sharpening leads to a blurring: the previous two chapters have
promoted the idea of a connection as a neat, well-defined link between two
expressions of meaning; this chapter suggests that this linkage was a complicated,
even ambiguous affair. Using the mathematical imagery of functions, there was no
one-to-one mapping between expressions of meaning: the relationship between
expressions was as varied as the people who created them.
This chapter also demonstrates clearly the non-hierarchic nature of expressions of
meaning, emphasising Wilensky's point that expressions become concrete through
their relationships with other concrete expressions and not by virtue of their position
in a hierarchy of abstraction.
In Chapter Ten, the final analysis chapter, I turn to the relationship between types of
language which featured in the study, and look at the various roles which these
language types took.
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CHAPTER TEN: ROLES AND
TYPES OF LANGUAGE
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Throughout the study, pupils expressed mathematical relationships (including
generality, justification and proof) in a number of ways using various forms of
language. In fact, the use of language underpinned all the other relationships described
in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine and I have touched on its use in those chapters. In
Chapter Ten I look at the various types of language which were a feature of the study
and attempt to define their roles in the expression of generality and justification.
In order to examine these roles I want to look in turn at the different forms of language
which pupils used to express their ideas. I begin by contrasting the use of natural and
formal language. Where natural language was used to explain mathematical
relationships contained within a generalised procedure, explanations were frequently
unstructured and it appeared difficult for pupils to communicate with one another;
where pupils used the formal language of the procedure, explanations appeared clearer
and communication between pupils - and with the researcher - became more effective.
I then introduce the concept of naturalised formalism, a form of webbing used by
pupils to express mathematical ideas, structured by use of a formal Logo procedure
but expressed in natural language.
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10.2 COMPARING THE USE OF NATURAL AND
FORMAL LANGUAGE
In some examples, pupils attempted to explain mathematical relationships contained
within their procedures using the natural language of the question statement. The
discrepancy between the formal mathematical structure of, for example, a Logo
procedure and the grammatical conventions of written (or worse, spoken) English
might account for the ambiguity of statements such as the following attempt by
Matthew to explain how a procedure worked.
Example: Matthew expressing mathematical relationships contained within his
procedure by means of natural language, although failing to communicate his meaning
effectively - 15 (D 3.2)
In Task 3.2 (writing a procedure to find the sum of three consecutive numbers)
Matthew had written the following procedure:
to task2 :a
op :a + :a + 1 + :a + 2
end
On request he attempted to explain how his procedure worked in terms of a generic
example:
Matthew:	 We!!, first you've got to get the four and plus the three andfour,
so any number plus one. So that'll do three again plus one, and
that'!! add that to three. Then you've already got four so then
you plus four again. Then plus two.
Such an explanation may be analysed as follows, but although clearly influenced by
the question statement, it remains largely unstructured:
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Well, first you've got to get the four... 	 4
and plus the three and four...
	 3 + 4
so any number plus one,
	 a + 1 4
So that'll do three again plus one...
	 3 + 1
and that'll add that to three. 	 3 + 3 + 1
Then you've already got four...	 3 + 4
so then you plus four [three] 62 again... 3 + 4 + 3
Thenplustwo.	 3+4+3+2
There was certainly no element of illumination in Matthew's explanation. In fact,
such informal language created a barrier to communication and frequently failed as a
means of expressing mathematical relationships.
It is interesting to contrast this with the next two examples which focus on formal
rather than natural language. In the first example, a pupil made use of formal language
to express mathematical relationships and in the example which follows, the formal
languagebecame a means of communication between the two pupils involved and the
researcher.
Example: Edward expressing a justification of his gn r4sed p:,ir ' in th lic=
of construction - 34 (G 4 )
In Task 4.3 (a procedure for summing two even numbers) Edward constructed his
procedure as follows:
to jeeeem :j :h
op :j + :j + :h + :h
end
He verified this with the following values:
62 Matthew presumably meant "three" rather than "four" at this point.
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Inputs	 Output
6	 8	 28
5	 7	 24
9	 4	 26
He was able to prove that this procedure would always output an even number in an
expression of proof that was entirely structured by the structure of that procedure
and couched in formal algebraic Ianguage,i.e. the languageof construction:
Edward:	 I've just added the .jto the .j which will equal an even number;
then I've added :h to :h which will equal an even number and
I've added them both together and equalled an even number.
This proof was expressed using formal language because it proceeded from his
construction and verification of the procedure and because it equipped him with the
metaphor of input and output. The act of symbolisation by which the procedure was
created had endowed the symbolism with a rich association of meaning, so that rather
than the symbols (the formal language) being a barrier to expression of the
mathematical relationship they defmed, they became the obvious means of expressing
that relationship. Because of their rich association of meanings, they were a resource
to be used for further exploration of the mathematics and as a means of expressing
generality and proof. It is probably fair to say that Edward could not have made this
simple proof had he not first represented the mathematical relationship in a fonnal
way such as a Logo procedure.
In fact Edward had to restructure his procedure in order to prove its validity: he could
not read from left to right but had to view the structure of the procedure as a whole in
order to extract the fact that the sum of the first two terms was even, that the sum of
the second two terms was even, and that the sum of these two even terms was itself
even. The ability to stand back from a procedure, to see it as a whole - an object - and
then to manipulate that object implied that the symbolic procedure was a concrete
entity in Edward's eyes. This concretion was the result of Edward's experience of
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symbolisation and verification.
So the use of formal languagehere facilitated the expression of generality and proof. It
was in fact a connection between the formalised statement of a mathematical
relationship as defmed by a Logo procedure and the articulation of some generalisation
about that relationship. That the language of expression was also the language of
construction was a significant feature of this environment. This phenomenon has
been described as "auto-expression", i.e. a language used for construction which
contains the means for its own expression (Noss and Hoyles 1996).
Formal language also provided a means of communication. Standard approaches to
the teaching of algebra rely either on the formal language of "paper and pencil" algebra
as a means of communication common to teacher and pupil (although in practice
pupils often have insufficient facility with formal algebra to use it in this way), or on
semi-formal symbolisations designed by pupils themselves in order to express
emergent concepts of generality (which, by the veiy nature of their subjective genesis,
contain few elements of commonality). Logo, the symbolic language in which
procedures were written and mathematical ideas and relationships expressed,
appeared to provide that commonality. Using the idea of the "mathematical
community of the classroom", the use of Logo provided the members of that
community - in the case of this study the two pupils in any one group plus the
researcher - with a common means of communication.
Example: Ben, Matthew and the Researcher sharing a common language for
communication in Logo procedures - 20 (D 4.2)
In Group D's work in Task 4.2, which called for a procedure to generate odd numbers,
Ben first wrote
to odd :a
op :a * 2- 1
end
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and then on request from the Researcher attempted a second, equivalent procedure:
to odd2 :a
op :a * 2 + 1
end
Matthew wrote
to odddd :a
op :a * 2 + 1
end
Matthew verified his own procedure odddd as follows
and later tested Ben's procedure odd with the following values:
These two sets of data derived from empirical verification served to highlight and
define the difference in the two procedures:
Matthew:	 I can guess what the dfJerence is.
Researcher: What do you think it is before you loolc[at the procedures]
Matthew:	 Well, instead of... I'm doing plus one in mine and I think he
doing times nine, take one, or something. An odd number, take
a number.
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Ben:	 No.
Researcher: Have a look
Ben:	 Well, it isn't. it is take one. The one that you were using was
odL
Researcher: How do these work, then?
Ben:	 Well, it's just :a times two is in the two times table - it's an even
number.
Matthew:	 So add one or take one: that'll change it to an odd number.
Researcher: Can you think ofyet another procedure that'll do the same
thing?
Ben:	 :a times two add three? [laughing] :a times two add nine. It's
:a times two add or take any odd number.
Researcher: Could you be even more general?
Ben:	 No.
Researcher: Yes, you could!
Ben:	 Or :a times any even number take away any odd number.
Researcher: Brilliant!
This nice little exchange again shows Logo as a common language, it shows how
empirical verification of a Logo procedure structured the pupils' thinking and their
arguing, it shows how the procedure structure which they had created provided a
focus for further discussion and it shows how this procedure structure could be used
as a model for extending and a resource for expressing their ideas. Interestingly, Ben
chose formal language to express his ideas in the last few lines, a language which was
easily and precisely communicated to the other members of the mathematical
community.
It is, of course, the power of algebra that it encapsulates mathematical relationships in
a clear and concise manner, provided, that is, that one is sufficiently conversant in the
relevant algebraic language to make sense of this clarity and conciseness. The
comparison between :a * 2 + 1 and :a * 2 - 1, two algebraic expressions which neatly
encapsulate the mathematical essence of oddness, focuses attention on the added!
subtracted constant and so leads to the further discussion and articulation of
generalisation. The important point again, however, is that these expressions were the
result of pupils' experience of procedure construction, supported veiy evidently here,
by the empirical testing of values. The ultimate expression of oddness as ":a times
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any even number take away any odd number" was a product of the learning situation.
One indicator of the rich association of meanings which the symbolism acquired was
the apparent lack of confusion between process and result. An area highlighted as
problematic in traditional paper and pencil algebra is appreciation that, say, 2x can
denote both a process (2 multiplied by x) and a product 63. The set of tasks in the
second session, for example, asks pupils to interpret natural language statements as
formal functions, and then to explain the effect of the function. As one of the pupils
observed, it was necessaiy for them to interpret the verb "double" as x * 2 or as x +
so making explicit the mathematical relationship contained within the tenn. Similarly,
statements of the type: "Well, number times two plus number is three of the numbers.
Divided by three is the number and divided by the number is on" (Tom working at
Task 2.1), demonstrate an easy fluency in interpretation between process and result.
10.3 NATURALISED FORMALISM
There was, however, a third way in which language was used to explain and to
communicate. Here an explanation was shaped by the formalised procedure which
formed the starting point for the mathematical relationship under discussion and not
by the natural language statement of the question, yet the explanation was expressed
in natural language. This use of language, which I shall refer to as naturalised
formalism, was neither purely natural language nor a formal mathematical statement,
but something in between the two. It appeared to provide a linguistic medium in
which formal relationships might be structured and explored without requiring a
rigorous command of mathematical formalism. Consider the following two examples.
63 For a discussion of the dilemma between process and product see Davis (1975), Sfard and
Linchevski (1993) and Gray and Tall (1994)
64 
"Number" used here without article is the variable :v on the screen in front of the pupils.
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Example: Edward explaining the behaviour of his procedure by means of naturalised
formalism- 55 (G 2.1)
In Task 2.1 Edward attempted to explain why his procedure
to jem :d
op(:d * 2+ :d)/3/:d
end
always produced an output of one:
Edward:	 It works with any number ... [looking at the procedure on the
screen] because whenever you times a number which you
started off with by two then add the number you started off with,
it's more or less like timesing by three.
Researcher: Right. Carry on.
Edward:	 Because then you divide it by three, equals the number you
started off with - it's just like doing the three times table. Then f
you divide by the number you started off with it will always
equal one.
Researcher: Great.
Example: Luke and Jamie describing how Luke's procedure worked, first (Jamie) in
terms of a generic example, and then (Luke) in naturalised formalism - 55 (E 2.2)
In Task 2.1, Luke constructed the following procedure:
to plum :o
op (:o * 2+ :o)/31:o
end
Researcher: Can you explain why this procedure always comes to one?
Jamie:	 Five, times two is ten, addfive is fifteen, divide by three is five,
divide by the number you first thought of is one.
Luke:	 Well, because zfyou do the number you thought ofdivided by the
number you thought, it equals one. By doing this procedure
you've got the number youfirst thought oftimes the number you
first thought of which is the same as times three. Then you've
got divided by three, then you divide by the number you first
started with which is one.
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In these examples pupils did not manipulate the symbols of an algebraic function as
might be the case in a paper and pencil example (or indeed in the examples of formal
language quoted in § 10.2), but manipulated the relationship defined by the symbols.
This relationship was expressed in a kind of formalised natural language which
commonly served as an intermediaiy language between the natural language of the
question and formal algebraic expression. This language might be termed "naturalised
formalism", a description which seems more apt than "fonnalised naturalism" since it
owed more to the formalised structure of the procedure than to the original natural
language expression of the question. A feature of naturalised formalism was that
through it pupils were able to express generality and even prove a result, as Luke and
Edward did in the statements quoted above.
These two examples demonstrate statements in naturalised formalism as final
statements in the course of completion of a task. Expression of a mathematical
relationship in naturalised formalism might also lead to the re-expression of that same
relationship in formal terms.
Example: Tom using naturalised formalism to re-shape his generalised expression and
ultimately to re-express it in formal language- 40 (H 4.5)
In this example Tom's naturalised formalism explanation acted rather like generic
structuring65
 in that through it he shaped his expression of the function's properties to
such an extent that he was then able to re-express the relationship in formalised
language. The Researcher's role in encouraging him to articulate a formalised statement
was clearly of central importance.
Tom's procedure in Task 4.5 (the summation of an odd and an even number) was as
follows:
65 See Chapter 8, § 8.3
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to pip :e :m
op :e * 2 + :m * 2 + 1
end
He had verified this as follows using the knowledge that the sum of an odd number
and an even number is an odd number:
Tom:	 It ought to come out as an odd number: odd pius even is odd
Yes, because even plus even makes even, so even plus odd must
make one more or less than even.
Inputs	 Output
2	 4	 13
Tom;	 Four becomes eight; eight becomes 17; eight add 17 is 25
Inputs	 Output
4	 I	 8	 25
Tom:	 Yes. Right, six and nine: six will become 12; nine becomes 19:
31.
Inputs	 Output
6	 9	 31
Tom:	 I'm satisfied
Researcher: What sort ofnumber are you getting coming out?
David:	 Odd.
Tom:	 An odd number.
Researcher: Can you explain from looking at your procedure why?
Tom:	 Because you're making an even number and an odd number
and an even and an odd number is an odd number.
Researcher: Yes, but that doesn't explain why that works.
Tom:	 Because you know that fyou times something by two it becomes
an even number, so you times by two again to get the even
number and we know that one more than an even number is an
odd number. So times Iwo makes an even number plus one
235
Chapter Ten: Roles and Types of Language
makes an odd number: add the odd number and the even
number and you get an odd number.
Researcher: That doesn't quite explain why. :e times two is an even number,
yes. David any ideas?
David:	 No.
On being pressed by the researcher for an explanation, Tom restructured his
procedure to make the following statements:
Tom:	 Well, it would bejust like adding two numbers times two
together only adding one on the end.
Researcher: Right. Say that again.
Tom:	 So it's just like taking two even numbers, timesing them both by
two and adding one.
Researcher: Can you say that in relation to the :e 's and the :m 's.
Tom:	 :e times two is an even number; :m times two is an even
number; and you're adding those both together and adding one.
Here naturalised formalism was acting as a connection between expressions of
meaning: it was providing a link between the formal Logo procedure (which Tom
himself had constructed) and his formalised articulation (referring to that procedure)
of why it would always output an odd number (i.e. an explanation of the
mathematical relationship contained within that procedure).
Naturalised formalism displayed close parallels with generic structuring: generic
structuring involved the expression of generality through the exploration of a
procedure's behaviour in terms of specific and generic examples; naturalised formalism
was used to shape the expression of generality in formal terms - expression through
naturalised formalism clarified and defined relationships before they were expressed in
formal language.
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10.4 CONCLUSION
Language, mediated by use of the computer, was used in at least two ways as a
connection between expressions of meaning. Fonnal language, rather than acting as a
barrier, became a connection between formalised algebraic statements and articulation
of generality or even proof of that statement. What seemed to be important here was
the association of meanings the formal language acquired through the construction
process: the formal symbolism was concretised through acts of symbolisation and
was thus a natural means of expression when the procedure was analysed and ideas of
generality and proof discussed.
What I have described as naturalised formalism adds an extra element to this
relationship. The commonality of the language of construction and the language of
expression appeared to enable pupils to express generality using their constructed
procedures as a resource for expression. However, naturalised formalism seemed in
some cases to act as an intermediary stage between a constructed Logo procedure and
the articulation of generality and justification in formal language: it webbed the
expression of formal relationships. Generic structuring was a means of exploring and
clarif'ing structure through recourse to expressions which pupils might find more
concrete; in a similar way, naturalised formalism combined the concrete associations
of natural language with the formal structure of a procedure (itself concretised through
an act of symbolisation).
Chapter Ten is the last of the four chapters which deal with analysis of data. In
Chapter Eleven, the final chapter, I draw conclusions from these analyses and suggest
areas for further research.
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11.1 INTRODUCTION
In this final chapter I look once again at the aims of the research and summarise the
fmdings in the light of these aims. I then look in more detail at these findings. This
section I group under three headings, numbered 11.3.2 - 11.3.3:
creating generality;
structuring generality; and
webbing generality and justification.
Finally, after a review of the important role of the researcher in the thesis, I look at
the limitations and implications of the research and discuss possible areas for further
work.
11.2 AIMS & PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OF THE THESIS
The overall aim of the thesis was to observe children's creation of meaning through the
expression of mathematical generality and through the justification of that generality.
Review of the literature suggested that this might best be observed through
consideration of children's expressions of meaning and through the connections they
made between these expressions of meaning.
Three theoretical concepts - elaborated in Chapter Two - were dominant in
determining the design of the learning situation:
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i) concretion (Wilensky 1993) - objects becoming concrete by virtue of the
learner's relationship with that object;
ii) webbing (Noss and Hoyles 1996) - a structure which learners can draw
upon and reconstruct for support; and
iii) situated abstraction (Noss and Hoyles 1996) - the way in which learners
draw on the webbing of a setting to construct mathematical ideas and the way
in which that webbing shapes the expression of ideas. A Logo programming
environment was chosen as providing a window onto pupils' construction of
meaning
Based on these theoretical considerations, the overriding research issue was stated as
being to investigate how use of a carefully designed computer programming
environment structured children's expression of generality and the justification of that
expression, and from this issue three aims were identified:
i) to investigate ways in which children expressed generality using the
programming medium;
ii) to investigate connections between different expressions of generality
made in different modalities and their role in children's creation of
mathematical meaning;
iii) to investigate the role of connections between expressions of generality in
children's attempts to justify their constructed generalisations.
These investigations were carried out through the creation of a learning situation
which centred round the creation of Logo procedures to model simple functions. This
setting was chosen as opening a window onto children's constructions of meaning for
generality. The starting point for each activity was a mathematical relationship
expressed either in natural language or in a table of input-output pairings. The
activity thus involved generalising that relationship in terms of a Logo procedure. A
further dimension was added - one designed to explore children's justification of their
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generalisations - in that the activities were treated as a competitive game in which it
was necessary for children to prove or demonstrate to their partner that their
procedure was either as good as or better than their partner's.
The findings of the thesis weave around the dual themes of generality and
particularity; abstract and concrete; and formal and informal. They focus not on these
relationships as dichotomies but throw light on them as complementary partnerships
in the creation of meaning. The principal findings were as follows:
i) within the learning situation defined in the study children were able to
make formalised generalisations of mathematical relationships, often webbed
by what I have termed "semi-generalisation";
ii) the expressive powers of the symbolisation, which was both a goal and a
means of expression within the activities, achieved a more functional role by
the symbols' association with a history of specific numerical examples;
iii) children constructed situated abstractions for the justification of generality
webbed by what I have defined as "generic structuring" and "naturalised
formalism";
iv) the apparent "rift" between empirical and deductive starting points for
generalisation, justification and proving activities appeared less clear than the
literature suggests.
Each of these points is discussed in the following section.
11.3 DISCUSSION
11.3.1 Introduction
In determining how children concretise a mathematical object, I have introduced
Wilensky's idea that this is achieved not through "some intensive examination of the
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object, but rather an examination of the modes of interaction and the models which the
person uses to understand the object" (Wilensky 1993, p 198). In the following
sections I explore through data from the study these modes of interaction and the
models the pupils used. In § 11.3.2 I describe the symbolisation process through
which pupils engaged with the initial mathematical problem in each of the tasks, and
examine the process of semi-generalisation which they frequently used to web the
symbolisation process. I draw parallels with a form of webbing described by Noss
and Hoyles (1996) as flagging and suggest how semi-generalisation extends this
concept.
In the next section (*11.3.3) I look at how the children used the auto-expressive
quality of the computational environment to analyse and justif' their procedures,
suggesting how my research brings a new dimension to the idea of auto-expression. I
also look at how the computational environment itself appeared to motivate the
participants' justification of generality.
In the third section (* 11.3.4) I explore two important processes which children used
to concretise mathematical relationships: generic structuring and naturalised
formalism.
11.3.2 Creating Generality
Act of Syntholisation
The central act of each task canied out by the pupils in the study involved the
creation of a procedure expressed in symbolic algebraic language. Creation of such a
procedure required a generalisation of the mathematical relationship defmed in the
task, that relationship - the starting point for each of the tasks - being a problem
66 See Chapter 2.
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expressed in natural language(or in a few cases a collection of numericalvalues). Thus
each task involved an act of symbolisation which attempted to create a connection
between a problem expressed in natural language and the expression of that problem in
formal algebraic language. The feature of the programming medium which appeared to
facilitate this act of symbolisation was the ability it afforded pupils to verify
empirically the emergent procedure at each iteration of its construction.
In addition, the act of symbolisation appeared to carfy with it a number of important
consequences:
i) it produced descriptions of procedure behaviour shaped by the formalised
procedure rather than the natural language statement of the question. When
discussing a task, pupils referred and pointed to - and sometimes used the
language of - their procedures, rather than referring back to the natural language
statement of the original question;
ii) it provided a rich association of meanings for the symbolism. Pupils had
used the symbolism as a means of constructing the procedure and they had
verified the symbolism empirically;
iii) translation into symbolic form was perceived as a helpful act - for many
pupils it appeared to clarify mathematical relationships;
iv) it appeared to create in pupils not just acceptance of but a perceived need
for symbolic mathematical expression
Semi-generalisadon
The programming medium provided a powerful piece of webbing for the construction
of generalisations in what I have termed semi-generalisation. Semi-generalisation is the
creation of a partially correct procedure which is used as a basic framework - what
might be termed a partly-functioning prototype - for further work. There were three
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important features of semi-generalised procedures:
1) a procedure was as generalised as necessaiy for further work on that
procedure, be that work further efforts towards complete generalisatiori, or
further work on the structure of the procedure;
ii) the importance of the computational medium was its role in capturing the
working model in a kind of limbo between specific and general which
nevertheless made available the possibility of empirical verification;
iii) with the computer's preservation of the semi-generalised procedure and
with use of a constant input, the procedure could be seen as an object which
could itself be manipulated;
It is also possible to identify a number of features relating to the process of
construction and to the use of semi-generalisations:
i) further adjustments to the procedure might proceed in a piecemeal fashion:
pupils' attention could shift from one aspect to another and they did not need
to tacide all aspects of the procedure simultaneously in order to correct the
procedure;
ii) validity of a partially correct procedure might be tested by pupils within
any range of parameters defined as necessaty for the procedure to be semi-
generalised, for example a severely limited domain of input (commonly
confined to one value);
iii) completion of the procedure became a process of homing-in, supported by
easily achieved verification;
iv) complete generalisation of the procedure might not proceed beyond this
level, or it might happen that when the bugs in the procedure had been
removed, the pupil would in fact make the procedure fully generalised,
v) generalisation of a semi-generalised procedure might also occur as part of
the justification process, so a semi-generalised procedure might provide a good
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focus for analysis and discussion.
Semi-generalisation contains close parallels with what Noss and Hoyles describe as
flagging (Noss and Hoyles 1996 , p 110), in that the "critical features of the problem
were marked, modified and finally built into a mathematical structure, but one that
could be modified later." Where semi-generalisation extends the notion of flaggingis in
the close connection which is maintained between generality in the form of the
emergent Logo procedure and the specificity of the empirical verification process; and
in the way children were able to use the semi-generalised procedure as an object which
could be manipulated prior to completion of the complete generalisation. There is a
sense of fluidity in the learning process here: unbound by the fetters of routine and
acknowledged procedure, but with the gap between what lay within the children's
experience and the final expression of mathematical relationships webbed by the
computational medium, children appeared able to explore and broaden their expression
of generality in diverse, yet ultimately complementary ways.
Expression of generality in the study took the form of re-expressing natural language
statements as a formalised mathematical relationship through writing a Logo
procedure. The connection between natural language statements and formalised Logo
procedures was the act of symbolisation, this act frequently webbed by semi-
generalisation.
Figure 11.1 depicts this relationship. The two expressions of meaning - natural
language and Logo procedure - are represented as being linked by an act of
symbolisation. The double-headed arrow is used to show that the relationship is two
way, the act of symbolisation both formalising the natural language statement in terms
of a Logo procedure, and enriching the Logo procedure in terms of the symbolism's
strong links with the original natural language statement. Semi-generalisation is shown
as "floating" between the two to depict the support offered by this powerful piece of
webbing. It should be noted that the placing of the various components of the
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diagram is not designed to convey a sense of hierarchy.
[Logo Procedt
Jlilion_
[SEMI-GENEP.ALISA TION]
[Natural Language 
j
Figure 11.1: Semi-generalisation webbing symbolisation - the arrows represent two
expressions of meaning linked by the act of symbolisation, the process webbed by
semi-generalisation.
11.3.3 Restructuring Generality
The design of the learning situation incorporated a game context whereby pupils'
procedure construction was intimately bound up with the necessity to demonstrate
the superiority of one procedure over another. In many cases this demonstration
consisted of pupils testing values, i.e. empirically verifying their procedure; where, in
addition, some element of analysis of the procedure structure was involved, pupils
were involved in the jutVIcation of that procedure. In this situation all analysis of
procedure was in fact also a justification of that procedure's validity, and
consequently, analysis of procedure structure and the motivation behind that analysis
are vital windows onto pupils' ability and desire to justify. It is interesting to note
that there was no clear distinction between use of empirical verification as a means of
demonstrating the validity of a procedure and the use of analysis of procedure
structure. Frequently both were used side by side, one backing up the other:
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empirical verification might be used to "back up" verbal justification; verbal
justification might be used to enhance a point made during empirical verification. In
this situation a least, the apparent gulf between empirical and deductive failed to
appear.
Analysis of Structure
The central importance of the relationship between construction and verification has
already been highlighted. This relationship also heavily influenced the ability to
analyse the structure of a procedure. Features of construction and verification which
promoted the analysis of structure were:
i) iterative term-by-term (re)construction and verification where the
empirical verification of a procedure informed the subsequent reconstruction
of that procedure; and
ii) using the calculator to create a tabular presentation of empirical
verification, i.e. the fact that the input/output pairings of the verification
process appeared in a tabular format, the ordering of which was under the
control of an individual pupil;
Another key to the effective analysis of structure was term-by-term verification,
carried out largely through mental evaluation of a procedure under a specific input
value. Here less direct use was made of the computer.
Roles of Symbolism
Of primary importance to the analysis of a procedure was the role and use of the
symbolism itself. The power of the act of symbolisation - the building of procedures
on the computer screen - extended beyond simply forging links between two
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expressions of a mathematical statement. The data provides examples of the symbols
of the constructed procedures acquiring a significance which was clearly structured by
the medium in which the language was embedded:
i) experience of constructing and verifying the procedure had transformed the
symbols into a means of expression;
ii) the verification process had endowed the symbols with a history of several
specific numerical examples, although they remained a generalised expression
of a mathematical relationship.
Using the symbols in this way - as both a means of expression and as abstractions of
a recently concrete cperience - pupils were able to restructure a procedure (i.e.
manipulate its symbols) into a new form, from the structure of which justification and
even proof of that procedure appeared to become clear. This, of course, is a key facet
of the process of formal proof. The important characteristic of these cases was that
the restructuring of the generalised statement (the procedure) necessary to its
justification was facilitated by the expressive quality of the abstract symbols, albeit
expressed in naturalised formalism rather than in the language of construction itself.
Analysis of procedure structure exhibited the following features:
i) Logo was used as a common language - a common reference point for
discussion and a common means of communication common that is, to the
pair of pupils participating in any one task and to the researcher,
ii) empirical verification of a Logo procedure structured some pupils' thinking
and their arguments;
iii) procedure structure provided a focus for further discussion; and
iv) procedure structure was used as a model for extending and a resource for
expressing pupils' ideas.
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Although not a central theme of this thesis, it is interesting to note in passing that
some pupils chose to use the formal language of their procedure to express their ideas
in preference to natural language.
The formalised procedure provided a framework for analysis and discussion: its
structure appeared to focus discussion, whether spontaneous discussion on the part
of the pupils, or the result of an artificial focus created by the researcher. (The
commonality of the language provided an important starting point for dialogue
between researcher and pupils). The algebraic expression (in contrast to the natural
language expression) made consideration of the function bit by bit possible: it
provided reference points for analysis. Pupils often appeared to grapple with the
natural language expression of the question in a manner lacking focus and direction; the
formal expression of the procedure lent itself to concentration on small chunks (the
focus often provided by the researcher). As a means of support, the researcher could
isolate a section of the procedure and either explain it outright, or illicit an explanation
through discussion with the pupils. Attention might then shift (or be shifted) to
another section which pupils might then find easier to explain. The researcher could
explain one chunk as an aid to pupils' progress. Also chunks might be rearranged in
order to investigate mathematical relationships contained within the function. Now,
of course this is a routine part of traditional paper and pencil algebra, and it would be
wrong to ascribe any unique advantage to Logo algebra over paper algebra in respect
of symbol manipulation. The value of the learning situation lay in the rich association
of meanings the Logo symbols acquired through their use in the construction process
and through empirical verification of the procedure and the way in which the Logo
meaning provided an anchor for analysis and the subsequent expression of
justification.
248
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion
New Perspectives on Aido-&pre&cion
A computational medium in which the language of construction is also the language of
expression and justification of generality (i.e. one which contains the "elements of a
languageto talk about itself') may be described as auto-expressive (Noss and Hoyles
1996, P. 69). However, the use of language in this study adds an extra dimension to
the idea of auto-expression. For here it is not merely the language which thcilitates
expression of generality, but it is the use of that language interpreted through its
relationship with the specificity of recent numerical verification. The symbolism of
the language is a generalised expression of a mathematical relationship, but it has extra
power by virtue of the symbols' association with a history of specific numerical
examples. Now this association increases the situatedness of a procedure in that it is
firmly linked in a pupil's experience to specific numerical examples, but it
nevertheless remains a generalised expression, as does the justification of that
generality, within the specific learning situation.
.ustification of Procedure
Analysis of Structure
[iooProcedurè 1
Act of Symbolisation
[!tund .Lan_J
	 {SEMIGENERALISATIO]
Figure 11.2: Jus4flcation ofGenerality - the arrows represent expressions of meaning
linked by the act ofsymbolisation and analysis ofstructure.
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In this situation, then, use of the auto-expressive language became more powerful by
its situation; by a paradox the ability to generalise is heightened by a stronger
relationship with the specific.
Figure 11.2 extends the web of expressions of meaning and connections, shown in
Figure 11.1, to include justification of procedure generalisation effected through
analysis of structure. Again the two-headed arrow is intended to denote a two-way
relationship: analysis of procedure structure leading to justification of a procedure's
generality; and justification of the procedure confirming the generality of the
procedure.
11.3.4 Webbing Generality and Justification
Generic structuring
Generic structuring is the process of gaining a clearer picture of a procedure's structure
through recourse to examples which give an insight into the general through the
particular; it is the connection between two expressions of meaning, namely the
verification of a procedure with a specific value and a generalised statement about that
procedure, expressed in natural language, formal algebraic language, or indeed in
naturalised formalism. I use the word generic because it makes use of examples which
are chosen not for their specific values, but as representatives of their class; and
structuring because it is used as a means of shaping experience of specific empirical
verification into the expression of some general statement, or for the examination and
clarification of an emergent generalisation.
Generic structuring is intimately bound up with the rehearsal of a procedure's
behaviour with particular inputs from which the pupils obtained a general feeling of
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the function and through which they highlighted patterns. As the pattern was
spotted, the example ceased to be simply a description of what happened with a
particular value in a particular case. The particular value became representative of
values in its class and the example became a generic explanation of how the function
behaved, using a value as an example. This use of procedure structure and the
formation of generic examples constitutes generic structuring.
The point at which an example took on a generic, explanatory quality rather than a
particular descriptive quality was not always easy to discern. In fact identification of
pupils' use of examples as generic could rest on subtleties of emphasis and tone of
voice: a particular description might be recited almost monotonously; the use of a
generic example might be characterised by a purposeful, directed tone of voice, leading
to a "triumphant" conclusion, as if to say quod erat demonstrandum. This might
sound fanciful, but responsiveness to tone of voice is, I believe, an essential facet of
the researche?s observational role in work such as this.
The most important element necessary in any generalisation would appear to be an
awareness of the structure of the procedure being explained. This is another criterion
which may help to distinguish between generic and particular examples: an
explanation which casts some new light on the structure of a procedure (for example
by rearranging the written order of terms), but uses a particular input, is very likely
using that input as representative of its class and is a result of generic structuring.
Generic examples were expressed in both natural language and in the formal algebraic
language of procedure construction. At no point in the study did pupils appear to
lack the means to express generic examples. This is in direct contrast to Balachefi's
expectation of problems in expression. Balacheff, in speaking of generic examples,
says:
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The reasons for the truth of an assertion are made explicit by means of
operations or transformations on an object chosen not in its own right but as a
characteristic representative of its class. Problems may well be presented here
by the dfJIculiy on the part of pupils to express mathematical relationships
either in natural language or informal algebraic language.
(Balacheff 1988, p. 219)
Scrutiny of the data suggests that the apparent relative ease of expression found in the
study might be put down to the closeness in form between generic example and
particular example, and the impression that the expression of particular examples is so
heavily dependent on procedure structure, which itself is the result of pupils'
construction and testing of their own procedures - the result of their own act of
symbolisation and empirical testing.
Generic structuring took a variety of forms: sometimes through the use of generic
examples it was used as a starting point for the expression of generality, sometimes as
a fall back in cases where pupils were unable to sustain a more generalised
explanation, but more usually it underpinned the formation of emergent
generalisations and justifications of generality, with the attention continually passing
from the specific to the general. In this last case, pupils sometimes used generic
examples as a reference point: if they lost their bearings in a more abstract explanation
with which they were not as yet fully comfortable, the generic example might provide
familiar, concrete territory from which to build further.
Naturalisedforma1Lm
In examples of what I have called naturalised formalism, an explanation was shaped
by the formalised procedure which formed the starting point for the mathematical
relationship under discussion and not by the natural language statement of the
question, yet the explanation was expressed in natural language.
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Naturalised formalism was characterised by the following features:
i) pupils did not manipulate the symbols of an algebraic function as might be
the case in a paper and pencil example, but manipulated the relationship
defined by the symbols;
ii) it expressed a mathematical relationship in a kind of formalised natural
language which commonly served as an intermediaiy language between the
natural language of the question and formal algebraic expression; and
iii) through its use pupils were able to express generality and even prove a
result.
Examples from the data show naturalised formalism acting as a connection between
expressions of meaning, acting as a link between a formal Logo procedure and a pupil's
formalised articulation of why that procedure would always behave in a certain
manner (i.e. an explanation of the mathematical relationship contained within that
procedure).
The parallel here with generic structuring is striking: in examples of generic structuring
pupils expressed generality and justifications of generality through the exploration of
a procedure's behaviour in terms of specific and generic examples; naturalised
formalism acted as a shaping medium for the expression of generality in formal terms -
expression through naturalised formalism helped clarify and define relationships prior
to their expression in formal language.
Naturalised formalism appeared to act as an intermediary stage between a generalised
Logo procedure and the articulation and justification of generality in formal language.
Rather in the way that generic structuring provided a means of moving towards
expressions which pupils might find more concrete in order to explore and clarify the
structure of a procedure, so naturalised formalism appeared to provide a means of
exploring the structure of a Logo procedure through a means of expression which
combined the concrete associations of natural language with the formal structure of a
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procedure which had itself become concretised through an act of symbolisation,
namely the construction of that procedure.
If concretion is the "process of the new knowledge coming into relationship with
itself and with prior knowledge" (Wilensky 1993, p. 201), then generic structuring and
naturalised formalism are two important means of interpreting that process. They
also enrich our understanding of the idea of situated abstraction (Noss and Hoyles
1996) in that they provide an insight into two ways in which pupils appeared to web
generality and justification within this particular setting. In this study, expressions of
generality and justification were clearly webbed by generic structuring and naturalised
formalism, and indeed by semi-generalisation.
STRLICTURJ
[NATURALISED FORMALISM] - - - - - [10g0 Procedu1
I
I
I
I
I
I___________________________________________________
I
f!MIGEWERAUSATIOJ
[NaturalLanuae 1
Figure 11.3: Just/Ication webbed by generic structuring and naturalised formalism -
building on Figures 11.2 and 11.3, generic structuring and semi-generalisation are
shown webbing analysis of structure and act of symbolisation re3pectively, and
naturalised formalism is depictea by means of a dotted line, as providing a form Cf
webbing which links natural language, formalised Logo procedures and jusqfications
ofthe generality ofthose Logo procedures.
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Figure 11.3 expands the two previous diagrams to include generic structuring and
naturalised formalism. Like semi-generalisation, these are depicted as "floating" in
order to show that they constitute much used but by no means indispensable means
of webbing justification of generality. Naturalised formalism is deliberately placed
within the triangle of natural language - logo procedure - justfIcation of procedure
and joined to them by dotted lines to depict how through naturalised formalism,
justification of a procedure's generality might be shaped by the logo procedure, yet
expressed in natural language.
11.4 A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCHER'S ROLE
The role of the researcher in this study had a crucial significance. A rationale behind
the interventions made by the researcher is described in Chapter Four 67. Maintaining
the right balance proved a difficult job: the balance between instructive, supportive
and exploratory intervention was important and one determined to a great extent by
the researcher's goals. As Noss and Hoyles observe:
When the connections to the teacher's goal are dominant, students may simply
imitate a procedure or try to guess what the teacher wants; when they are not
made at all, the mathematical agenda might be bypassed (although f we
recognise diversity and reject the notion of a unique line of development, the
situation is not so brittle).
(Noss and Hoyles 1996, p. 109)
Whilst stressing again that, the researcher's role was all along intended as participative
- and I must emphasise that nowhere would I wish to claim that the fmdings obtained
in this study would necessarily be replicated in a similar study in which the researcher
took a more passive role - it is nonetheless interesting to speculate how the activities
might have progressed had it indeed been more passive. It seems likely that pupils
would have constructed some form of generalised Logo procedures with no
'7 See4.4.2
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intervention from the researcher (bar initial explanations of the game context, etc.) and
that pupils would have proceeded to cany out auto- and altero-venfication, given that
these were the rules of the game. It is less certain, however, that much spontaneous
discussion would have ensued and that what would have occurred would have led
anywhere of great mathematical import.
That said, what I describe in Section 11.7.1 as auto-concretion is of particular interest
in this context. In that section I speculate that for some children, carefully
constructed learning situations can in themselves motivate pupils to go in search of a
broader understanding of the mathematical concept contained within them. If this
speculation were supported by further evidence, there would be important
implications here for the role of the researcher/teacher.
11.5 LIMITATIONS IN SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
Clearly the research described in this thesis, whilst containing a number of interesting
findings, is also limited in the scope of the findings:
i) the children who took part in the study were chosen on the basis of their
generally high ability in mathematics as identified by standardised tests
administered by the school68;
ii) the children were generally well-motivated - each chose to take part in the
study, all of which took place in the children's own free time;
iii) only a relatively small sample of children, which was nonetheless
sufficient for exploring the aims of the study, was used;
iv) all the children were white (due to the locality) and most came from middle
class backgrounds.
' SeeChapter66.3.1.
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11.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the findings of this thesis explore
relationships between generality and particularity, abstract and concrete and formal
and informal, looking on these not as dichotomies but as complementary partnerships
in the creation of meaning. I consider implications for research under the heading of
each of four major findings.
Finding 1
Within the learning situation defined in the study, children were able to make
formalised generalisations of mathematical relationships, often webbed by
what I have termed "semi-generalisation".
In Chapter Two I discussed the idea of situated abstraction: "how learners construct
mathematical ideas by drawing on the webbing of a particular setting which, in turn,
shapes the way the ideas are expressed" (Noss and Hoyles 1996, p 122). The
research data very clearly reveals three forms webbing appeared to take - semi-
generalisation, generic structuring and naturalised formalism - in the construction of
generalisation and justification. These forms of webbing all exploited relationships
between generality and particularity: through the particular - and especially through
consideration of the structure of the particular - pupils were able to achieve powerful
insights into generality, and, furthermore, by means of the language of construction,
explain, justify and even prove their generalisations.
Returning once more to the S-column analogy and diSessa's specific naive schemata
first described in Chapter One, it is apparent that the hierarchic ordering of
representations, on which the "rift" viewpoint relies, is at odds with the subjective
and uniquely personal ways in which the pupils in this study have been observed
concretising mathematical objects and relationships: expressing and re-expressing
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meaning, and forging connections between their constructed expressions of meaning
for generality and justification. Perhaps, if the idea of hierarchy is inappropriate, then
the metaphor of specific naive schemata as a kind of bore-hole through strata of
meaning is also inappropriate. The power of that visual metaphor lay in the slim
column cutting through wide strata - a narrow, situated aspect of some much greater
field of knowledge.
Now, it is possible to identify local as opposed to global hierarchies within this
study. However, these local hierarchies were fluid and ever changing - consideration
of the way in which pupils appeared to shift between the particular and the general
demonstrate this in my description of generic structuring and naturalised formalism.
For most pupils a generalisedLogo procedure of a mathematical relationship began at
a "higher level of abstraction" than the natural language description of the same. But,
as I have described in this chapter, at other times the Logo procedure through analysis
became a more powerful and more concrete expression than natural language. This
shifting feeling of what at any one time constitutes concreteness resonates strongly
with Wilensky' s discussion of concrete and abstract (Wilensky 1993).
Finding 2
The expressive powers of the symbolisation, which was both a goal and a
means of expression within the activities, achieved a more functional role by
the symbols' association with a history of specific numerical examples.
In Chapter Three I reviewed research (Anderson 1995, p 48) which suggested that
approaches to mathematics, which involve pupils in constructing their own
generalisations from pattern spotting activities, may be criticised for stopping at the
point where a generalisation is produced, which is also the point where proving might
begin. Algebra(if it is used) becomes the final goal of the activity. It is interesting to
compare this criticism with the use of formal algebraic language in this study. The
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Logo procedure expressed in formal algebraic language (a formal expression of
generality) was the goal of the construction stage of any task. However, formal
language then became a resource for use in the exploration and explanation of the
structure of mathematical relationships, and for use as a means for justifying
generality. Thus formal language served the dual role of medium for construction of
generality and medium for the justification of that generality.
The findings thus corroborate research which stresses the importance of an act of
construction (e.g. Tall (1989) and Goldenberg and Hazzan (1995)) and which stresses
the relationship between the means of expressing generality and the means of
expressing justification of that generality (e.g. Bell 1996, p. 177). In fact Boero's
finding, that in children's attempts at justification, the "proving process may
naturally evolve from it as a "textual development" of the statement [of generality]
itself' (Boero 1995, p. 2), is extended in my research as it demonstrates that this
evolution is possible at an even earlier age than Boero's findings show, i.e. amongst
nine, ten and eleven year olds. Sutherland's findings that children can "make a
generalisation and formalise this generalisation in Logo" (Sutherland 1989, p. 341) are
also extended by the participation in my study of younger children, but more
significantly by the identification of the important relationship between particularity
and generality in this Logo programming context: the constantly evolving relationship
between the general, in terms of the Logo expressions, and the particular, in terms of
the symbols' association with a history of specific numerical examples was a result of
the strong link between empirical verification and construction.
This strong link between particularity and generality was a recurring feature of pupils'
work. Boero has made a link between precision of generality and verification of
validity (Boero 1995, p. 10); my findings (casting in a new light Sutherland's view
that the computer frees pupils from the evaluation of an expression - Sutherland
1995) suggest that construction and verification are not so much two distinct
processes which are closely linked, but that they are two discernible features of one
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greater, more complex process of construction, and that consequently for many
children in learning situations of this type, effective construction of generality is
dependent on the interplay between construction and verification: structural aspects
of a situation are focused by the process of verification.
The findings also underline the power of learning situations which are built around an
auto-expressive language (Noss and Hoyles 1996), the relationship between
particularity and generality adding an extra dimension to the idea of auto-expression.
Recognition of the power of auto-expression, or at least a strong connection between
generalising and justifying, also questions the value of activities such as those
described by Austin (1995, p. 74) and even Maher and Davis (1995, p. 87), which are
essentially dead-ended, having no expressive means for justification or proof. Perhaps
it is these sorts of activities which Anderson (op cit) is criticising.
Finding 3
Children constructed situated abstractions for the justification of generality
webbed by what I have defined as "generic structuring" and "naturalised
fonnalism".
Generic structuring highlights the central importance to justification of generality of
seeing the general in the particular (Mason 1996, p. 70). A number of authors
describe the use of generic examples in the justification of generality and expression of
proof (e.g. Balacheff 1988, Tall 1979, Steiner 1976, Movshovitz-Hadar 1988). Ideas
such as generic proof (Tall op cit) and generic example-assisted proof (Movshovitz-
Hadar op cit) involve the use of a particular example, representative of its class (i.e.
generic), chosen to demonstrate a proof so that a non-generic proof may be stated as
an extension of the neric proof. Generic structuring differs from these in that pupils
choose to "dip into" a generic example - often momentarily - in order to give
particularity to the generality of an expression they have constructed. They use this
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experience to help structure their justification of generality. Generic structuring
supports pupils in their concretising of a generality and is within the control of a
pupil.
Noss (1997) suggests that proof inhabits a world which lies between natural language
and mathematical formalism. My notion of naturalised formalism provides a
powerful insight into that world, a world where generality and justification may be
expressed in a natural language structured by mathematical formalism. Sutherland
gives the example of why for one pupil "it was the experience of symbolising
mathematical experiences with a spreadsheet language which helped him to begin to
express his ideas in natural language" (Sutherland 1993b, p. 46). Naturalised
formalism helps to explain - within a Logo programming context - why the process of
symbolisation influences expression.
Furthermore, naturalised formalism satisfies Balacheff's criterion that language must
become a tool for logical deduction - for this is the role of naturalised formalism - but
by forming a bridge between natural language and mathematical formalism (as
manifested in Logo) it obviates Balacheff's need for abstraction in the sense of moving
away from one form of language to embrace another. In other words naturalised
formalism resonates closely with and extends the view of abstraction (Noss and
Hoyles 1996, p. 48) which sees the process as the creation of meaning (the creation of
connections) rather than a moving away from one thing to the replacement of it by
another.
Finding 4
The apparent "rift" between empirical and deductive starting points for
generalisation, justification and proving activities appeared less clear than the
literature suggests.
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In Chapter Three I described what is presented in much of the literature as a rift
between formal, axiomatic proof teaching (demonstration) and teaching methods
which focus on processes of proving (preuve), beginning with pattern spotting
activities and leading through generalisation to justification (Simpson 1995). My
research suggests that such a view is unnecessarily bunkered. I do not claim to have
constructed a learning situation in which children somehow encounter and integrate
both preuve and demonstration (although why should this not be achieved given more
mathematically experienced children and more advanced mathematics within a
carefully constructed learning environment?) and come away with a rounded,
comprehensive understanding of all that proof entails. What this research does show,
however, is that given appropriate tools which afford them adequate webbing, it is
possible for pupils to explore generality through a computational medium thereby
building a powerful, situated collection of meanings to enrich their developing
conceptions of generality, and for them to attempt, again supported by the medium,
to justify these generalisations.
Simpson's gloomy picture of "alien" and "natural" routes as two parallel paths,
mutually exclusive until, in an apparently non-Euclidean Universe, they converge at
the Infinity of Proof, seems particularly inappropriate. Kenneth Ruthven69 suggests
the analogy of two flywheels spinning on a single machine: each wheel is distinct but
the two are linked by a band which is forever passing from one to the other. Whilst
the idea of representing the proving process by a wheel forever going round in circles
but never getting anywhere certainly has its attractions, I prefer to portray the two
routes as two winding, constantly crossing paths: the route to proof then becomes a
journey involving constant interchange between routes, first one path and then
another as most appropriate at any particular stage in the journey. Such a route
would not be unique: one pupil might progress quickly along the "alien" path, barely
69 Oral Reaction (JustiI,ring and Proving in School Mathematics Conference, University of London
Institute of Education, December 1995)
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straying onto the "natural" path; for another the emphasis might be quite different
with much crossing and retracing of routes. Importantly neither path would be a one-
way street; back tracking would be a constantly available reality and the crossing
points would be frequent enough to allow easy comparison between the experiences
gained from travelling each path at similar points of the journey.
11.7 PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Some issues emerged from the study data which have a bearing on classroom practice.
Because this area was not one on which the thesis aimed to focus, these issues can
form no more than bases for speculation: further testing would be necessaiy to give
them any weight, but they nonetheless remain interesting pointers towards possible
further research. The chief area for speculation in this section is what features of the
learning situation motivated re-structuring of procedures and what motivated
justification of generality.
11.7.1 Promoting Justification
Whereas some tasks dealt with functions which had input-output pairings which were
easily calculable or which were known as facts by the pupils, there were others where
for the computer verification to be effective, the pupil would have to go through
mental calculations of a complexity which would admit errors. Where for some pupils
verification lacked relevance due to the difficulty of mental calculation or to
unfamiliarity with expected outcome, there were examples of pupils choosing to
explain and justify how a procedure worked through analysis of the procedure's
structure, rather than relying on empirical testing. In these examples the difficulty
level, i.e. the complexity level of the functions, would appear to have pushed pupils
towards justifying their procedures in terms of natural (or other) language rather than
attempting to verify them with input-output pairs which, because of the pupils'
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unfamiliarity with the mathematical relationships defined by the functions, in that
instance held little or no relevance.
This is a surprising result and has to be interpreted within the context in which it was
observed. However, were such a finding to be corroborated by further research, the
implications would be highly significant. For there would then appear to be a critical
balance of difficulty level which, when exceeded, rather than proving a disincentive to
the further, richer construction of meaning, actually promoted what is usually felt to
be a harder, less natural and less spontaneous form of reasoning. In Chapter Three I
questioned the assumption that empirical rather than logical reasoning is necessarily
the most natural form in which children attempted to make sense of generalisation and
justification70; this finding would seem to suggest that for some children in this
particular learning situation, empirical reasoning might have been neither their first
choice, nor what they perceived as the most appropriate choice.
In Chapter Nine I looked at ways in which pupils explored equivalence of function
when this occurred through their pursuance of independent routes to the same
common goal. The main value of pupils exploring and discussing equivalent
procedures lay in the enrichment of mathematical concepts such activities appeared to
promote - the enrichment of the quality of relationship these children were developing
with a mathematical object and the diverse collection of connections it wove between
and within many expressions of meaning.
Thus children's exploration of the equivalence of procedures provided a valuable
window onto their concretion of those procedures, and above all underlined the
uniqueness of children's webs of connections: it demonstrated the unpredictability of
the maimer in which children may make those connections, even in a learning situation
which is carefully constructed and tested such as this one. The relationship between
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even just a pair of children in this study (who shared a common mathematical
background and a common school and who received common input in the study tasks,
even working together in parts of them) and the mathematical objects with which they
were working remain unique to each of the pair.
Comparison of procedures also appeared to promote analysis of procedure structure
and therefore justification of generality, and this was most marked where the
procedures being compared were in fact equivalent or where pupils went on to
construct second procedures equivalent to their first (supporting my speculation in
Chapter Three that Bell's ideas on using equivalence as a focus for discussion - Bell
1996, p. 176 - might be fertile ground for justification of generality). The feature of
the game context of the learning situation suddenly becomes important: undoubtedly
the competitive edge (for these children) which was inherent in having to demonstrate
that one procedure was superior to another - or more subtly one was as effective as
the other, only different - promoted the comparison of procedures and necessarily the
analysis of procedure structure and, ipso facto, justification of generality.
Turning again to the question of motivation, I do not wish to think of this in the sense
of children wanting to cany out some activity because of a sense of some intrinsic
worth to be found in that activity; rather I am interested in the possibility of there
being some element inherent in the construction of the learning situation (and therefore
children's interaction with that learning situation) which will, if children make the right
connections and encounter this element at a propitious juncture in their concretion of
the overriding mathematical relationship under investigation, somehow promote the
forging of further connections. In this study there appeared to be three such elements:
i) the game context: satisfying the requirement to demonstrate to one another
that one procedure was superior to another motivated analysis and
7° See Chapter 3 § 3.3 where I question Fischbem (1982).
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justification (or at least demonstrative empirical verification) of the
procedures;
ii) the difficulty level of function: analysis and justification were motivated
by the inappropriateness of empirical verification, whether due to children's
unfamiliarity with empirical results or the complexity of accompanying mental
calculation;
iii) the comparison of equivalent procedures: the ability (even likelihood) of
pupils pursuing unique paths towards the solution of the mathematical
activities motivated the comparison of one another's procedures and the
consequent analysis and justification of those procedures.
It must be emphasised that these elements did not feature in each pupil's encounter
with the learning situation, in the same way that Logo was not an auto-expressive
language for all pupils. However, for those who encountered these elements at the
optimum point in their creation of meaning for the mathematics being explored, their
relationship with the tools was such that analysis and justification appeared to
become the natural by-products of their activity. I suggest that it may be possible to
construct learning situations which contain within them elements which motivate their
own concretion: auto-concretion, perhaps?. That is, there may be situations in which
the forging of connections between expressions of meaning motivates further
exploration of further expressions.
It is worth pointing out that such a view is not at variance with Wilensky's statement
about the determination of concreteness not turning on intensive examinations of the
object (Wilensky 1993, p 198), for auto-concretion is entirely dependent on pupils'
interaction with the learning situation.
It is also worth stressing again that this is a phenomenon observed in a few cases in
this study. However, the notion of auto-concretion is one which would be repaid by
further study.
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11.7.2 Expectations
The children in this study were aged nine, ten and eleven. It is interesting to note that
their attempts at generalisation, justification and even proof, expressed in something
approaching mathematical formalism within this carefully designed computational
setting, were far in advance of any "usual" expectations for this age. For example, the
UK National Curriculum (DES 1991)' expects above average eleven year olds (Level
5) to be "generalising from a number of particular examples and carrying out simple
tests," and cites the example
Having investigated the dfJerence between six iwo-digit numbers and their
reverses (e.g. 82 and 28), make the conjecture that the difference is always in
the nine times table, and decide to check three other numbers to test it.
There is a strong implication here that expectation of mathematical achievement,
certainly as far as early experience of the power of mathematical formalism is
concerned, is unnecessarily low. Why do we deprive children of this age (and older)
of mathematical experiences which, given the right settings, appear to be within their
reach?
Following on from this point, it is interesting to look again at the work of Healy and
Hoyles (1998 - reviewed in Chapter Three) in the light of this study. They found
that in constructing proofs the most popular form of argument is empirical
verification and students are unlikely to use deductive reasoning (F28 and F32). In
this study, although empirical verification was the prevalent form of justification, it
clearly was possible for children (much younger than those in Healy and Hoyles's
survey) to engage in deductive reasoning - often through the researcher's interventions
- and in some cases to choose to reason deductively rather than empirically.
See Chapter 1.
267
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion
11.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POSSIBILITIES
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study shows that, given appropriate tools and support, young children are able
to generalise mathematical relationships in formal mathematical language and to justify
and even prove these generalisations. Further research needs to build on this positive
view of what children can achieve, given the existence of careflully designed learning
situations. How can we develop new tools and new learning situations to develop and
enrich children's experience of generality, justification and proof?
The relationship between the expressive powers of the symbolisation and the
symbols' association with a history of specific numerical relationships in this study
has highlighted the importance of looking at generality through particularity.
Research into children's ability to express generality and to justify it within a
programming environment, needs to consider how particularity may be used most
effectively both as a resource by children and as a tool by teachers.
Semi-generalisation, generic structuring and naturalised fonnalism were three methods
which children used to web their creation of meaning for generality and justification.
By unravelling these forms of webbing, it becomes possible to identify the important
features of a learning situation - here the ability to access the general through the
particular and the mutually supportive relationship between natural and formal
language. So identifying and analysing forms of webbing within carefully constructed
computational learning situations provides a window onto the essential features of
that learning situation. The implication for research is to identify and analyse ways in
which children web mathematical relationships so as to develop an ever richer
understanding of children's creation of mathematical meaning.
268
REFERENCES
Alibert, D. (1988)
Towards New Customs in the Classroom. For the Learning of Mathematics 8(2): 31-
35.
Alibert, D. and Thomas, M. (1991)
Research on Mathematical Proof In D. Tall (Ed) Advanced Mathematical Thinking.
Kiuwer, Dordrecht.
Almeida, D. (1995)
Making Proof Accessible in the Mathematics Classroom. Justifying and Proving in
School Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Anderson, J. (1995)
The Legacy of School - Attempts at Justifying and Proving among New Graduates.
Justifying and Proving in School Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education,
University of London.
Austin, K. (1995)
Proof in Mathematics - The First Two Steps. Justifying and Proving in School
Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Balacheff, N. (1987)
Processus depreuve et Situations de Validation. Educational Studies in Mathematics
18: 147-176
Balacheff, N. (1988)
Aspects ofProof in Pupils'Practice ofSchoolMathematics. In D. Pimm (Ed)
Mathematics, Teachers and Children. London, Nodder and Stoughton.
Bednarz, N., Kieran, C. and Lee, L (1996)
Approaches to Algebra: Perspectives for Research and Teaching. Kiuwer, Dordrecht.
Bell, A. (1976)
A Study ofPupils'ProofExplanations in Mathematical Situations. Educational Studies
in Mathematics 7: 23-40
Bell, A. (1993)
Problem Solving Approaches to Algebra. ESRC Seminar Group on Algebraic
Processes and the Role of Symbolism, Institute of Education, University of London.
269
References
Bell, A. (1996)
Algebraic Thought and the Role of Manipulable Symbolic Language. In Bednarz, N.,
Kieran, C. and Lee, L. (Eds) Approaches to Algebra: Perspectives for Research and
Teaching. Kiuwer, Dordrecht.
Bell, A and Malone, J. (1993)
Learning the Language ofAlgebra. Proceedings of the Seventeenth International
Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Japan: Vol 1 (pp 138-145)
Binns, L and Mason, J. (1993)
Explorations of Vergnaud's Theorem-in-Action in the Context ofAlgebra. ESRC
Seminar Group on Algebraic Processes and the Role of Symbolism, Institute of
Education, University of London.
Blair, J., Carpy, J., Clark, L, Duncan, A., Henderson, P., MacCallum, A.,
McCulloch, D., Mcinnes, D., Mackinlay, J., Preston, C., Tait, W. (1976)
Stage 4 Mathematics: A Development Through Activity. Scottish Primary Maths
Group, Heinemann Educational Books, London and Edinburgh.
Boero, P. (1995)
Approaching Theorems: Backwards and Forwards from Historical, Epistemological
and Cognitive Analyses to Classroom Experiences. Justifying and Proving in School
Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Booth, L (1984a)
Misconceptions Leading to Error in Elementary Algebra. Journal of Structural
Learning 8: 125-138
Booth, L (1984b)
Grade 8 Students' Understanding ofStructural Properties in Mathematics. In
Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education, Paris.
Brousseau, G. (1981)
Pro blèmes de didactique des décimaux. Recherches en Didactiques des
Mathématiques 18(2): 147-176. Cited in Laborde, C. (1989) Audacity andReason:
French Research in Mathematics Education. For the Learning of Mathematics 9(3):
3 1-36.
Brousseau, G. (1986)
Fondations et méthodes de la didaclique des mathématiques. Recherches en
Didactiques des Mathématiques 7 (2): 33-115.
Brousseau, G. (1988)
Etude locale des processus d'acquisition en situations scolaires.
270
References
Bruner, J.S. (1966)
Toward a Theory ofInstruction. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University
Press
Byatt, S. (1994)
Blindfolding the Train-Spotters. Micromath 10: 25-26
Chalouh, L and Herscovics, N. (1988)
Teaching Algebraic Expressionsin a Meaningful Way. In A.F. Coxford (Ed) The Ideas
of Algebra (1988 Year Book) NCTM, Reston VA, pp 33-42
Chazan, D. (1993)
High School Geometry Students'Ju$rflcation for their Views ofEmpirical Evidence
and Mathematical Proof Educational Studies in Mathematics 24: 359-387.
Cobb, P. (1986)
Concrete and be Abstract: a Case Study. Educational Studies in Mathematics 17: 37-
48.
Cockroft W. H. (1982)
Mathematics Counts. London: HMSO.
Coe, R. and Ruthven, K. (1994)
Proof Practices and Constructs of Advanced Mathematics Students. British
Educational Research Journal 20 (1): 41-53.
Collis, K.F. (1974)
Cognitive Development and Mathematics Learning. Paper prepared for the
Psychology of Mathematics Workshop, published at the Shell Mathematics Unit
Centre for Science Education, Chelsea Colege, University of London.
Davis, RB. (1975)
Cognitive Processes Involved in Solving Simple Algebraic Equations. Journal of
Children's Mathematical Behaviour 1(3): 7-35.
Davis, RB. (1984)
Learning Mathematics: The Cognitive Science Approach to Mathematics Education.
London and New York, Routledge.
Davis, It B. (1986)
Algebra in Elementary Schools. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference
for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Birkhauser, Boston.
271
References
Davis, R. and Maher, C. (1993)
Children Development ofMethods ofProof In Proceedings of the Seventeenth
International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Japan.
Davydov, G. (1990)
Types of Generalisation in Instruction. In Kilpatrick, J. (Ed) Soviet Studies in
Mathematics Education (J. Teller, trans). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers
of Mathematics.
de Villiers, M. (1995)
Why proof in Dynamic Geometry? Justiiring and Proving in School Mathematics
Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
DES (1989)
Mathematics in the National Curriculum. London: HMSO.
DES (1991)
Mathematics in the National Curriculum (1991). London: HMSO.
DES (1995)
Mathematics in the National Curriculum. London: HMSO.
diSessa, A.A. (1987)
Phenomenology and the Evolution oflntuition. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of
Representation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey
and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
diSessa, A.A. (1994)
Comments in EdDubinsky's Chapter. In Schoenfeld, A. (Ed) Mathematical Thinking
and Problem Solving. Lawrence Eribaum Associates, Hilisdale, New Jersey.
Dreyfus, T. (1991)
On the Status of Visual Reasoning in Mathematics and Mathematics Education. In
Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education, Assisi: Volume 1: 33-48.
Dreyfus, T. and Eisenburg, T. (1986)
On the Aesthetics ofMathematical Thought. For the Learning of Mathematics 6(1): 2-
10.
Dufour-Janvier, B., Bednarz, N. and Berlanger, M. (1987)
Pedagogical Considerations Concerning the Problem ofRepresentation. In C Janvier
(Ed) Problems ofRepresentation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics,
Hilisdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
272
References
Falbel, A. (1993)
The Computer as a Convivial Tool. In Harel, I. and Papert, S. (Eds) Constructionism.
Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey.
Feurzeig, W. (1986)
Algebra Slaves and Sgents in a Logo-based Mathematics Curriculum. Instructional
Science 14: 229 - 254.
Finlow-Bates, K. (1994)
First Year Mathematics Students'Notions ofthe Role ofInformal Proofand Examples.
In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education, Lisbon.
Fischbein, E. (1982)
Intuition andProof For the Learning of Mathematics 3: 9-24.
Goldenberg, E.P. and Hazzan, 0. (1995)
Proof as Explanation in Geometry. Justifying and Proving in School Mathematics
Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Goldin, G.A. (1987a)
Levels ofLanguage in Mathematical Problem Solving. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of
Representation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey
and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Goldin, G.A. (1987b)
Cognitive Representational Systems for Mathematical Problem Solving. In C Janvier
(Ed) Problems ofRepresentation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics,
Hilisdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence Erlbauin Associates.
Gray, E. M. and Tall, D. 0. (1994)
Duality, Ambiguity and Flexibility: A Proceptual View ofSimple Arithmetic. Journal for
Research in Mathematics Education 26 (2): 115 - 141.
Hanna, G. (1989a)
More then FormaiProof For the Learning of Mathematics 9(1): 20-23.
Hanna, G. (1989b)
Proofs the Prove and Proofs that Explain. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth
International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Paris.
Hanna, G. (1991)
Mathematical Proof in D.Tall (Ed) Advanced Mathematical Thinking. Dordrecht:
Kiuwer.
273
References
Hanna, G. (1995a)
Challenges to the Importance of Proof For the Learning of Mathematics 15 (3): 42-
49.
Hanna, G. (1995b)
Proof as Explanation in Geometry. Justifying and Proving in School Mathematics
Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Harel, G. and Tall, D. (1991)
The General, the Abstract and the Generic in Advanced Mathematics. For the
Learning of Mathematics 11(1): 38 - 42.
Hatch, G., Baker, M., Cockett, P., Marriott, G. and Micklewright, W. (1992)
Maths Chest. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, London.
Healy, L and Hoyles, C. (1998)
Just ,5/ing and Proving in School Mathematics: Summary ofthe Survey Results.
Institute of Education, University of London.
Healy, L, Pozzi, S. and Hoyles, C. (1995)
Making Sense of Groups, Computers and Mathematics. Cognition and Instruction 13
(4): 505-523.
Hiebert, J. (1988)
A Theory ofDeveloping Competence with Written Mathematical Symbols. Educational
Studies in Mathematics 19: 333-355.
bytes, C. (1996)
The Curricular Shaping ofStudents'Approaches to Proof For the Learning of
Mathematics 17 (1): 7-16.
Hoyles, C., Healy, L and Pozzi, S. (1994)
Groupwork with Computers: an Overview of Findings. Journal of Computer
Assisted Learning 10: 202-2 15.
bytes, C. and Noss, It (1992)
Learning Mathematics and Logo. MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
Hoyles, C. and Noss, it (1993)
Out of the Cul-de Sac? In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference for
the Psychology of Mathematics Education (North America), pp 83-90.
ilhich, I. (1973)
Tools for Conviviality. London, Calder and Boyars. Cited in Noss, R. and Hoyles, C.
(1996) Windows on Mathematical Meanings: Learning Cultures and Computers.
Dordrecht, Boston and London. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
274
References
Janvier, C. (1987a)
Translation Processes in Mathematics Education. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of
Representation in the Learning and Teaching of Mathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey
and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Janvier, C. (1987b)
Representation and Understanding: The Notion ofFunction as an Example. In C
Janvier (Ed) Problems of Representation in the Learning and Teaching of
Mathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Janvier, C. (1987 c)
Conceptions and Representations: The Circle as an Example. In C Janvier (Ed)
Problems of Representation in the Learning and Teaching of Mathematics, Hillsdale,
New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Jones, K. (1995)
Dynamic Geometry Contexts for Proofas Explanation. Justifying and Proving in
School Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Kafai, Y. and Resnick, M. (1996)
Constructionism in Practice: Designing, Thinking and Learning in a Digital World,
Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kaput, J.J. (1987 a)
Representation Systems in Mathematics. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems ofRepresentation
in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hillsdale, New Jersey and London,
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kaput, J.J. (1987 b)
Towards a Theory of Symbol Use in Mathematics. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of
Representation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hillsdale, New Jersey
and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Kieran, C. (1983)
A Comparison between Novices' Views ofAlgebraic Letters and their Use of
Symmetric andAsymmetric Equation-Solving Procedures. In Berberon, J. C.,
Hersovics, N. & Kieran, C. (Eds) Proceedings of the Eleventh International
Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. Montral: Umversité de
Montréal. pp 22 1-227.
Klotz, F.S. (1986)
When is a Program like a Function? Proceedings of the Second International
Conference for Logo and Mathematics Education (pp 14 - 24). London, University of
London Institute of Education.
275
References
LMS (1985)
Tackling the Mathematics Problem. London Mathematical Society with IMA and
RSS.
Laborde, C. (1989)
Audacity and Reason: French Research in Mathematics Education. For the Learning
of Mathematics 9 (3): 3 1-36.
Lawler, R.W. (1985)
Computer Experience and Cognitive Development: A Child's Learning in a Computer
Culture. Chichester, Ellis Horwood Ltd.
Lawson-Dick, 0. (1992)
Aubrey's BriefLives. Reprint of 1949 edition. Mandarin: London.
Lerman, S., Finlow-Bates, K. and Morgan, C. (1993)
A Survey of Current Concepts ofProofHeld by First Year Mathematics Students. In
Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education, Japan.
Leron, U. (1985a)
Heuristic Presentations: the Role ofStructuring. For the Learning of Mathematics 5
(3):7-13.
Leron, U. (1985b)
A Direct Approach to Indirect Proofs. Educational Studies in Mathematics 16: 321-
325.
Leron, U. and Zazkis, it (1986)
Functions and Variables: A Case Study of Learning Mathematics through Logo.
Proceedings of the Second International Conference for Logo and Mathematics
Education (pp 186-220). London, University of London Institute of Education.
Lesh, R., Post, T., Behr, M. (1987)
Representations and Translations among Representations In Mathematics Learning
and Problem Solving. In C. Janvier (Ed) Problems ofRepresentation in the Learning
and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum
Associates.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1963 - 76)
StructuralAnthropology (2 vols). New York, Basic Books. Cited in Papert, S. (1980)
Mindstorms. Basic Books, New York.
Maher, C. and Davis, RB. (1995)
Children's Explorations Leading to Proof Justifying and Proving in School
Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
276
References
Manin, Y.L (1977)
A Course in Mathematical Logic. New York: Springer Verlag. Cited in Hanna, G.
(1991) MathematicaiProof In D.Tall (Ed) Advanced Mathematical Thinking.
Dordrecht: Kiuwer.
Mariotti. M.A. (1995)
Introducing Pupils to Proofi A Teaching Experiment. Justifying and Proving in School
Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Mason, J.H. (1980)
When is a Symbol Symbolic? For the Learning of Mathematics 1(2): 8-12.
Mason, J.H. (1987a)
What do Symbols Represent? In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of Representation in the
Learning and Teaching of Mathematics, Hillsdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Mason, Jil. (1987b)
Representing Representing: Notesfollowing the Conference. In C Janvier (Ed)
Problems ofRepresentation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale,
New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Mason, J.H. (1989)
MathematicalAbstraction as the Result ofa Delicate Shift ofAttention. For the
Learning of Mathematics 9 (2): 2-8.
Mason, J. (1996)
Expressing Generality and Roots ofAlgebra. In Bednarz, N., Kieran, C. and Lee, L.
(Eds) Approaches to Algebra: Perspectives for Research and Teaching. Kluwer,
Dordrecht.
Minsky, M. (1986)
The Society ofthe Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Moore, R.C. (1994)
Making the Transition to Formal Proof Educational Studies in Mathematics 27: 249-
266.
Movshovitz-fladar, N. (1988)
Stimulating Presentation of Theorems followed by Responsive Proofs. For the
Learning of Mathematics 8(2): 12-19, 30.
277
References
Nelson, G. (1987)
Using Microcomputer-A ssisted Pro blem Solving to Explore the Concept ofLiteral
Symbols - A Follow-Up Study. In Berberon, J. C., Hersovics, N. & Kieran, C. (Eds)
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education. Montral: Université de Montréal. pp 22 1-227.
Nemirovsky, it (1996a)
Mathematical Narratives, Modelling andAlgebra. In Bednarz, N., Kieran, C. and Lee,
L. (Eds) Approaches to Algebra: Perspe ctives for Research and Teaching. Kiuwer,
Dordrecht.
Nemirovsky, R (1996b)
A Functional Approach to Algebra: Two Issues that Emerge. In Bednarz, N., Kieran,
C. and Lee, L. (Eds) Approaches to Algebra: Perspectives for Research and Teaching.
Kiuwer, Dordrecht.
Nesher, P. and Kilpatrick, J. (1990)
Mathematics and Cognition: A Research Synthesis by the International Group for the
Psychology ofMathematics Education. 1CM! Study Series. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Noss, it (1986)
Constructing a Conceptual Frameworkfor Elementary Algebra through Logo
Programming. Educational Studies in Mathematics 17: 335-357.
Noss, it (1997)
New Cultures, New Numeracies. Inaugural Professorial Lecture, University of
London Institute of Education.
Noss, it and Hoyies, C. (1996)
Windows on Mathematical Meanings: Learning Cultures and Computers. Dordrecht,
Boston and London. Kiuwer Academic Publishers.
Nunes, T., Schliemann, A.D. and Carraher, D.W. (1993)
Street Mathematics and School Mathematics. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Ortiz and MacGregor, S.K. (1991)
Effects ofLogo Programming on Understanding Variables. Journal of Educational
Computing Research.
Parlett, M. and Hamilton, D. (1972)
Evaluation as illumination: A New Approach to the Study ofInnovatory Programs.
Occasional Paper.
278
References
Papert, S. (1980)
Mindsiorms. Basic Books, New York.
Pine, S. and Kieren, T. (1989)
A Recursive Theory ofMathematical Understanding. For the Learning of
Mathematics 9 (3): 7 - Ii.
Pine, S. and Kieren, T. (1994)
Beyond the Metaphor: Formalising in Mathematical Understanding within
Constructivist Environments. For the Learning of Mathematics 14: 39-43.
Porteous, K. (1990)
What Do Children Really Believe? Educational Studies in Mathematics 21: 589-598.
Radford, L (1996)
Some Reflections on Teaching Algebra through Generalisation. In Bednarz, N.,
Kieran, C. and Lee, L. (Eds) Approaches to Algebra: Perspectives for Research and
Teaching. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Roberts, N., Carter, R., Davis, F. and Feuerzeig, W. (1989)
Power Tools for Alge bra Problem Solving. Journal of Mathematical Behaviour 8:
25 1-265.
Schoenfeld, A.H. (1985)
Mathematical Problem Solving. Orlando, Academic Press.
Sémadéni, Z. (1984)
Action Proofs in Primary Mathe,natics Teaching and in Teacher Training. For the
Learning of Mathematics 4 (1): 32-34.
Sfard, A. (1991)
On the Dual Nature ofMathematical Conceptions: Reflections on Processes and
Objects as Two Sides of the same Coin. Educational Studies in Mathematics 22: 1-36.
Sfard, A. and Linchevski, L (1994)
The Gains and the Pitfalls ofRefIcation - The Case ofAlgebra. Educational Studies in
Mathematics 26: 191 - 228.
Simpson, A. (1995)
Developing a Proving Attitude. Justifying and Proving in School Mathematics
Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Steiner, M. (1976)
Mathematical Explanation. Mimeographed Notes, Columbia University. Cited in
Alibert, D. and Thomas, M. (1991) Research on Mathematical Proof In D. Tall (Ed)
Advanced Mathematical Thinking. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
279
References
Steiner, M. (1978)
Mathematical Explanation. Philosophiocal Studies 34: 135-151.
Sutherland, R. (1987)
What are the Links between Variable in Logo and Variable in Algebra? Recherches en
Didactiques des Mathématiques 8: 103-130.
Sutherland, R. (1989)
Providing a Computer Based Frameworkfor Algebraic Thinking. Educational
Studies in Mathematics 20: 3 17-344.
Sutherland, R. (1992)
Thinking algebraically: Pupil models developed in Logo and a spreadsheet
environment. London: University of London Institute of Education.
Sutherland, it (1993a)
Connecting Theory and Practice: Results from the Teaching ofLogo. Educational
Studies in Mathematics 24: 95-113.
Sutherland, R. (1993b)
Consciousness of the Unknown. For the Learning of Mathematics 13: 43-46.
Sutherland, R. (1994)
The Role ofProgramming: Towards Experimental Mathematics. In R Bichier, R W
Scholz, R Stra.Ber, B Winkelmann (Eds): Didactics ofMathematics as a ScientfIc
Discipline. Dordrecht: Kiuwer Academic Publishers: 117-187.
Sutherland, R. (1995)
Algebraic Thinking: The Role ofthe Computer. In Burton, L. & Jaworski, B.
Technology in Mathematics Teaching - a bridge between teaching and learning.
Charwell. Bratt, Sweden, pp 275-288.
Sutherland, R. and Hoyles, C. (1986)
Logo as a Context for Learning about Variable. In Proceedings of the Tenth
International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (pp 30 1-306),
London: University of London Institute of Education.
Tall, D. (1979)
Cognitive Aspects of Proof with Special Reference to the irrationality of..
Proceedings of the Third International Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics
Education, Warwicic 203-205.
Tall, D. (1989)
The Nature ofMathematical Proof Mathematics Teaching 127: 28-31.
280
References
Tall, D. (1995)
Cognitive Development, Representations and Proof Justifying and Proving in School
Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Thurston, W.P. (1995)
On Proof and Progress in Mathematics. For the Learning of Mathematics 15(1): 29-
37.
Turkie, S. and Papert, S. (1990)
Epistemological Pluralism: Styles and Voices within the Computer Culture. Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16(1): 345-377.
van Dormolen, J. (1977)
Learning to Understand what Giving a Proof Really Means. Educational Studies in
Mathematics 8: 27-34.
Vergnaud, G. (1981)
Quelques orientations Theoriques et Methodologiques des Recherches Francaises en
Didactiques des Mathématiques. In Proceedings of the 5th Annual Meeting of the
International Group for Psychology of Mathematics Education, edited by Equipe de
Récherche Pedagogique, Grenoble, pp 7- 17.
Vergnaud, G. (1982)
Cognitive and Developmental Psychology andResearch in Mathematics Education:
Some Theoretical and Methodological Issues. For the Learning of Mathematics 3(2):
31-41.
Vergnaud, G. (1987)
Conclusion. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems ofRepresentation in the Learning and
Teaching ofMathematics, Hillsdale, New Jersey and London, Lawrence Eribaum
Associates.
Vergnaud, G. (1990)
Epistemology and Psyc hology ofMathemarics Education. In Nesher, P. and
Kilpatrick, J. (Eds) Mathematics and Cognition: A Research Synthesis by the
International Groupfor the Psychology ofMathematics Education. ICMI Study
Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Dormolen, J. (1977)
Learning to Understand what Giving a ProofReally Means. Educational Studies in
Mathematics 8: 27 - 34.
Vinner, S. (1988)
Visual Considerations in College Calculus - Students and Teachers. Theory of
Education ifi, Antwerp: 109 - 116.
281
References
Voim ink, J. (1988)
The Role ofProof in Students' Understanding of Geometry. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of mathematics teachers, Gennany. Cited in Hanna, G. (1989) Proofs
the Prove and Proofs that Explain. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International
Conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Paris.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1987a)
Learning as a Constructive Activity. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems ofRepresentation in
the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey and London,
Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1987b)
Preliminaries to any Theory ofRepresentation. In C Janvier (Ed) Problems of
Representation in the Learning and Teaching ofMathematics, Hilisdale, New Jersey
and London, Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1962)
Thought and Language. Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978)
Mind in Society: The Development ofHigher Psychological Processes. Cambridge
MA, Harvard University Press.
Weir, S. (1987)
Cultivating Minds: A Logo Casebook. Harper and Row. In Sacristan Rock, A. I.
Windows on the Infinite: Constructing Meanings in a Logo -Based Microworid.
Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of London Institute of Education.
Wilensky, U. (1993)
Abstract Meditations on the Concrete and Concrete Implications for Mathematics
Education. In Hare!, I. and Papert, S. (Eds) Constructionism. MIT. Ablex Publishing
Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey.
Wittmann, E.C. and Muller, G. (1990)
When is a Proof a Proof? Bulletin de la Société Mathématique de Belge 1: 15-40.
Cited in Hanna, G. (1995b) Proofas Explanation in Geometry. Justifying and Proving
in School Mathematics Conference, Institute of Education, University of London.
Wood, D., Bruner, J. and Ross, G. (1979)
The Role of Tutoring in Problem Solving. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry 17: 89-100. Cited in Noss, R. and Hoyles, C. (1992) Learning
Mathematics and Logo. MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
282
APPENDIX ONE: PRE-TAsK
INTERVIEW
Appendix One contains the questions which made up the pre-task interview
administered to all pupils prior to taking part in the main study.
Part One: Function machines I
Here is a machine which changes one number into another. If you put a number in
from the left, it multiplies it by 2 and adds on 3.
IN	 Multiply by 2
	
OUT
Add on 3
1. Can you say what would happen if you put a 5 into that machine?
2. Try some other numbers of your own.
3. Can you plain in your own words how this machine works?
4. Imagine you had to explain to a child in Year 5/4 how this works.
What would you say?
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Part Two: Function machines II
Now look at this table of values. Just one machine has changed all the numbers on the
left into the numbers on the right.
Input	 Output
0	 1
1	 4
2	 7
3	 10
4	 13
5	 16
6	 19
7	 22
8	 25
9	 28
10	 31
1. Can you work out what must go in the box in the machine?
If a rule was worked out, the following questions were asked about that rule;
otherwise the pupil was shown the rule "multiply by 3 and add on 1" and the questions
were asked about this.
2. Are you sure that this rule always works?
3. Why are you sure?
4. Can you explain how this rule works?
5. How would you explain that to a child in Year 5/4?
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Part Three: Amaze Your F riends
Task 2.1 was administered orally and the pupil asked for the answer.
Pick a number between I and 10. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number you first
thought of Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first thought of What do you
get?
If the right answer was reached (one) the pupil was asked to pick a new number and
try again; f the wrong answer was reached, the procedure was gone through out loud
with the interviewer interjecting as necessary. The pupil was then shown a written
copy of the puzzle.
1. Do you notice anything about this puzzle?
2. Do you think that the answer will always be one?
3. How can you make sure you're right?
4. Why do you think the answer is always one?
Part Four: Consecutive Numbers
Look at these three sets of numbers:
8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13
223, 224, 225, 226
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
1. What can you say about these numbers?
If the word "consecutive" or a description of that property had been reached the
following questions were asked:
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2. Can you say anything else about consecutive numbers?
3. How would you describe consecutive numbers to a child in Year 5/4?
Part Five: Odd and Even Numbers I
Look at these numbers: 2, 38, 6, 174.
1. What can you say about all these numbers?
2. What (else) do you know about even numbers?
3. How would you describe an even number to a younger child?
Part Six: Odd and Even Numbers II
Now look at these numbers: 5, 91, 17, 653.
1. What can you say about all these numbers?
2. What (else) do you know about odd numbers?
3. How would you describe an odd number to a younger child?
Part Seven: Odd and Even Numbers III
1. How would you change an even number into an odd number?
2. How would you change an odd number into an even number?
3. Do you remember the function machines we talked about in the beginning? Well
can you think of a function machine which would change any number you put into it
into an even number?
4. Can you think of a function machine which would change any number you put into
it into an odd number?
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STUDY TASKS
Session One: Function Machines
Pupils were asked to construct Logo procedures to model the function machines in
Tasks 1.1 - 13, and to construct function machines which would output the values in
the accompanying tables in Tasks 1.4- 1.6.
Task 1.1
IN	 Multiply by 2
	 OUT
Add on I
Task 1.2
IN
	
Multiply by 3
	 OUT
Add on 2
Task 1.3
IN	 Multiply by 3
	 OUT
Add on 4
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Task 1.4
input	 Output
0	 3
1	 5
2	 7
3	 9
4	 11
5	 13
6	 15
7	 17
8	 19
9	 21
10	 23
Task 1.5
Input	 Output
0	 1
1	 5
2	 9
3	 13
4	 17
5	 21
6	 25
7	 29
8	 33
9	 37
10	 41
Task 1.6
input Output
0	 2
1	 7
2	 12
3	 17
4	 22
5	 27
6	 32
7	 37
8	 42
9	 47
10	 52
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Task 1 Extra
Input	 Output
0	 2
1	 3
2	 6
3	 11
4	 18
5	 27
6	 38
7	 51
8	 66
9	 83
10	 102
Session Two: Amaze Your Friends
Pupils were asked to construct Logo procedures to model the following "puzzles"
expressed in natural language:
Task 2.1
Amaze Your Friends .......
Pick a number between 1 and 10. Multiply it by 2. Add on the number you first
thought of. Divide by 3. Divide by the number you first thought of.
The Answer is ....... ONE !!!
Task 2.2
Astound Your Friends .......
Pick a number between I and 10. Double it. Double it again. Take away 4. Divide
the answer by 4 and add on 1.
The Answer is ....... 1flE NUMBER YOU STARTED WITH!!!
289
Appendix Two: The Main Study Tasks
Task 2.3
Thrill Your Friends .......
Pick a number between I and 10. Add on 2. Multiply by 4. Take away 8. Divide
by the number you first thought of.
The Answer is ...... . FOUR !!!
Session Three: Consecutive Numbers
Task 3.1
Write a Logo procedure which adds the input to the next number, e.g. if you input 5,
it adds 5 and 6 and outputs 11.
Task 3.2
Write a Logo procedure which adds three consecutive numbers, e.g. if you input 3, it
outputs the sum of 3, 4 and 5.
Task 3.3
Now write a procedure which multiplies the input by the previous number, e.g. if you
input 8, it multiplies 8 by 7 and outputs 56.
Task 3 Extra
Write a procedure which multiplies the input by the number before it and the number
after it.
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Session Four: Odds and Evens
Task 4.1
Write a procedure which will always output an even number, whatever number you
use as an input.
Task 4.2
Write a procedure which will always output an odd number, whatever number you
use as an input.
Task 4.3
Write a procedure which adds two even numbers together.
Task 4.4
Write a procedure which adds two odd numbers together.
Task 4.5
Write a procedure which adds an even number and an odd number.
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This Appendix illustrates the third stage in the gathering and analysis of data. The
first stage was to collect the data by means of audio recording and observation. This
was followed by transcription of the spoken word and description of action. In the
third stage, these transcriptions and descriptions were worked into episodic case
studies in order to facilitate the identification of common themes for the four data
analysis chapters (Chapters Seven - Ten). Appendix Three contains this episodic
treatment of Group F - Jenny and Sophie. Because the purpose of these case studies
was to provide data for further analysis, details such as brief descriptions of each task
when it is mentioned do not feature here as they do in the data analysis chapters.
Session One: Function Machines
Episode 76: Strategies for Validation - F 1.1
Typical of the pupils' choice of test values in the validation process were those in
Task 1.1. For the procedure
to jenny :j
op :j * 2 + 1
end
Sophie tried
and Jenny tried
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Researcher:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
When you are trying values in there to check that they work,
how many values do you think you need to do and what sorts
ofnumbers do you use?
I normally do around four and I do high ones and low ones and
middle ones.
Why do you do high, low and middle?
Because then you know that fthe high ones work and the low
ones work and the middle ones work, quite afew ofthe rest
could be right.
How about yoz4 Sophie?
About four or five times and round numbers.
Like?
F fey and sLy.
I notice you've taken mainly high numbers. Is there a reason
for that?
Because most of the function machine numbers are low
numbers and it's not too hard to work out the hard numbers.
You mean the numbers that are inside the function machine.
For these pupils at this early stage empirical verification was a rational, well thought
out process. Jenny's idea of "spread" is common, but, Sophie's unusual. Her ability at
mental arithmetic was perhaps better than some other pupils'. In Tasks 1.4 - 1.6 both
girls continued with their strategies, although Jenny adapted hers to include only
values (but still a spread of values) within the domain indicated by the question.
Sophie initially checked 10 as an input (within the domain) but all her other values lay
outside the domain. This defeated the object of validation in this case, since apart
from 10, there was no pair of values to compare with the expected values on paper.
For example, both girls wrote a similar program to Sophie's:
to dad :t
op :t * 4 + 1
end
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which Sophie checked with
and Jenny with
Episode 78: The computer/mental arithmetic interface - F 1.2
The Tasks in section one produced an interesting contrast in the way the two girls
worked. Sophie saw the computer as an interactive tool, but one where mental
arithmetic had the final say: the computer generated values, and these could be
checked mentally:
Researcher: Do you think it's easier doing these using the computer than
working them out in your head?
Sophie:	 I think it's better.
Researcher: Why?
Sophie:	 Because you're partly working it out in your head and on the
computer, and you're checking it in your head.
Jenny, on the other hand, saw the computer as a means for checking her own mental
calculations:
Researcher: So do you think the computer helps yog Jenny?
Jenny:	 It does help because sometimes you make mistakes in your
head.
Researcher: So it checks your calculations.
Jenny:	 Yes.
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Episode 77: The role of the computer in verifying procedures 
- F 1.3
Jenny repeated her claim that she used the computer to check up on her mistakes.
Researcher: So was the computer helpful there?
Sophie:	 Yes.
Researcher: Can you say again why the computer is helpful?
Jenny:	 Well, I make a lot ofslip ups, and it helps me to check my
mistakes, but when I'm writing it on my own it doesn't matter
1ff accidentally don't do a space, but it does on the computer.
Researcher: You've got to be very exact on the computer.
On the other hand, of course, the syntax might actually get in the way of the
mathematics.
Session Two: Amaze Your Friends
Episode 102: Trial and error informed by procedure construction - F 2.1
Sophie's re-construction of her procedure in the following example (Task 2.1) was
infonned by successive attempts at validation:
to mum :d
op(:d*2)+ :d13/:d
end
Input	 Output
10	 20.33334
op:d*(2+:d)/3/:d
- Input	 Output
10	 4
op:d*2+(:d/3)/:d
295
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Input	 Output
10	 20.33334
op (:d * 2 + :d)13 / :d
Input	 Output
10	 1
2	 1
4567890	 1
Episode 50: The visual appeal of procedure structure and an appreciation of
mathematical formalism - F 2.2
In Task 2.1, Sophie and Jenny had both written correct procedures, e.g. Jenny's:
to Jenny :h
op(:h *2+ :h)/3/:h
end
Researcher
Jenny:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Can you say why it always comes out as one?
Urn, because you...
Because the number you get has always got either a two or a
three in it and a two and a three, you times it by two and divide
it by three.
How do you mean it's always got a two or a three?
Sophie:	 When you... Say the number was ten. When you times it by
two which is 20, it's always got a two in it72 and then you add
ten again which comes to 30. So the first number's always got a
two in it and the second number's always got a three in it.
Researcher: Right, I see what you mean.
Jenny:	 So you're timesing it by three and then you're dividing it by
three so it comes out.
Researcher: But it doesn't come out as the same nu,nber, it comes out as
one.
Jenny:	 Well then you divide it by its own number so that makes it one.
Researcher: Had you worked that out before or does looking at the Logo
procedure help you to work that out?
Sophie:	 Yes, the Logo procedure.
i.e. divisible by two.
i.e. divisible by three.
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Researcher: How?
Sophie:	 It's more spaced out so I can see it clearer.
Jenny:	 It reminds you ofwhat the sum is.
This extract provides two interesting clues to the value of the learning situation:
Firstly, the visual appeal of the procedure: it was spaced in such a way (structured)
as to allow Sophie to consider, identify and express how it functioned. Sophie was
referring to the symbolic procedure structure rather than the natural language structure
of the written question she had worked from initially. One of the functions of
mathematical symbolism is to present relationships in as clear a way as possible, and
it is this function that Sophie had identified here. Although in this example she might
not "speak" in Logo (i.e. use terms such as :h times two), from what she said it would
seem that her description of what the function did was largely shaped by
consideration of the symbolic procedure rather than of the natural language statement.
Her descriptions were in a kind of naturalised formalism (or formalised naturalism)
which commonly served as an intermediary language between natural and formal. It is
"naturalised formalism" rather than "fonnalised naturalism" because it owed more to
the formalised structure of the procedure than to the original natural language
expression of the question.
Secondly, Jenny's statement that it provided a fixed, clear, concise record of "what the
sum is". This, of course, is another function of mathematical symbolism. Because
Jenny had constructed the symbolism herself, it was richly endowed with meaning.
For her - for both of them - the translation into symbolic form was a helpful act,
creating clarity. This might be compared with conceptions of formal symbolism
which are characterised by mistrust and misunderstanding. Learning situations such
as the one experienced by Jenny and Sophie where an act of construction used the
symbolism as an integral part of a "concrete" mathematical experience, appeared to
create not just an acceptance of symbolic mathematical expression, but a perceived
need for it.
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Episode 51: Generic Examples - F 2.3
Jenny and Sophie attempted to describe how Task 2.2 worked entirely through
generic examples:
to jenny :j
op (:j * 2 * 2 - 4)14 + 1
end
Researcher: Can you say why that always comes back to the number you
started with?
Jenny:	 Because you double it and double it again... Say you pick ten.
You double it - that's 20- and you double that - that's 40- and
then you take four, so it's 36. Then fyou take four away...
[Pause]
Sophie: It's like that other one. The numbers that you use, like four,
four, one and two you usually get the number - one of those
numbers in it.
Researcher: Can you be a bit more precise. Jenny, you were doing quite
well then.
Jenny:	 Well, when you double it and double it again - use five this time
-you double i and it's ten and you double it again and it's 20,
then you take four off it and fyou divide it byfour, then it
always comes to, um you always divide it by four and it comes
equally out and then you just add on one flaughing].
Researcher: Can you add anything to that?
Jenny:	 Because you go up and then you just go down... and then you
go down too far so you add one.
Session Three: Consecutive Numbers
Episode 52: Change in level of abstraction - F 3.1
In Task 3.2 Jenny moved from a generalised description of how her procedure
behaved to a generic example when she was no longer able to continue with the
generalised description:
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Jenny:	 You could have done :1 times three, which would have been the
three main numbers and then you add the three, because :1, say
is five, then six and there's one and then there's two more, so
you add that onto the one. So that's the three.
Episode 26: Ability to explain structured by procedure construction - F 3.2
In the discussion which took place as a part of the justification process in Task 3.2,
the Researcher asked the girls to consider Jenny's procedure for Task 3.1:
to cat :0
op :0+ :0 +
end
Researcher: [after the girls had tried afew values] What do you notice about
all the outputs?
Sophie:	 They're timesing by two and then you just add on one.
Researcher: What do you notice fyou look at the numbers.
Jenny.	 They're all odd numbers.
Researcher: Can you say why they're always odd?
Jenny:	 Because when you times by Iwo it's always even and when
you add on one it's odd.
Researcher: How about in 000 [Task 3,2]?
to 000 :p
op :p + :p + :p +3
end
Jenny:	 I don't know.
Researcher: Try some values again.
Jenny:	 They're different.
Researcher: Some are even and some are odd Why?
Jenny:	 Because you've timesed by three, not two.
Researcher: And what does timesing by three do? [Pause] Does it make
them all even or all odd?
Jenny:	 Because ifyou timesed it by two and then you just added on
the number. So when you timesed it by two, it's an even and
so then fyou... like five, you times it by two, you get ten.
Then you're juSt adding on anotherJlve andJlve's odd, so it
comes out as 15, so it's odd So fyou times it by two and then
add on an even number, it will come out as an even.
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Researcher: And :fyou times it by two and add on an odd number?
Jenny:	 It will come out odd.
Jenny's explanations were slightly unfocused.
Session Four: Odds and Evens
Episode 53: Simple consideration of equivalence - F 4.1
In Task 4.1 Sophie wrote
to mmm :p
op :p * 2
end
and Jenny wrote
to liii :y
op :y+ :y
end
In the discussion they compared their procedures and concluded that they were
equivalent:
Researcher: Can you explain Sophie, what you have done and why you
have done it like that.
Sophie:	 The number that you put in is timesed by two, because
whether it's odd or even, fyou times it by two it will always
come out as an even number.
Researcher: Jenny, what have you done?
Jenny:	 Well, I've done the same as Sophie, really, but I've put add the
same number as you put in instead oftimesing it by two.
Researcher: Does it matter which you do?
Sophie:	 No.
Jenny:	 No.
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Episode 103: Construction strategies: non-interactive - F 4.2
In Task 4.2 Jenny wrote down the following:
toyoJ:h
op:h *3
end
She thought about this procedure, apparently verifying it mentally, and then changed
it to the following, without verifying the first procedure on the computer:
op:h*2+1
This she then validated empirically:
Jenny was using the computer as an extension of her working memory - as a kind of
note pad. Paper and pencil would very likely have served just as well.
Episode 27: Generalisation through construction, verification and discussion - F 4.3
In Task 4.2, Sophie produced the procedure
to pop :m
op :m * 2- 1
end
Jenny wrote the procedure
to yoi :h
op :h * 2 + 1
end
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After brief verification of the two procedures, the girls predicted what their friend's
procedure would be. Both predicted correctly:
Researcher: Can you say what Jenny's procedure does?
Sophie:	 Each time she c timesing by two and adding on one.
and
Researcher: What do you think Sophie has done, Jenny?
Jenny:	 I think she's timesing by two and taking one.
Jenny was now able to make a generalisation about functions which output odd
numbers:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Jenny:
Does it matter that they're different?
No.
No.
What do you have to do to make an odd number, then?
Well, fyou produce an even number, all you have to do is add
one or take one.
Construction, verification and discussion would appear to effect this generalisation.
Episode 28: Explanation structured by procedure construction - F 4.4
In Task 4.3 Jenny explained why her procedure
to yuck :e :s
op :e * 2 + :s * 2
end
always output an even number:
Jenny:
Researcher:
Sophie:
Researcher:
Jenny:
Because you're timesing it by two.
What are you timesing by two?
The two numbers that you put in.
And then?
Which makes them an even number and then you add both even
numbers which makes another even number.
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Episode 29: Formalism as a resource: expression of proof structured by procedure
construction - F 4.5
In Task 4.4, Sophie wrote
to zich :n :p
op :n * 2 - 1 + :p * 2 - 1
end
and Jenny wrote
to yach :e :s
op :e * 2 + 1 + :s * 2 + 1
end
The Researcher asked them to explain their procedures.
Jenny:	 I've done exactly the same as before, apart from I've put one
onto both of the even numbers to make them both odd
Researcher: So :e *2 + 1 is odd. What sort ofnumber does it come
out as?
Jenny:	 An even number.
Researcher: Why does it come out as an even number?
Jenny:	 Because odd p1 us odd equals even.
Researcher: That's true, but can you explain why that is true by looking at
that [the procedure]? [Pause] What does :e *2 make?
Jenny:	 Even.
Researcher: Can you go on?
Jenny:	 And so then you do :s *2 which makes another even and then
you p1 us them together which makes another even and then
you plus two to that and so that makes another even.
Jenny had proved that the sum of two odd number was even by consideration of her
procedure. Sophie was able to make a similar statement:
Sophie:	 It's exactly the same as Jenny's, exceptl've taken away one
instead ofadding one.
Researcher: So why does that one always come to an even number, then?
Sophie:	 Because it's just the same as the ones we did before with one
number, only it's got Iwo numbers.
Researcher: Again :n *2 will be even.
Sophie:	 So :p *2 will be even and then you're adding on another Iwo.
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Researcher: But you're taking away. Does that matter?
Sophie:	 No, because one add one is two, so you're just adding on
another even number.
Episode 30: Formalism as a resource - F 4.6
In Task 4.5 Sophie wrote the following procedure
to zuch :n :p
op :n*2+:p*2_1
end
and Jenny the following:
to yock :e :s
op :e * 2+1 + :8 * 2
end
Researcher: What sort ofnumber does that always come out to?
Jenny:	 An odd number.
Researcher: Can you say why?
Jenny: Because you've made your even number and then you've made
your odd number and when you do even add even it makes an
even and so :fyou do an even plus an odd - it will be taking one
or adding one - it will make it an odd
This is an interesting general description, incorporating as it did the two ides about
creating an odd number which had emerged over the course of the tasks in section
four. The Researcher led the girls towards making a generalisation:
Researcher: Where are the even bits and where are the odd bits in there?
[pointing to the procedure]
Jenny:	 Well thefirst bit's the odd bit. You times your number by two
and then you add the one, and then the second bit's the even bit
where you just times it by two.
Researcher: But fyou said :e *2 is even, that's an even bit.
Jenny:	 But I did that bit as the odd bit and I did that bit as the even
bit.
Researcher: Does it matter the order that you do it in?
Researcher: Let's have a look at Sophie's.
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Sophie:	 It's the same as Jenny's again, except thatl've got my even first
and my odd last.
Researcher: So, :f:n * 2 is even, :p * 2 is even aswell, isn't it? So
altogether, what part of that is even?
Sophie:	 All of it apart from the taking away ofthe one.
Researcher: So you could say that :n * 2 plus :p *2 is a great big even
chunk So it's like saying an even bit take away one, which of
course makes it odd.
The language of construction formed a common language in which Researcher and
pupils were able to discuss how the procedures worked.
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